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Summary 
The primary objective of this thesis is to contribute to the debate on the reasons 
behind Russia's poor economic performance in its first decade after the fall of 
communism, by examining the role of IMF economic programs in the reform process. 
In particular, we are interested in the failure of neo-classical models of the market 
economy, upon which economic reform programs were based, to predict the outcomes 
in Russia. The purpose of the work is to offer a number of theoretical models which 
incorporate certain characteristics, such as political and economic motivations of both 
the IMF and Russian government, large-scale public sector corruption, a substantial 
underground economy, and a weak tax base, and which are capable predicting the 
resulting failings in the IMF-Russia economic reform program. 
In chapter 2, we present a theory of conditionality in which the recipient, aware 
that the lender faces political and economic motivations in the conditional 
development lending process, undertakes a game with the lender in which the 
recipient attempts to undertake the least amount of compliance that guarantees it 
future loans. There is an exogenous conflict between economics and politics within 
the lending agency that determines its degree of tolerance for policy (non-) 
compliance. We then analyse how the donor, in an attempt to regulate its internal 
conflict, may adopt "rules of thumb" in the lending process which pre-define the 
actions it will take in response to the lender's level of compliance. The recipient's 
strategy depends on the payoffs it obtains from the actions available to the lender 
under each "rule of thumb". We examine how the IMF-Russia relationship from 
1992-2002 has elements of the games we model. 
In chapter 3, we model corruption a proportional tax on labour income in a 
three-sector economy with a corrupt bureaucracy, a legitimate private sector, and a 
shadow economy, and examine how tighter fiscal policies may result in a rise in 
corruption. The rise in corruption negatively affects legitimate private sector 
employment and output. We suggest that the Russian economy has a similar three- 
sector structure and analyse the impact of reduced spending and increased taxation on 
corruption and employment. 
In chapter 4, we modify Alesina and Tabellini's (1987) model of time 
inconsistency to allow for a weak tax base and then apply it to post-communist 
Russia. In particular we examine two non-consecutive time periods in which, for 
different reasons, public debt could not be used to finance the government's budget 
deficit: 1992-94 and post August 17 1998. We suggest that Russia did in fact move 
from one sub-optimal position to another, and we raise questions about the optimality 
of Russia's current monetary policies. 
In chapter 5, we examine the optimality of monetary policy in the presence of 
bureaucratic corruption. We model corruption as a proportional tax on firm revenue 
and a positive function of the official tax rate. The higher the official tax, the higher 
the corruption tax levied by public bureaucrats in order to supplement their decreasing 
official net wage, and the lower is output. We find that under both discretion and 
commitment, inflation is higher, and output and taxation are lower, than when there is 
no co1TUption. 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
With the fall of communism in December 1991, the Russian government began a 
program of reform to aid the transition to a market-based economy. Although the 
Russian authorities were given extensive political, financial and expert economic 
advice by western countries and international financial organisations, the reform 
program seemed beset by problems. 
The Russian government has battled long and hard with inflation which has been 
fuelled by excessive spending, soft budget constraints and credit creation by the 
central bank. Additionally, restructuring of former state-owned firms has proceeded 
slowly, the banking sector is in need of reform, the country still lacks a good social 
security system, and there are structural weakrusses in the regulatory, judicial, and tax 
systems. While unemployment has not risen by as much as was initially feared, the 
unemployment rates mask substantial inefficiencies in the capital and labour markets 
and highlight the unwillingness of employee-owned firms to restructure. Further- 
more, wage and payment arrears have grown, corruption has infiltrated all sectors of 
the Russian economy. and there has been a lack of progress on property rights. 
Output declined until 1997 when the economy showed positive growth of GDP for the 
first time since the reform process started. In 1998 output declined again mainly in 
response to the August 17 1998 ruble crisis, but has since recovered. 
Not all the reforms that Russia has undertaken have been unsuccessful. There was 
rapid price liberalisation and privatisation of state-owned industries, a value-added tax 
was successfully introduced early on, and there has been a growth in private sector 
employment. Structural change also took place with a shift from military to civilian 
output, an increase in the private retail market, and the development of the financial 
sector. There were also reforms of the exchange rate system, a successful 
introduction of the Treasury bill market in 1996, and trade liberalisation. 
The primary objective of this thesis is to contribute to the debate of the reasons 
behind Russia's poor economic performance in its first decade after the fall of 
communism by examining the role of IMF economic programs in the reform process. 
In particular, we are interested in the failure of neo-classical models of the market 
economy, upon which economic reform programs were based, to predict the outcomes 
in Russia. The purpose of the work is to offer a number of theoretical models which 
incorporate specific characteristics, such as the conflict between the political and 
economic motivations of both the lender (the IMF) and the recipient (the Russian 
government), large-scale public sector corruption, a substantial underground 
economy, and a weak tax base, and which are capable predicting the resulting failings 
in the IMF-Russia economic reform program. 
Recent economic crises, such as in Russia in August 1998, in Argentina in 2001, 
and in Brazil in 2002, have highlighted the large gap between the theory and practice 
of conditional development lending. Multilateral lending between international 
financial agencies and recipient `governments often involves conditionalit%': recipients 
have to undertake certain reforms to be eligible for (further) loans. While an extensive 
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literature evaluates the impact of policy conditionality, less attention has been paid to 
the theory of conditionality. Mosley (1992) models conditionality as a bargaining 
game between a recipient and a donor in which conditions are imposed by donors and 
accepted, usually unwillingly, by recipients. Mosley includes an exogenous 
parameter in the utility functions that symbolises the political cost to the recipient and 
the political benefit to the donor of compliance with the reform agenda. 
In fact, existing theories of conditionality such as Mosley's fail to characterise the 
relationship and predict the outcomes in the Russia-IMF relationship. Indeed, popular 
opinion in Russia suggests that the IMF bowed to political pressure to help Russia 
financially, without sound economic basis, relaxing its conditions when necessary, 
without regard for Russia's ability to pay back the loan under more relaxed conditions. 
Since Russia joined the IMF, the IMF has lent Russia several billions of dollars 
conditional on the achievement of certain macroeconomic and structural targets which 
Russia has consistently failed to achieve. 
Despite Russia's inability to achieve the targets set by the IMF, the IMF has 
continued to lend it money (albeit halting the loans for short periods of time) without 
fully addressing the reasons why Russia consistently fails to reach the targets. In 1999 
the IMF adopted a hard-line stance with Russia with respect to the last $3.4 billion 
loan under the extended Fund facility programme. There was much debate about 
what had caused the IMF to change its approach to Russia. 
One argument that has been put forward is that the IMF was acting on behalf of the 
United States, ensuring Russia complied with the United States' political, 
environmental and economic objectives. Others disagreed with this view. They 
suggested that the IMF was doing all it could to continue to lend money to Russia 
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without affecting its reputation. Whatever the reasons behind the I \1F's decision, 
Russia issued a Letter of Intent on July 13 1999 accepting IMF conditions. 
In chapter 2 we present a theory of conditionality to help bridge the gap between 
theory and practice in conditional development lending. We suggest that the donor 
faces an exogenous conflict between politics and economics within its own decision- 
making board about the circumstances under which further lending should proceed 
and that the recipient is, in fact, aware of the politics-economics split within the donor 
agency, and so there ensues a game in which the recipient attempts to undertake the 
least amount of compliance that will ensure it further finance and the donor 
undertakes a (punishment) strategy consistent with its own motivations. 
We model the game as a simple two-period game between the lender and the 
recipient, and solve for the subgame perfect Nash Equilibrium by backwards 
induction. This yields many possible equilibria, depending on the relative values of 
the parameters in the payoff functions. 
We then suggest that the donor, in an attempt to regulate the conflict within it, may 
adopt certain rules in an attempt to provide a framework within which lending 
decisions are made with some consistency. We identify three rules of thumb that the 
donor might adopt: no re-lending; reward only frill compliance; and leniency. For 
each rule, we solve for the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium by backwards 
induction. 
We show that in each case the recipient balances the economic costs associated 
with losing further finance against the immediate avoided political costs of non- 
compliance. The recipient's actual level of compliance is determined by factors that 
are specific to each rule. 
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We then examine whether the relationship between the INIF and Russia from 1992- 
2002 has elements of the game modelled. We find that at different periods, there are 
elements of the games that apply under the three rules. In particular, we suggest that 
the parameters of the game, which affected the internal conflict within the IMII=, 
shifted as Russia evolved into a market economy. 
In chapter 3, we model corruption as a proportional tax on labour income in a 
three-sector economy with a corrupt bureaucracy, a legitimate private sector, and a 
shadow economy, and examine how tighter fiscal policies, namely reduced 
expenditure and increased taxation, may result in a rise in corruption. The rise in 
corruption negatively affects legitimate private sector employment and output. 
We define the corruption effect as the negative impact of a rise in corruption on 
legitimate private sector employment and output. We find that in general the 
corruption effect of increased taxation exceeds that of reduced expenditure. However, 
if reduced spending results in public sector wage arrears then the corruption effect of 
reduced spending will exceed that of increased taxation. A crucial assumption is that 
corrupt bureaucrats will try to maintain a constant net wage. 
We suggest that the Russian economy has a similar three-sector structure and 
analyse whether the fiscal policies pursued by the Russian go\ernment resulted in a 
change in corruption which affected employment and output. Insufficient data makes 
an in depth empirical study of this chapter impossible. However we examine how the 
initial indications from the data support the results of our model. 
Chapter 3 helps explain Russia's poor economic performance during the 1990s. and 
raises questions about the optimal rate of tax in the presence of an unofficial tax on 
wages. That is, is the optimal rate of tax in a corrupt economy lower than that in a 
non-corrupt economy? While our results lend credence to the IMF's recent policies of 
"good governance", they suggest corruption should be rooted out before structural 
adjustment programs are undertaken to minimise the corruption effect. 
In chapter 4, we analyse the optimality of monetary policy in the presence of a 
weak tax base. We do so by modifying Alesina and Tabellini's (1987) model of time 
inconsistency to allow for a weak tax base and then applying it to post-communist 
Russia. In particular we examine two non-consecutive time periods in which, for 
different reasons, public debt could not be used to finance the government's budget 
deficit: 1992-94 and post-August 17th 1998. Alesina and Tabellini's basic model 
suggests that in both periods when policies were non-coordinated discretion was 
preferable to commitment. 
We suggest, however, that in the first period in Russia, an underlying assumption 
of the model was violated which meant commitment would have been preferable to 
discretion. Furthermore, in the second period when commitment to policies was 
undertaken, we suggest that the assumption was no longer being violated and 
therefore policies should have been discretionary. Thus Russia has moved from one 
sub-optimal position to another. In this chapter we also analyse how the causes of a 
weak tax base affect the choice between rules and discretion. The results of our 
model, while helping to explain Russia's relatively poor economic performance during 
key periods in the 1990s, suggests that in 1992-94 output did not fall as much as it 
would have under a committed central bank, and post August 17 1998, output is 
actually lower than optimal. 
In chapter 5, \\, c examine the optimality of monetary policy in the presence of 
bureaucratic comiption. We introduce an unofficial comiption tax into a time 
inconsistency model of monetary policy and examine the consequences for inflation, 
output, taNation and government expenditure of widespread bureaucratic corruption 
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under both committed and discretionary monetary policy. We model the corruption 
tax as a proportional tax on firm revenue and a positive function of the official tax 
rate. The higher the official tax, the higher the corruption tax levied by public 
bureaucrats in order to supplement their decreasing official net wage, and the lower is 
output. 
Our model shows that under both discretion and commitment, inflation is 
higher, and output and taxation are lower than in the case of no corruption. The 
higher inflation and lower tax rate only manage to mitigate part of the loss in output 
associated with corruption. As the corruption tax has a negative impact on output and 
rises as the official tax rate rises, we show that the output loss under commitment 
exceeds that under discretion because official tax rates are higher. 
Furthermore, under both discretion and commitment, the loss in output and the rise 
in inflation are less when preferences are coordinated than when they are not 
coordinated. We suggest that when preferences are not coordinated, discretion will be 
preferable to commitment as the gains from reduced inflation are far outweighed by 
the loss in output and government expenditure, and higher taxes. Both players, the 
fiscal authority and the central bank, are worse off under commitment. Thus, the 
movement from discretion to commitment is not a pareto improvement as at least one 
player is worse off. We go further and suggest that even when preferences are 
coordinated, discretion may be preferable to commitment as the gains from reduced 
inflation may be outweighed by the loss of output and government expenditure and 
higher taxes. At least one of the players, particularly the fiscal authority, may be 
worse off under commitment. 
We then look briefly at monetary policy in Russia from 1992-2002, which has 
been plagued by time inconsistencies. We suggest that one of the least nom ative 
results of our theoretical model, that corruption results in higher inflation and lower 
taxes, appears to hold in the Russian context. 
The implication of chapter 5 is that inflation-reduction in a corrupt economy has 
more severe consequences for output, inflation and government expenditure than in a 
non-corrupt economy. This model helps to explain why tighter monetary policies in 
many transition and developing countries often results in larger-than-expected output 
losses, higher-than- anticipated inflation, larger government budget deficits, and lower 
tax rates, and why it may be more difficult for such economies to stick to pre-agreed 
targets for fiscal and monetary policy. 
In chapter 6 we present the conclusions of our work and discuss prospective future 
research. We also discuss the consensus that neither Russia nor the IMF is to blame 
for the failure of reforms. After seventy years of central planning and huge market 
distortions, it was not possible to reform the economy in the short- or medium-term. 
Russia inherited a large budget deficit, low foreign exchange reserves, a collapse of 
trade with former Soviet republics, and loss-making public enterprises. Furthermore, 
Russia had little experience of private ownership and little exposure to the free market 
system. The IMF has admitted that the legacy of central planning has contributed to 
the failure of reforms in Russia. M. Camdessus, the former Managing Director of the 
IMF, suggests that the failure results from "70 years of central planning and the 
incomplete implementation of reform policies- itself a result of a lack of domestic 
political consensus on reform" (Camdessus, September 13,1999). To make matters 
more difficult, Russia has had to build a democracy from scratch which is a major 
undertaking at any time and has greatly retarded the reform process. 
s 
Chapter 2 
A Theory of Conditionality 
2.1. Introduction 
Multilateral lending between international lending agencies and recipient 
governments often involves conditionality: recipients have to undertake certain 
reforms to be eligible for (further) loans. While the conditions, type and amount of 
loan varies across countries, the multilateral lending process has some common 
characteristics (some of the points below are raised by Mosley, 1987; Mosley, 
I larrigan and Toye, 1991; Mosley, 1992): 
(l) No collateral is demanded by the lender 
(2) The lender imposes policy conditions 
(a) as a substitute for collateral to increase the probability of repayment 
(h) to promote economic development to a more capitalist-based econonly, 
usually MN involving the removal of a protective shield against market forces such 
as exchange controls, import licensing, price controls or food subsidies 
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(c) increasingly, to encourage political development to a more democratic 
system, and also to promote "good governance" in light of recent high-profile 
corruption scandals (for example, in Russia in 1999) 
(3) The recipient may be tempted to renege on its promises to comply with conditions 
because there are: 
(a) political costs for the recipient government 
Drazen (2000) suggests that countries face the following political 
constraints in implementing reforms: opposition to reform/ vested 
interests/ heterogeneity of voters; uncertainty, incomplete information 
and/ or asymmetric information, time inconsistency problems 
especially where there is majority rule and asymmetric information; 
and the degree of complementarity of reforms. 
(b) economic costs for the recipient government 
Drazen suggests the following economic constraints: unavailability of 
capital to implement reforms; delay in implementing some welfare- 
improving policies may make it optimal to postpone the removal of 
other distortions even though immediate removal of these distortions is 
economically feasible: and significant economic problems related to 
incomplete information about the post-reform environment (for 
example, risk aversion). 
(c) lags between implementation and results 
lag between the implementation of a reform programme and the 
emergence of concrete empirical results from implementation may 
provide incentives for the recipient to mislead the donor about whether 
he has implemented the reform programme. In practice, l\IF policies 
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and targets are often macroeconomic, and non-compliance can be 
picked up in a matter of months. 
Thus the decision to implement conditions, like the decision to repay a loan, is 
therefore subject to moral hazard. 
(4) Lenders can punish breach of conditionality by refusal of further credit. In fact, 
non-compliance, and its associated moral hazard problem, can be minimised by 
releasing the loan in instalments or tranches. Indeed, the IMF usually delivers loans 
in tranches, each tranche conditional both on success in attaining the required 
economic targets in the previous period(s), and the commitment to future reforms. 
In this chapter, we discuss how the recipient government may avoid full 
implementation of conditions without jeopardising future loans by playing a strategic 
game with the donor. 
During conditional development lending, especially in the case of Russia, the 
IMF has released further tranches without the attainment of prior targets. We suggest 
that this is the result of a fourth feature of conditional development lending that may 
tempt the recipient to renege on its promises to comply with conditions, and which 
cannot be resolved by releasing the loans in tranches. We suggest that the recipient is, 
in fact, aware that the donor is motivated not just by economic considerations but by 
its own political interests in the conditional development lending process, and that 
these political incentives are a factor in determining the donor's degree of tolerance of 
non- compliance with economic reform programmes. Thus there ensues a game in 
which the recipient, aware that the donor has political motivations, attempts to 
undertake the least level of compliance that guarantees it future loans, and the donor 
adopts a punishment strategy consistent with its o\\1n political and economic 
motivations. 
The political motivations of lenders stem from a number of factors. For 
instance, donor agencies, such as the IMF, are controlled by the Board of Governors 
which consists of representatives of the member countries. These representatkes 
protect the economic and political interests of their countries. Thus is hardly 
surprising that on occasion, political motivations may conflict with economic ones. 
For example, it is the assertion of this chapter, and thesis as a whole, that the IMF 
continued to lend to Russia without sound economic basis because it was a political 
objective of IMF member countries, such as the USA and the UK, to eradicate 
communism from the former USSR. 
In some cases, the donor invests part of its reputation in the economic and 
political reform of the recipient country, and this makes it politically costly for the 
donor to acknowledge that the recipient has failed to comply with conditions. 
More recently, the rise in anti-globalisation protestors has made donor 
agencies want to appear accountable. 
We model the game between the recipient and donor in section 2.3, in which 
the recipient chooses its level of compliance with policy conditions and the donor 
decides whether or not to extend further financing. We solve for the subgame perfect 
Nash equilibrium. 
We find that the lender's decision to refinance depends not only on the 
recipient's lc\cl of compliance, but also on a trade-off between the economic gains 
from mthholding further loans (as the loans can be reallocated elsewhere) \ crsus the 
political costs of mthholding finance. The recipient's choice of compliance lc\ el 
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depends on the likelihood of receiving further finance and on a trade-off between the 
economic gains of compliance (more loans) versus the political costs of compliance 
(within the recipient's country) 
We go on to propose three rules of thumb that a lender might adopt. because 
of its internal conflicts, in an attempt to regulate these conflicts. The three rules of 
thumb are: No Re-lending; Reward Only Full Compliance; and Lenicnca-'. The 
recipient considers the relevant rule of thumb, and undertakes the necessary amount 
of compliance to maximise its payoff function. We discuss the types of situations 
under which each rule of thumb might be adopted, and how the rules of thumb change 
in response to shifts in the parameters in the utility functions. 
The model differs from existing theories in explicitly allowing the lender and 
recipient to face a trade-off between political and economic interests within their 
organisations which affect the degree of slippage or the tolerance of policy slippages. 
Furthermore, the adoption of "rules of thumb" allows the donor to behave differently 
to two countries that implement the same proportion of required conditions, or to one 
country which implements the same proportion of required conditions over two 
different time periods. 
In effect, this model helps to bridge the large gap between theory and practice 
in conditional development lending which was highlighted by the attitude of the IMF 
and other donor agencies to post-Soviet Russia. Indeed, existing literature on theories 
of conditionality fail to characterise the relationship and predict the outcomes in the 
Russia-IMF relationship. 
The chapter is organised as follows. In section 2.2 we examine the current 
theoretical literature. The simple static two-person twwo-period game is developed in 
section ?. ý. In section 2.4 x\c analyse how the relationship between Russia and the 
1' 
IMF from 1992-2002 displayed aspects of the game developed in section 1.3. Section 
2.5 discusses the limitations of, and possible extensions to. the model. Section 2.6 
concludes. 
2.2 Current Theoretical Literature 
An extensive literature evaluates the impact of policy conditionality, but much 
less attention has been paid to the theory of conditionality. 
Mosley (1987,1992) models conditionality as a static bargaining game 
between a recipient and a donor in which conditions are imposed by donors and 
accepted, usually unwillingly, by recipients. He ascribes only economic objectives to 
the donor except for an exogenous parameter that indicates the subjective utility 
attached by the donor to one extra condition negotiated with the recipient and solves 
for the Nash equilibrium. 
White and Morrissey (1997) provide a framework for examining 
conditionality in which recipients may wish to execute economic reforms, and need 
financial assistance to do so, but are unable to implement all conditions. Howcver, 
White and Morrissey too ascribe only economic objectives to the donor. Eaton et a!. 
(1986) and Anderson et al. (1989) analyse the enforcement of debt service by the 
World Bank within a game-theoretic framework. They show that conditionality 
strengthens enforcement: a result that merely describes one of the functions of 
conditionality rather than the theory of conditionality. Killick (1995,1996) evaluates 
the e//t'ct vc'nc's.,; of policy conditionality in a principal-agent framework in which the 
recipients (the agents) implement conditions desired by the donors (the principals). 
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2.3 Simple Two-Person Two-Period Game 
The relationship between the recipient government and a lender has elements 
of a game: players, strategies, and payoffs which are contingent on the actions of all 
the players in the game. 
There are two players: the recipient government and the lending organisation. 
Mosley (1992) divides the conditionality game into three periods. 
(1) An initial negotiating process (Act 1) in which donor and recipient try to 
agree on the conditions that are to be attached to a development loan. 
(2) An implementation process (Act 2) in which the recipient decides how far 
to honour the promises it made during Act 1. The recipient has two strategies: "total 
compliance" or "partial/zero compliance". 
(3) A response by the donor in the following period consisting of a decision to 
grant or refuse further finance to the recipient in light of the recipient's performance 
during Act 2. The donor has two strategies: "full finance" or " no finance". 
The model to be developed in this chapter concentrates on the game that takes 
place in Acts 2 and 3 of Mosley's model (henceforth periods 1 and 2). 
In period 1 the recipient decides how far to honour the conditions that have 
been imposed by (or agreed with) the donor. That is, the recipient fulfils p, V of 
conditions, where N is the total number of conditions and p(0 <_ p <_ 1) is the 
proportion of conditions fulfilled (the recipient's compliance). We ascribe two 
possible strategies to the recipient: comply, and default. 
With the strategy of compliance, the recipient fulfils all the conditions. 
political and economic, that are attached to the loan. With the strategy of def wltin -. 
the recipient fulfils some, or none, of the conditions that are attached to the loan. 
I5 
The recipient's choice of level of compliance (p) depends on his assessment 
of the donor's tolerance of non-compliance in the next period and the payoffs that 
accrue from his decision. Given the political costs (a) to the recipient of policy 
compliance, the recipient aims to undertake the least amount of compliance that will 
guarantee it future loans. 
In period 2, the lender decides whether to extend financing in the forni of 
another loan/ tranche, and provides further loans to a non-compliant recipient with a 
probability of y. The lender has two options, or strategies, in this period. These are: 
re-lend, and withhold, further finance. 
With the strategy of re-lending, the donor extends the loan to the recipient in 
the second period. With the strategy of withholding ,f ti-ther 
finance, the donor 
extends no loans to the recipient in the next period. 
The donor and recipient face different payoff functions. 
P1 'Of% to iiic rL'C'1/)ieflt 
The payoff received by the recipient is given by: 
Y6L'+' 1ý a) 
where: 
L` is the value of the loan obtained from the donor for the first period 
L'+' is the loan the recipient expects to receive in the second period 
y is the probability that the recipient will receive further finance, `iven non- 
compliance 
is the discount factor. c5 = l+r where 
r is the rate of interest 
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p is the weight the recipient attaches to the fulfilment of the conditions, 0! 5 p<1, 
and represents the proportion of conditions to be fulfilled 
a represents the political cost to the recipient of complying with the donor's 
conditions. 
The utility of a recipient depends positively on loans, but negatively on the 
number of conditions attached to the loan. For each strategy s; the utility function is 
linear and of the form: 
U= L' +y6L'+" _ pcEV r 
N does not vary across strategies. Let L` = L+' =1 for simplicity. The utility 
function can then be written as: 
U; =1+ yS- pcW 
Payoff to the lciuk'r 
The payoff received by the lender is given by: 
Uj-. f (6 Lt+I p, ß ýl 
where: 
L'+' is the value of the loan the donor is to give to the recipient in period 2 
13 represents the political benefit to the donor of compliance with the donor's 
conditions 
7r represents the political costs of withholding finance 
There is a positive gain to the lender of the recipient's compliance of 
pß3V, for 1>p>0. If the lender withholds further financing, there is a positive gain 
to lender equal to the discounted value of the second tranche that can now be 
reallocated clse\vhcre; it is like a free good. However, in this case, the lender st ill pa\ 
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a political price that arises from its (exogenous) internal political conflicts: a high 
price equal to it if the lender fails to reward full compliance, or a lower price equal to 
pic if the lender is recognised to be legitimately punishing the recipient's non- 
compliance. 
Thus the utility of a donor depends positively on compliance, positively on 
loans it can reallocate elsewhere, and negatively on the political costs it faces for not 
granting further finance. For each strategy si the utility function is of the form: 
Uj = p/3N; for l >_ p >_ 0 if the lender re-lends 
and Uj = p13N +6- pir; for I >_ p >- 0 if the lender withholds finance. 
Payoffs for each combination of strategies 
The payoffs to each player can then be computed for each combination of 
strategies chosen by it and the other player. Let it, 
(s,, 
sj) be the payoff to the 
recipient (player 1) as a function of the strategies chosen by both players. Let 
u, 
(s1, 
sj) be the payoff to the lender (player 2) as a function of the strategies chosen 
by both players. This is shown in the diagram below: 
Figure 2.1: The extended form of the game with payoffs 
Recipient 
V 
Complies Defaults 
V 
Lender Lender 
\/\ 
Re-lends Withholds Re-lends Withholds 
I. II. III. Iý 
R: 1+ cS - a, V R: 1- aN' 
R: 1+ (5 - paA R: 1- pa, V 
L: 8. V L: 6 +, 8 iV -7r L: /) [3. x' L: ö+ý, ß ý' - ýýJr 
is 
We solve for the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium by backwards induction. 
Firstly, we consider the lender's payoffs and strategies. 
I. If the recipient complies fully and 8N >8 +ßN -7r, i. e. 6< 7r, the lender will re- 
lend. 
II. Even if the recipient complies fully and 8 >fr, the lender will withhold financing. 
III. Even if the recipient defaults and p ON >6+p , 
8N - pic, i. e. 8< pir, , the 
lender 
will re-lend. 
IV. If the recipient defaults and 6> pir, the lender will withhold financing. 
Secondly, we consider the recipient's payoffs and strategies, given the 
strategies of the lender. 
A. If 6> it the lender will always withhold, and as 1- paN > 1- aN the recipient 
will always default. 
B. If it >6> pir, the lender will only withhold in cases of non-compliance, and the 
recipient will choose to comply if 1+6- aN > 1- paN, i. e. 6> 
(1 
-p 
)aN 
. 
C. If 8< pir, the lender will re-lend to a non-compliant recipient, and the recipient 
will choose to comply only if 1+6- aN >1+ yS - paN , 
i. e. S>3a. 
1-y 
This can be illustrated as follows: 
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Figure 2.2: A summary of the equilibria of the two-period game 
Discount factor ((5 ) 
7r 
Pit 
R: Default. L: Withhold 
R' Comply if U> (I - p)aW. L: Re-lend only if compliant 
R: Comply. L: Re-Lend 
even if non-compliant a_'`' 
ý -Y 
(1-p)"aN 
R: Default. L: Re-Lend even if non-compliant 
Lender's re-financing propensity (y 1 
An area of particular interest is that below the curve (S =1 
ýý 
a. V where the 1-y 
recipient does not comply and the lender re-lends. 
The internal conflict the lender faces affects the values of ß, Ir, und h. In the 
case of Russia and the IMF, the internal conflict, and hence these parameters, shifted 
as Russia evolved into a market economy - for example, the political cost ýr of 
withholding finance lessened as the threat of Russia reverting to Communism 
diminished. 
We propose that a lender may attempt to create rules under which lending 
decisions are made to regulate the internal conflict and to pro,, ide a coherent and 
consistent lending policy. These rules are decided in an exogenous conflict between 
politics and economics that takes place within the donor agency as to the 
circumstances under which punishment is levied. This conflict, in e/lcc r, 
determines 
the donor's degree of tolerance for policy slippages and helps f\ the value of z in 
relation to c) . 
In Section 2.4 we suggest that from 199-1-2002, as the Russian 
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economy evolved more and more towards a market economy, there were distinct 
shifts in these parameters (and hence the rules) in response to particular actions by the 
Russian We suggest three main types of rules that arise from the politics-economics 
split within the donor agency. The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for each type of 
rule is solved by backward induction 
Rule (1): No Re-lending (S > ir) 
No level of compliance is sufficient to ensure further financing. This rule 
corresponds to the top tier of diagram 2.2. Here, the issue is not so much just about 
the economic conditions in the recipient country but also about the political 
conditions. Perhaps, a recent coup d'etat has ushered in a government deemed to be 
undesirable by the donor agency and the international community at large. 
Alternatively, perhaps a democratically elected government is deemed to be 
undertaking human rights abuses and is therefore not a "suitable" recipient of loans. 
In Section 2.4 we suggest that the IMF adopted a 'no re-lending' policy with respect to 
Russia between the end of September 1999 (when funding ývas withdrawn for alleged 
misuse of funds) and December 31 st 1999 (when President Yeltsin resigned). 
The extended game with payoffs is given below. 
Figure 2.3: The extended form game for Rule 1 
Recipient 
V 
Complies Defaults 
V 
Lender Lender 
Re-lends Withholds Re-lends Withholds 
Il. Iv. 
R: I-aN R: 1-\ 
+, 8N-7r L: 6 -- /)ß, \' - lnr 
The lender always chooses to withhold further finance. and as 
1- pocN > 1- aN (for p< l ), the recipient will always default on the conditions 
attached to the loan. 
This rule of thumb also seems to have been applied to Pakistan's military 
government (led by Colonel Musharraf) before September 11,2001. The 
international community pressed for a return to democracy and withheld aid and loans 
to Pakistan. After the terrorist attacks of September 11th in America, this same 
military government was now deemed to be a worthwhile "ally" and full loans and aid 
were resumed to Pakistan without any change in the domestic economic conditions. 
Result 1: 
The equilibrium for the rule "no re-lending" is default, withhold. That is, thc 
lender will always choose to withhold f ur-ther finance and the recipient will 
always choose to default. 
Rule (? ): Reward on/i' full compliance (ir >6> pir) 
The lender has no tolerance for policy slippages, and will punish any deviation 
from a full compliance strategy on the part of the recipient. This rule corresponds to 
the middle tier of diagram 2.2. 
There could be a variety of reasons for this strategy: the donor clearly 
maintains an economic and political interest in the country concerned, and yct 
punishes any slippage in policies. This stance corresponds to a "harsh parent" stance, 
in which a Seemingly errant "child" (the recipient `overnmcnt) is kept in line with a 
vcr ' short leash. 
, AX donor that acts 
like this may be adopting a particularly strict political stance 
with respect to this countr\', perhaps because 
it is not co-operating on key' 
ýý 
international political/ human rights agreements. In section 2.4 we discuss how the 
IMF's adoption of an unusually hard line stance with Russia in 1999 with respect to 
the last $3.4 billion loan under the extended Fund facility programme, led to much 
debate about the IMF's political motivations. 
The extended game with payoffs that relate to this particular game is given 
below. 
Figure 2.4: The extended form game for Rule 2 
Recipient 
V 
Complies Defaults 
V 
Lender Lender 
\/\ 
Re-lends Withholds Re-lends Withholds 
I. [V. 
R: 1+ö-aN R: 1-paA' 
L: 8N L: 6 +pf3N-p7r 
There are two equilibria: comply, re-lend; and default, withhold. The recipient 
will choose to comply if 1+ 6- aN >I -paN, that is, if 
6> (1- p kx% . In which 
case the lender will offer further finance. If 6< 
(1- p)a\', the recipient will renege 
on its promises to comply with conditions, and the 
lender will withhold further 
finance. 
Result 2: 
1/ the donor has a "re%tard ortll 1ri// contpliurtce" ride about 
fiirthc'r linurtrirrýý. 
t/tc' rc'cipic'nt n ill choosc to be fiilh" compliant i/ thc value col c/isc. "ountc'cl 
future 
ýý 
loans are of greater benefit to it than the immediate political benefits of non- 
compliance, and will choose to be non-compliant if not. If the recipient is ful v 
compliant, the donor will offer further finance. If the recipient is non- 
compliant, the donor will withhold further finance. 
Rule (3): Leniency (5 < pir) 
The donor has tolerance for policy slippages depending on the circumstances 
of the recipient country. Unlike with Rules (1) and (2), there is the possibility (y) of 
receiving further finance for non-compliance. . This rule corresponds to the 
bottom 
tier of diagram 2.2. 
In Section 2.4 we discuss how the IMF's continuous lending to Russia from 
1992-1998, despite serious policy slippages, seemed overly generous and driven by 
politics rather than economics. 
The extended game with payoffs that relate to this particular game is given 
below. 
Figure 2.5: The extended form game for Rule 3 
Recipient 
V 
Complies Defaults 
V 
Lender Lender 
\/\ 
Re-lends Withholds Re-lends Withholds 
L III. IV. 
R: 1+ 6- aA' 
R: 1+ yS - pa, `' R: 1- pa, V 
L: 13 . x' L: pßA' 
L: 6- pß"ß - per 
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The equilibria depend on the relative values of the parameters in the payoff functions. 
If S>1p" aN, the recipient is compliant and the lender offers re-finance. If 1-Y 
6<1pl 
-Y 
- aV, the recipient is non-compliant, and the lender offers re-finance with a 
probability of y. 
Result 3: 
If the donor punishes recipients who implement less than 100"ö of the 
conditions attached to the loan with a probability of 1- y, their the recipient 
will choose to fully comply with conditions as long as value of discomitc'd 
future loans exceeds the immediate political gain from police' slippage. If the 
gain from policy slippage exceeds the cost associated with the loss o/further 
. 
finance, the recipient will be non-compliant. Thc recipienit'. s choice ?f 
compliance' level depends on the discount rate attached to thc future loan, the 
political costs of compliance, and on the /)rohahilitY of piiiti. ti'hnic'nt. 
2.4 The Game between the IMF and Russia: 1992-2002 
The Players 
The Russian Government/ Authorities 
In July 1991 the Soviet Union applied for associate membership of the IMF. 
This would zivc it access to technical advice but not financial assistance. One week 
later the Soviet Union applied to 1MF for full membership. This caused some debate 
about what tvpc of membership to afford Russia. The Economist (3 August. 1991 ) 
suggested that the 
American 
`government was 
the biggest opponent of ýerantin`u, 
the 
-'S 
Soviet Union full membership. The American government argued that associate 
status could be granted in one month, but full membership could take years (although 
applications from Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria were approved in 9 months). 
Furthermore, they argued that the Soviet Union should first move further towards a 
market economy and a convertible currency (but the IMF only requires a commitment 
to move towards currency convertibility). 
The Economist analysed the reasons are behind America's reluctance to grant 
the Soviet Union full membership. It noted that the IMF had increased its quotas by 
50% to meet the increased demand for capital from Eastern Europe and Latin 
America. However, the American Congress was reluctant to provide the money. In 
general, any increase in quotas has to be approved by the governments of member 
countries. A vote with at least 85% of total quotas is required to ratify any increase in 
quotas. America's vote (at that time about 20% of total quotas) was therefore crucial, 
and Congress was less likely to provide the money if the Soviet Union was allowed to 
borrow from the IMF. Another reason behind America's reluctance to provide the 
Soviet Union with full membership, reasoned the Economist, was that assessing the 
Soviet Union's quota will be problematic and complicated. In addition it was likely 
that this would upset the balance of power on the Executive Board. 
However the Economist concluded that the vote for Soviet Union membership 
(after all the relevant data has been collected, the quota calculated, and the conditions 
for membership considered) would be by a simple majority - America could not block 
Soviet membership on its own. 
On October 5 1991, the IMF and the USSR established a Special Association 
(this temporary anrangement allowed I%IF policy advice and technical assistance to be 
made immediately available to the USSR). Between November 1991 and April 1992 
26 
the IMF undertook pre-membership economic reviews of all the 15 states of the 
former USSR. The USSR officially broke up on 25th December 1991, five days 
before the 69th anniversary of the founding of the Soviet Union. Russia was accepted 
as a member of the IMF in April 1992, allowing it to qualify for substantial loans 
from the IMF conditional on certain reforms. 
The International Monetary Fund 
The purpose of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) is to "promote 
international monetary co-operation, to facilitate the expansion and balanced growth 
of international trade, to promote exchange rate stability, to assist in the elimination of 
trade restrictions and the establishment of a multilateral system of payments, to give 
financial assistance, and to reduce imbalances in the international balances of 
payments of member countries" (Article 1 of the Articles of Agreements). 
The IMF fulfils its responsibilities by regularly surveying the domestic and 
external situation of member countries, providing technical and financial assistance to 
countries when requested, and making the availability of its financial resources to a 
country conditional on the implementation of appropriate adjustment policies (to 
reduce moral hazard). 
The IMF exercises surveillance in two main ways. Firstly, members of staff 
meet regularly with the authorities of each member country to gather current 
economic and financial information and to review economic policies and 
developments. The nature of these consultations depends on characteristics of 
member countries and on the current external economic situation. The staff papers 
are discussed by the I NIF's permanent decision-making body, the Executive Board 
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(henceforth, the Board). The Board is composed of 24 Directors who are appointed 
by member countries or are elected by groups of countries. 
Secondly, there are regular discussions by the Board on the outlook of the 
world economy. The World Economic Outlook is published twice a year b`v the 
International Monetary Fund and forms the basis of regular reviews by the Board and 
Interim Committee on the economic policies of member countries and their effects on 
the nternational monetary system. The Interim Committee is composed of the 24 
members of the Executive Board and meets twice yearly to decide IMF policy. 
The IMF is vulnerable to political bias because the USA and other major 
donor governments on the IMF's decision-making boards are a major influence on 
IMF lending decisions, and the IMF's shareholders are effectively also its clients. 
Additionally, the IMF does need to (a) get its money back to establish and maintain its 
reputation as a 'fable international financial institution, and (b) continue to lend to 
ensure profit. Furthermore, the severe economic and social costs that arise from the 
IMF's reform policies require that the IMF remain supportive towards reforming 
governments to ensure that they continue with reform (and to ensure that the IMF gets 
its money back). The rise in anti-globalisation protestors in recent years has raised 
questions about the conduct of donor agencies in developing/ emerging markets. 
Until recently, the IMF only took the attainment of economic targets into 
account when deciding whether or not disburse further loans. However, the 
proliferation of corruption in many societies has for a long time, become of 
increasing 
concern to the donor community. The IMF has begun to make loans conditional not 
only on certain c'cononlic reforms but also on certain political ones. 
That is, the 
"basic soundness of government institutions with which they are 
dealing" (Rajghatta, 
1997). In 1997 the IMF adopted new guidelines allowing it to withhold aid to 
2 
countries where it believes corruption is so widespread as to harm the I `l F's goals of 
economic recovery. In particular, "financial assistance from the INIF.... could be 
suspended or delayed on account of poor governance.. . 
if there is reason to believe it 
could have significant macroeconomic implications that threaten the successful 
implementation of the program, or puts in doubt the purpose of the use of IMF 
resources" (Rajghatta, 1997). 
There are a number of financial arrangements that the IMF can make with 
member countries. In general, loans from the IMF depend on the problems facing the 
country and on the degree of conditionality that is attached to the loans. ' Types of 
financial assistance include a stand-by arrangement (mainly for short-term problems), 
structural adjustment facility (SAF) (medium term problems), and more recently the 
systemic tran. 5formation, facility (STF). The STF is a temporary financial facility to 
help the transition process from central planning to a market based economy. Certain 
conditions are attached to the STF. Not only must the country provide a written 
statement of its policy objectives and measures to be used to accomplish these 
objectives, it must also undertake significant policy actions prior to the receipt of the 
loan. In addition it must agree not to raise trading barriers and to allow currency 
convertibility. 
Strategies, Payoffs, and The Game 
Since Russia joined the IMF, the IMF has lent Russia several billions of 
dollars conditional on the achievement of certain macroeconomic and structural 
targets which Russia has consistently failed to achieve. Despite Russia's 
inability to 
achieve the targets set by the IMF, the IMF has continued to lend 
it money (albeit 
(iuitian (1995) analyses IN1F conditionality since the 1940s. 
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halting the loans for short periods of time). For example, The Economist (26 March 
1994) notes that in 1993/94 Russia fell far short of its macroeconomic targets: for 
example the monthly inflation rate was 12% instead of 8% at the end of December 
1993. And yet the IMF agreed to release S1.5 billion systematic transformation 
facility (STF) to Russia. The Economist asks whether the IMF bowed to political 
pressure. 
Russia's failure to implement or to adhere to reforms was acknowledged 
officially by Russia in 1999 in a Letter of Intent from the Russian government and the 
central bank of Russia in connection with the economic crisis of August 1998: 
We readily acknowledge that these fundamental elements of the crisis 
reflect, in part, the fact that implementation of the government's 
economic program, over the past several years, has been incomplete. 
Further, in certain respects, weak implementation has served to worsen 
structural problems. In particular, the inability of the government to 
enforce cash payment of statutory tax liabilities and to pay its own bills 
in a timely fashion has played a significant role in the spread of the 
nonpayment problem. Moreover, potential benefits from reforms, 
most significantly privatization, have been diminished owing to the 
absence of transparency in the process and a failure to ensure that 
economic gains were broadly distributed among the population, and 
this has served to dampen public support for the reform process in 
general. 
Russia, the IMF and other commentators have blamed Russia's failure on a 
number of factors including: a lack of strong leadership, an opposition-dominated 
parliament, political blockages (Skidelsky and Clark 1998) and powerful interest 
groups (Polushchuk (1998)); corruption; and worker-controlled firms (Blanchard 
1997). 
3() 
While we agree that the factors above did contribute to lower Russia's ability 
to comply with conditions, we suggest that this is not enough of an explanation. We 
suggest that, as in our model in section 2.3, Russia's awareness of the IMF's political 
intentions and interests in the country made it also aware that the possibility of 
punishment (1- y) was low. In fact, prior to 1998, we would postulate that y -* 1. 
For example, the IMF Annual Report (1995) noted that in Russia output continued to 
decline precariously. It admitted that slippages in policy had exacerbated the decline 
in output, jeopardised the credibility of reform efforts, and created an uncertain 
investment climate. In addition, the conflict in Chechnya from December 1994, which 
was much criticised by world leaders and organisations, added pressures to an already 
difficult fiscal position. And yet, the IMF sanctioned more loans. 
The following year, in the World Economic Outlook (1996) the IMF noted 
that a key concern for the Russian economy was inflation and weaknesses in 
government finances continued to be a cause for concern. The government deficit had 
been reduced through a reduction in expenditures but revenue performance was poor 
because of the lack of reform of the tax system. 
In late October and November 1997, and in late January 1998, spillovers from 
the Asian crisis contributed to the attack on the ruble. The authorities defended the 
exchange rate by raising interest rates sharply. This was associated with steep 
declines in the stock market. The external current account was close to balance but 
the weak fiscal position characterised by poor revenue collection, and a decline in oil 
prices further weakened Russia's position. Yet in May 1998, the INIF's management 
outlined the conditions for a loan of S670 million about to be released to Russia on 
completion of a review by the Executive Board (IMF, May 1990. It stressed fiscal 
balance, firm monetary control and continued progress with structural reforms as 
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important for stronger economic growth and lower inflation, and strongly 
recommended that Russia should avoid devaluing the ruble. The IMF suggested that 
this would re-establish confidence in the ruble and hence financial stabil itv. 
However, the attack on the ruble continued. On August 17 the Russian 
authorities announced a number of emergency measures to deal with the growing loss 
of investor confidence in the country's fiscal and international payments position. 
These included a devaluation of the ruble (without supportive macroeconomic 
policies), a unilateral restructuring of public debt, and a 90-day moratorium on foreign 
credit repayments. 
This marked a turning point in the attitude of the IMF towards Russia, and 
there was a noticeable reduction in its tolerance for non-compliance with policy 
conditions. 
We postulate that up till August 17th 1998 the relationship between the IMF 
and Russia corresponded to the game that takes place in section 2.3 under Rulc 3 
(Ienieiicv) where the probability of punishment, 1- y, is very low. 
Then, from August 18th 1998 the IMF seemed to adopt Rule 2 (Rceward on/v 
firll compliance'). In early 1999, a framework for a new program of policies was 
agreed between Russia and the IMF. Then, in mid-1999 the IMF adopted a hard-line 
stance with Russia with respect to the last S3.4 billion loan under the extended Fund 
facility programme. Conditions included restructuring the banking system and 
restructuring budget arrears. The Russian government thought that the [NIF would, 
once again. lend it money without evidence that the conditions of the loans were 
being carried out. In fact, Russian government officials made statements to the effect 
that the INIF had no choice but to extend loans to Russia, if only to repay Russia',, 
debt to the INIF itself. But the IMF continued to adopt its new stance. Camde. us iIS 
;ý 
reported to have stated that "It would be a disservice to Russia to make them loans on 
complacent terms. We will not do that". 2 This unusual hard-line stance lead to much 
debate. What had caused the IMF to change its approach to Russia? 
One argument is that the IMF was acting on behalf of the United States. The 
IMF's economic demands apparently coincided with pressure from America for 
Russia to "speed ratification of the START II Treaty, soften its positions on Kosovo 
and Iraq, curtail its cooperation with Iran in the field of nuclear power, and curb its 
activities in the arms markets of China, India, Syria, and other countries". 3 This was a 
popular view taken by the Soviet press. In previous stalled negotiations between the 
IMF and Russia the U. S. always stepped in to resolve difficult issues. This time, the 
U. S. was keeping quiet, allowing the IMF to dig its heels in. This caused many 
questions to be asked. Kucherenko (March 4,1999) summarises the dilemma: 
The Fund voiced no objections when our reformers began building a 
pyramid of debt that was obviously going to end in disaster, dooming 
our nation's financial system to collapse. Year after year it ignored the 
payments problem and the insufficient supply of rubles, which led to a 
situation in which government short-term bonds (GKO's) utterly 
consumed the federal budget. It was unfazed by the whole misshapen 
structure of Russia's "pre-August" economy, which was based on 
altogether barren, speculative transactions. It was likewise unfazed by 
the utter chaos that reigned in our tax collection system. Finally, the 
IMF was perfectly aware of preparations for the Aug. 17 crash.......... 
For the first time, tax collection totals for January exceeded the figures 
for December. But the IMF refuses to acknowledge this. Which is 
strange, and seemingly illogical: When taxes were being collected with 
far less success, the IMF was pleased with us. The moment we make 
some progress in this area, we're told we're incapable of collecting 
taxes.... 
2 Reported by Ulyanova, March 3,1999 
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Officially, the IMF is not making any political demands. At the same 
time, however, its demands are being made against a backdrop of 
certain events. The US is currently putting tremendous pressure on 
Russia..... 
Others disagreed with this argument. They suggested that the IMF was 
"bending over backwards to find a new way to make loans to Russia without losing 
face on account of any excessively flagrant violation of the Fund's rules and operating 
principles" (Latsis, March 4,1999). 
Other commentators pointed out that it was actually Russia who would benefit 
the most from a proper budget, not the IMF, and as such it was in Russia's interests to 
accept and implement IMF conditions. 
Another view suggested that the government's opposition had brewed an 
unnecessary storm over its negotiations with the IMF. This was intended to make the 
government unpopular. In response to this gesture Yury Maslyukov (the First Deputy 
Prime Minister), was unnecessarily declaring national interests were not served by 
accepting IMF conditions. He is reported to have said "certain terms are simply 
inappropriate for Russia. " For instance, "we're being asked to do such things as set up 
trade-monitoring organizations in the natural-gas industry, which would bring the 
thieves crawling out of the woodwork" (Ulyanova, March 3,1999). 
The matter appeared to be resolved when Russia issued a Letter of Intent on 
July 13 1999 accepting IMF conditions. However the IMF continued its hard-line 
stance and in September released a statement which said that "the IMF, through the 
routine process of monitoring its lending programs, is scrutinizing the Russian 
authorities' policy implementation. If the IMF's Executive Board concludes that 
3 Reported by Bckker, larch 4,1999 
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Russia failing to meet program commitments, it will consider suspending further 
disbursements, as it has done on several occasions in the past. " (Camdessus, 
September 13,1999). This IMF policy of 'reward only full compliance' lasted until 
the end of September that year. 
As predicted by Rule 2 in 2.3, if the donor adopts an all-or-nothing stance then 
the recipient will fully comply with conditions in order to gain further finance if 
future loans are of greater benefit to it than the immediate political benefits of non- 
compliance. Putin noted that Russia had met its budget goals for 1999 (in spite of the 
fact that the IMF has suspended loan payments since September). 4 This assertion was 
backed by Michel Camdessus, the Managing Director of the IMF. He reported that 
Russia had met objectives in economic growth, lower inflation, fiscal balance, and 
international reserves. However he said that Russia had not completed some 
structural benchmarks for end-September 1999 as outlined in the Statement by the 
Russian government (Camdessus, M. 1999). 
We postulate that as the IMF was adopting an all-or-nothing stance with 
respect to the next tranche of the loan, Russia attempted to convince the IMF that it 
had, or was intending to, fully comply with conditions. However, mainly because of 
political blockages, which are approximated by the variable a in our model, Russia 
did not fully comply with conditions. Result 2 suggests that this was because 
6< (I - p)oN, that is, the value of discounted future loans was of less benefit that the 
immediate political gains from non-compliance. 
Then at the end of September 1999 we postulate that the IMF seemed to adopt 
Rule 1 (No re-lending) by withdrawing finance from Russia, not for "failing to meet 
program commitments" but for alleged misuse of funds. This was an interesting 
Russia's nhjc c liº c .ý MV I 
despite /, 1/l 
. 
Pýcriýr, Dawn, 28 December 1999 
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precedent, because even though there have been alleged misuses of INIF funds in 
Russia since 1992 and in other countries for decades, the IMF had rarely done 
anything about it. Nonetheless to ensure that IMF funds were not misused, all monc%- 
that was paid out to Russia was to be held by the IMF and loan repayments to the INIF 
will be taken from that account. These arrangements were: 
"a response to the FIMACO episode, in which the Russian central bank 
hid from the IMF its use of an offshore subsidiary to handle some of its 
foreign reserves. That affair, which did not involve money laundering, 
has been extensively examined at the IMF's insistence by the 
accounting firm PricewaterhouseCoopers. The Russian authorities 
now understand that any future efforts to hide the true level of foreign 
reserves from creditors can result in loan suspension". 5 
Rule 1 predicts that if the donor adopts a 'no re-lending' policy, the 
recipient will always default. In practice , this rule was only observed 
in Russia for about three months because the political environment 
under which corruption and money laundering flourished was abruptly 
changed when President Yeltsin announced his resignation on 
December 31 st 1999. He was succeeded by President Putin who was 
liked by the 'West', and in our model in section 2.3, this resulted in a 
shift in a in the recipient's utility function, and in a shift in the relative 
values of )rand 6 in the donor's utility function 
Indeed, since the year 2000, Russia has been implementing many of the I `1 F 
reforms. For instance, a new Tax Code, which had been rejected by the Duma on 
many occasions, was eventually passed, enabling the Russian authorities to improve 
('amdcssus, September I 1999 
6 Russia's ohjec"tii-c c mrt It-spite Putin, Dawn, 21S 
December 1991) 
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the fiscal situation that was partly responsible for the August 1998 economic crisis. 
In return, the IMF has been continuing to provide further finance to Russia. 
We suggest that since the year 2000 the relationship between the IMF and 
Russia again corresponds to the game that takes place under Rule 3 ('leniency'). 
However, the probability of punishment, 1- y, is now higher than it was from 1992- 
1998 because the donor has lower tolerance for non-compliance. 
It is quite interesting to note that the reforms that the IMF is currently 
recommending for Russia are the same ones it recommended in the early 1990s. 
Despite Russia's obvious non-implementation of conditions, it has continued to 
receive loans over the years. It is therefore difficult to deny that the IMF had political 
interests in Russia's reform, not just economic ones. M. Camdessus addresses "two 
overriding issues: whether engagement is better than isolation, and whether there is 
reason to hope that economic reform will succeed in Russia and other countries facing 
the same painful transition" (Ibid. ). He concludes that engagement is better than 
isolation. 
If, as our model suggests, Russia's awareness of the IMF's political motives 
may have reduced its compliance with policy conditions thereby further retarding 
structural adjustment, then perhaps it is precisely engagement that contributed to 
Russia's economic problems. 
2.5 Limitations and Extensions 
There are a number of limitations to our model in 2.3. 
Firstly, there may be other important factors in the conditional development 
process that would influence the payoffs that accrue to the recipient and/ or donor. 
For instand., the recipient may benefit posit ve/v from inflows of private foreign 
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investment when it complies with IMF conditions (for example, Marchesi (1999) and 
Marchesi and Thomas (1999)). Thus instead of always choosing the lowest possible 
level of compliance which guarantees it future loans, the recipient might undertake 
more compliance to ensure more private foreign investment. 
Secondly, the model does not take into account the economic costs which may 
arise from implementing policies. It considers only economic benefit (loans) and 
political costs. The economic costs could be even more severe if reforms are poorly 
designed: there was much criticism of the suitability of the IMF's reform programme 
for Russia with Jeffrey Sachs being one of the IMF's most vocal critics. However it 
can be assumed that the more inappropriate the policies the more difficult will be the 
complete implementation of the policies and this will lead to a lower level of 
compliance. 
And finally, the model does not draw a distinction between slippage due to 
lack of government desire, and slippage due to lack of government capacity. This is 
an important consideration as the model has assumed that the government has a 
choice over its level of compliance/ slippage. 
While we consider empirical evidence from Russia as an analytical narrativ e, 
more empirical work can be undertaken of a cross section of countries, and/ or over a 
period of time in one country, to try to determine statistical values for the differences 
in the IMF's tolerance for policy slippages. 
2.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter we model a game between a recipient and a lender and discuss 
how the recipient `government may avoid full implementation of conditions without 
jeopardising future 
loans by playing a strategic game with the donor. 
l` 
We suggest that the recipient is, in fact, aware that the donor is motivated not 
just by economic considerations but by its own political interests in the conditional 
development lending process, and that these political incentives are a factor in 
determining the donor's degree of tolerance of non- compliance with economic 
reform programmes. Thus there ensues a game in which the recipient, aware that the 
donor has political motivations, attempts to undertake the least level of compliance 
that guarantees it future loans, and the donor adopts a punishment strategy consistent 
with its own political and economic motivations. 
We model the game between the recipient and donor in section 2.3, in which 
the recipient chooses its level of compliance with policy conditions and the donor 
decides whether or not to extend further financing. We solve for the subgame perfect 
Nash equilibrium by backwards induction. This yields many lending-compliance 
equilibria depending on the values of the parameters in the payoff functions. 
With so many lending-compliance options, and because it faces internal 
conflict in determining its lending options, we propose that a lender may attempt to 
create rules under which lending decisions are made to regulate the internal conflict 
and to provide a framework within which policy is made. These rules are decided in 
an exogenous conflict between politics and economics that takes place within the 
donor agency as to the circumstances under which punishment levied. This conflict. 
iii c'/jCct, determines the donor's degree of tolerance for policy slippages. The rules 
which arise from the intra-donor conflict, while permitting some discretion or 
which transgressions to punish, help to regulate the internal conflict by providing a 
framework of action within which to work. The rules of thumb help fix the value of 
rc in relation to 
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We suggest three main types of rules that arise from the politics-economics 
split within the donor agency. The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for each type of 
rule is solved by backward induction. 
With Rule 1, No Re-lending, no level of compliance is sufficient to ensure 
further financing. The equilibrium for this rule is default, wtwithhold. That is, the 
lender will always choose to withhold further finance and the recipient will always 
choose to default. 
With Rule 2, Reward only full compliance, the lender has no tolerance for 
policy slippages, and will punish any deviation from a full compliance strategy on the 
part of the recipient. A donor that acts like this may be adopting a particularly strict 
political stance with respect to this country, perhaps because it is not co-operating on 
key international political/ human rights agreements. If the donor has a "reward only 
full compliance" rule, then the recipient will choose to be fully compliant if the value 
of discounted future loans are of greater benefit to it than the immediate political 
benefits of non-compliance, and will choose to be non-compliant if not. If the 
recipient is fully compliant, the donor will offer further finance. If the recipient is 
non-compliant, the donor will withhold further finance. 
With Rule 3, Lenience', the donor has tolerance for policy slippages depending 
on the circumstances of the recipient country. Unlike with Rules (I) and (2), there is 
the possibility (y) of receiving further finance for non-compliance. We find that if 
the donor punishes recipients «ho implement less than 100% of the conditions 
attached to the loan with a probability of y, then the recipient will choose to fully 
comply with conditions as long as value of discounted future loans exceeds the 
immediate political gain 
from policy slippage. If the gain from policy slippage 
excecds the cost associated with the loss of further finance, the recipient Neill he non- 
40 
compliant. The recipient's choice of compliance level depends on the discount rate 
attached to the future loan, the political costs of compliance, and on the probability of 
punishment. 
Our model differs from existing theories in explicitly allowing the lender and 
recipient to face a trade-off between political and economic interests within its 
organisation which affect the degree of slippage or the tolerance of policy slippages. 
Furthermore, the adoption of "rules of thumb" allow the donor to behave differently to 
two countries that implement the same proportion of required conditions, or to one 
country which implements the same proportion of required conditions over two 
different time periods. 
In Section 2.4 we discuss how the game between Russia and the IMF has 
elements of the game modelled in Section 2.3. In particular, we propose that from 
1992-1998 the game between the two players had elements of Rule 3 (Lenience) 
where the probability of punishment was very low. From August 18th 1998 till the 
end of September 1999, the rules of the game seemed to change with the IMF 
adopting a hard line stance with regards to the last tranche of a loan. This "game" 
corresponded to elements of Rule 2 (Reward onhv. full compliance). Then, in response 
to allegations of money laundering, the IMF suspended all payments to the Russian 
authorities between the end of September 1999 and December 31st 1999, which 
corresponds to Rule 1 (No re-lending). President Yeltsin's resignation on December 
31st 1999 brought about a major shift in some of the parameters of the recipient's and 
donor's utility functions in our models, and consequently to the 'rules of thumb' under 
which the IMF operated with respect to Russia 
\Vcst, became the next President of Russia. 
Vladimir Putin, favoured by the 
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Since the year 2000, we propose that the game has again reverted to the one 
that takes place under Rule 3, but with a higher probability of punishment for non- 
compliance. 
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Chapter 3 
Fiscal Policy in an Economy with a Corrupt 
Bureaucracy and a Shadow Economy 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter analyses the contribution of fiscal policy to Russia's relatively poor 
economic performance since it began market reforms in 1992. In particular we focus 
on the consequences for employment, output and taxation revenues of fiscal policy- 
induced changes in bureaucratic corruption in an economy with a large shadow 
economy. 
Corruption is widely cited and researched as one of the reasons why firms and 
workers operate in the underground economy (Kaufmann (1994.1997), Johnson. 
Kaufmann and Zoido-Lobatan (1998); Shleifer (1997); Shleifer and Vishnu (1993). 
1994,1998)). Firms and workers are discouraged from operating officially in the 
legitimate private sector because of the rent-seeking predator` behaviour of corrupt 
public bureaucrats. Corruption is rife in Russia. Transparency International',, 
Corruption Perception Index (? 000) estimated Russia's index of corruption as equal to 
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2.1 (out of a perfect score of 10), ranking it 82nd worst out of 88 countries (see 
Transparency International's CPI index (2000) for a discussion of methodology, 
limitations, and problems with the data). 
The literature offers three other main reasons why firms may choose to operate 
underground, none of which are mutually exclusive. High official tax rates and 
cumbersome official regulations provide disincentives to operate in the legitimate 
sector (de Soto, 1989). Alternatively, firms and workers may be trying to hide their 
productive activities to avoid extortion by criminal gangs (Gustafson, 1999). Another 
reason behind the decision to operate underground is the lack of any advantages of 
operating legitimately, such as a strong institutional environment that allows the 
enforcement of property rights and contracts (MarcouiIler and Young (1995) . 
Johnson 
et al. (1997)). In Section 4.2 we provide an extensive literature survey of the 
definitions, causes and consequences of corruption and the shadow economy. 
In this chapter we do not contribute per se to the debate on the causes of 
corruption, but rather to the debate on the causes and consequences of changes in 
corruption in an already corrupt bureaucracy. In particular we focus on fiscal policy 
as a cause of changes in corruption. This allows us to discuss the consequences of 
some of the fiscal policies adopted by the Russian authorities during its transition to a 
market economy. 
The first policy we consider is reduced public sector spending, in particular the 
running up of public sector wage arrears because the spending targets of the Russian 
authorities often exceeded their revenue-raising abilities in 1992-1999. At the end of 
1999, wage arrears in the budget-funded sector were equal to 19.4 billion rubles 
(Russian Economic Tren(ss, 1999 (1)). This compares with a budget deficit of 11 .5 
billion rubles in January 1999 which does not take wage arrears into account. Since 
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the year 2000, the Russian authorities have concentrated on paying back arrears and 
have even increased public sector wages which have been eroded by years of high 
inflation. 
The second policy we consider is the policy of high taxes on wages. Indeed, up 
till the year 2000 progress in tax reform in Russia had been inadequate. The tax 
system was complex, with up to 200 types of taxes, numerous and sometimes 
arbitrary exemptions, narrow tax bases, and, partly as a result, high statutory tax rates 
on labour income. The revenue structure relied heavily on payroll taxes that lead to 
distortions in the economy. An often stated hypothesis (for example, Schneider 1994) 
is that the more complex the tax system, the smaller the size of the shadow economy 
(because people cannot work out exactly how much they pay in taxes). The outcomes 
in Russia and the results of our model contradict this theory. 
Our model is based loosely on the work of Frey and Weck (1983) «ho build a 
three-sector model comprising a (honest) bureaucracy, shadow sector and legitimate 
private sector, in which they examine various exogenous actions of bureaucrats. They 
use a second-order Taylor expansion to approximate the output function. We 
maintain the basic three-sector structure of Frey and Weck's model as we consider it 
to be representative of the Russian economy: Russia has a large bureaucracy, a 
legitimate private sector, and a substantial shadow sector. However we make a 
number of changes to Frey and Weck's model. 
Firstly, we modify a Cobb Douglas output function to include two labour inputs* 
bureaucratic input and legitimate private sector input. This allows us to separate out 
not only their respective contributions to output in the economy. 
but also to analyse 
variations in legitimate private sector employment separately 
from bureaucratic 
employment which is constant in the period in question 
in the model. 
4. 
Secondly, we allow the bureaucrats to be corrupt. We model corruption as a 
proportional tax on the income of legitimate private sector workers. We define the 
corruption effect as the negative impact of an increase in corruption on legitimate 
private sector employment and output. A crucial assumption we make is that 
bureaucrats are seeking to maintain a constant predetermined \va`ýe which is 
composed of their official and unofficial (corrupt) wage. This stems from a 
motivation to survive financially (petty corruption), rather than from a motivation to 
enrich themselves at all costs (grand corruption). Once the bureaucrats have attained 
enough money to survive on, they restrain their greed. This assumption differs from 
the standard literature in which the rent-seeking behaviour of bureaucrats stems from 
their desire for a higher wage. 
Corruption of state officials is a big problem in Russia, infiltrating, all aspects of 
the Russian economy. Gustafson (1999) sites the following example to show the 
extent of corruption in Russia. "Where ordinary Russians see it most is on the roads. " 
The traffic police pull you over to the side of the road, " says a young trucker, "and 
you'll stay there for one or two days, because one of your headlights is out. You'll pay 
a 'lemon' (limon - slang for 1 million old rubles, then worth about 
S160) just to get 
away. ""(p. 139). 
Thirdly, we model the imperfect tax collection abilities of the government in an 
economy with widespread tax arrears, tax exemptions, tax deferrals, inter-enterprise 
arrears and the substantial use of non-monetary means of payment (barter). Total 
arrears in July 1998 amounted to about 35 percent of GDP (Ru. ssran 
Economic 
Trends, 1999). Gara (2001) reports that banks and non-financial enterprises issued 
about 27.5 trillion rubles-worth of promissory notes in 1997 (equal to 
1.1 per cent of 
GDP), harter accounted for approximately half of inter-enterprise transactions in 
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1998, and that in April 2000 only one-third of the overall amount of all transactions 
were monetised. In addition, taxes to the government have sometimes been "paid in 
kind" and consequently the government has not been able to use its tax revenue for 
what it needs to or what it would like to. 
Our model has a number of interesting results. Based on our model we suggest 
that poor economic performance in terms of output and taxation revenues stems in 
part from a fiscal policy-induced corruption effect. We find that the corruption effect 
of increased taxation exceeds that of reduced expenditure. However, if reduced 
spending results in public sector wage arrears then the corruption effect of reduced 
spending will exceed that of increased taxation. We suggest that if corruption is 
interpreted as a proportional tax on labour income in the legitimate private sector, 
then there is a negative association between legitimate private sector employment and 
corruption. Further research to test the empirical basis of these associations could be 
undertaken. 
The model has implications for a large number of governments of developing and 
post-communist transition economies who face policy choices in financing their 
budgets. Furthermore, while lending support to the recent "good governance" policies 
of the IMF, the model suggests that such policies should be undertaken before other 
structural adjustment policies are recommended/ undertaken. Wolf and Gurgen 
(2000) discuss the IMF's recent efforts to improve governance in transition countries. 
The authors suggest that poor governance creates opportunities and incentives for 
corruption and thus governance must be improved if corruption is to be reducedl. 
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Following on from the policies adopted in Russia, it would appear that an 
interesting antidote to the corruption problems associated with public sector wage 
arrears was the policy of private sector wage arrears by firms and enterprises. 
The model and its results raise a number of questions. Firstly. what is the 
optimal rate of tax in an economy with an unofficial (corruption) tax? Secondly, if a 
fall in government expenditure is generally perceived to be good in terms of a 
reduction in the "crowding out" of private investment, is this positive effect cancelled 
out by an associated increase in corruption? This paper suggests that widening the tax 
base may be the least distortionary method of improving the budget deficit. 
The research in this chapter was motivated by observations of the situation in 
Russia since the fall of communism and as such I pay particular attention to 
characterising this relationship. However observation suggests that the analysis is 
applicable to other transition and developing economies, and hence may be 
interpreted more gene rally. 
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. An extensive literature survey of 
the definitions, causes and consequences of corruption and the shadow economy is 
given in section 3.2. Section 3.3 discusses Russia's three-sector economy. In section 
3.4 we develop the basic model to be used in the analysis. In section 3.5 we analyse 
the corruption effect of reduced bureaucratic wages, of which public sector wage 
arrears are an extreme example. In section 3.6 we examine the corruption effect of 
increased taxation. Section 3.7 compares the results for reduced expenditure and 
increased taxation. Section 3.8 discusses how the results of our model hold up in the 
Russian context. Section 3.9 examines the limitations to, and possible extensions of, 
our model. Section 3.10 concludes. 
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3.2 Review of the Literature on the Shadow Economy and 
Corruption 
3.2.1 The Shadow Economy 
Definition of the Shadow Economy 
Studies of the "shadow economy" which have been undertaken by economists, 
sociologists, political scientists, historians, social anthropologists (to name but a few) 
have resulted in a wide array of terms used to describe shadow sector activities. 
Synonyms for the shadow economy include the hidden, black, informal, unofficial, 
second, subterranean, parallel, clandestine and underground economy. 
We define the shadow economy as the "unrecorded value by any deliberate 
misreporting or evasion by a firm or individual" (this is taken from Kaufmann and 
Kaliberda, 1996). This definition covers untaxed incomes and unrecorded capital 
flight. However different authors use different terms to describe shadow activities 
depending on the type of activity or income they are concentrating on. 
Thomas (1992) classifies shadow sector activities into four main sectors of 
production. The Household Sector is involved in the production and consumption of 
goods and services which are usually left out of national income accounts h--cause 
they are difficult to measure with any degree of accuracy. Examples of such activities 
include the unpaid labour of housewives. The In/brmal Sector involves small-scale 
production of goods and services which are traded to consumers or to other producers. 
The production of these goods and services is not illegal but not usually included in 
national accounts because of the difficulties and expense involved in collecting such 
data. The Ire e ular" Sector involves the production of legal goods and services. 
but 
illegal means are employed to facilitate production (such as the avoidance of 
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legislation) or to keep production secret from the authorities (such as tax evasion and 
social security fraud). The Criminal Sector involves the production and consumption 
of illegal goods and services. Activities such as theft and extortion are included in the 
criminal sector. 
While Thomas (1992) distinguishes between the different types of activities in 
the shadow sector, Feige (1989) concentrates on the incomes from such activities. 1 ic 
constructs a simple taxonomic framework for total economic income in which he 
distinguishes between income generated in the shadow economy and income 
generated in the non-shadow economy. The table below illustrates this frame« ork. 
Table 3.1: Taxonomic framework for economic income 
Total Economic Income 
Market Classification Market Income Non-Market Income 
Legal Status Activity Illegal Activity Legal Activity Legal Activity Illegal Acti\ ity 
Reporting Status Unrecorded Income Recorded 
Income 
Imputed 
Income 
Unrecorded Income 
National Income and 
Product Accounts 
Monetary unobserved 
sector 
Estimated 
product 
gross national `on-monetary 
unobserved sector 
The shadow economy includes unrecorded income from both legal and illegal 
productive activities, and involves monetary and non-monetary transactions (barter). 
The growth of the shadow economy is of great concern to policymakcrs for a 
number of reasons including: 
(i) A decrease in tax receipts and an erosion of the tax base (which leads to rising 
budget deficits). This is particularly the case when the size of the shadow economy 
depends to a large extent on the overall burden of taxation and regulation 
(ii) "Policy illusion" - the process whereby policvmakers react to observed economic 
activity without regard for the unrecorded sector. This 
may lead to erroneous- policy 
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choices. McGee and Feige (1989) incorporate the unrecorded sector into existing 
macro-models to examine the consequences of policy reactions to misinformation. 
Theoretical Analysis of the Shadow Economy 
The shadow economy has received much attention over the years both 
theoretically and empirically. Theoretical attention on the activities of the shadow 
economy has focused mainly on tax evasion as a motive for operating in the shadow 
economy. However avoiding the direct and indirect burden of taxation is not the only 
factor influencing the shadow economy. Other factors include the burden of 
regulation, the complexity/ visibility of the tax system, the official labour market, and 
public sector services and social transfers. 
(i) Tax Evasion 
Microeconomic Studies 
Allingham and Sandmo (1972) present one of the first microeconomic models 
of tax evasion. They show that under certain assumptions individuals will declare 
more of their income as their pre-tax incomes grow, and that an increase in tax rates 
will lead to an increase in tax evasion. Other researchers such as Yitzhaki (1974) 
have relaxed the assumptions of the Allingham and Sandmo model and have come up 
with an array of differing results. 
Isachsen and Strom (1980) developed a model containing a regular and 
irregular sector. Their results show that an increase in the probability of detection 
reduced regular sector activity, while a rise in the tax rate or the irregular sector wage 
led to a change in the distribution of labour between the two sectors. 
Sandmo (1981) incorporates tax evasion into the analysis of optimum income 
taxation. Labour supply is distributed bctwcen a regular and irregular sector. Gien 
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taxpayer behaviour, the government chooses tax rates, penalties and the probability of 
detection to maximise a utilitarian social welfare function. A formula for the 
optimum marginal rate of taxation is derived. The author characterises the factors 
which determine the choice between the penalty rate and the probability of detection 
as instruments for the control of tax evasion. Hansson (1987) develops a simulation 
model to determine the optimal rate of income tax when untaxed production is taken 
into account. The traditional model with no untaxed production is taken to be a 
special case. A comparison of the optimal tax rates in the two cases shows the 
potential bias in the traditional analysis. 
Macroeconomic Studies 
Theoretical attention on the macroeconomics of tax evasion has focused on the 
possible disincentive effects of taxation associated with the Laffer curve. Waud 
(1986) analysed the effects of tax evasion on the Laffer curve by introducing a tax 
aversion function into a simple supply-side macroeconomic model thereby allowing 
for both tax avoidance and tax evasion. Hansson (1987) provides a theoretical 
analysis of the effects of the irregular sector on optimal income tax rates in the 
Swedish economy. 
Some studies have examined the effects of tax evasion by introducing the 
irregular sector into a macroeconomic model. Peacock and Shaw (1982) use a simple 
tiscal policy model to measure the extent of tax evasion and to study the implications 
for equity and stabilisation objectives. Ricketts (1984) uses a simple IS-LM model 
(building on the model of Peacock and Shaw) to examine the effects of an irregular 
sector on both the IS curve and the LM curve. Lai and Chang (1988) incomorate the 
effect of tax evasion on labour supply into the Peacock and Shat model. They show 
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that an increase in the degree of tax evasion may increase total tax re% enue rather than 
reduce it. 
(ii) Complexity/ Visibility of the Tax system 
Schneider (1994) discusses how the complexity/visibility of the tax system 
contributes to shadow economy activities. He states (an often stated hypothesis) that 
the more complex/ less visible the tax system the lower the size of the shadow 
economy (and vice versa). 
(iii) Avoiding Bureaucracy and Regulations 
While tax evasion is one of the motives for operating in the shadow economy, 
it is not the only one. Avoiding bureaucracy, especially in countries where economic 
activity is highly regulated, is another motive for operating in the shadow economy. 
There has been little macroeconomic modelling of this phenomenon. 
Frey and Weck (1983) present a three-sector model with a public sector, a 
private legitimate economy, and a shadow economy. They analyse various exoWnous 
actions by the bureaucracy, such as an increase in the tax rate and an ncrease in the 
number of bureaucrats, and the resulting reactions of taxpayers. They find that an 
increase in the tax rate reduces employment in the legitimate private sector and 
increases employment in the shadow economy. An increase in the number of 
bureaucrats (where the wage rate remains the same) will be acompanied by an 
increase in the tax rate to fund the extra public employment. If the tax rate remain,, 
below the optimal rate of tax, there will be a decrease in bgitimate private sector 
employment. Employment in the shadow may increase overall, depcndin__º on how 
much employment increase,, as a result of an increase in the burden of taxation and on 
how many workers are attracted to the new employment in the public sector. 
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However, Frey and Weck do not consider the implications of a corrupt bureaucracy 
on their results. 
An increase in the intensity of regulations governing the official sector (for 
example, reduced working hours) may lead to an increase in shadow sector activity. 
Regulations increase labour costs of employers and these costs are often passed on to 
employees who choose to work in the shadow economy to avoid these regulations. 
Johnson, Kaufmann and Shleifer (1997) develop a model which sug`gcsts that, 
in general, countries with a higher level of regulation of their economies tend to have 
bigger shadow economies. ' Empirical support for this hypothesis is given by 
Johnson, Kaufman and Zoido-Lobaton (1998b) and by Friedman, Johnson, Kaufman, 
and Zoido-Lobaton (1999). These studies lend support to the theory that it is the 
enforcement of regulation that is important in driving firms underground - not the 
overall extent of regulation (where unenforced). Policy recommendations suggest 
that governments should concentrate on improving the enforcement of laws and 
regulations rather than just increasing their number. Some governments prefer to 
increase the number of laws and regulations as a means of controlling the shadow 
economy, as this increases employment in the public sector and further increases the 
power of the bureaucrats. 
(ii') Official Sector Labour Market 
In addition to the disincentive effects of the intensity of regulations governing 
the official sector, there arc a number of other characteristics of the official sector 
labour market that have been found to influence the decision to operate in the shadow 
1 Johnson, Kaufmann, and ZoidO-Lobaton (1998b) undertake empirical anj Iý, is ol'thi: model. 
Their results show 
that a one point increase of the regulation index results in an 
8.1% increase in the size of the shadow economy. 
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economy. These include the net wage in official sector, total wage costs, and the 
unemployment rate. 
Lemieux, Fortin, and Frechette (1994) analyse microdata from Canada and 
their results suggest that changes in the net wage in the official sector do influence the 
number of hours worked in the shadow economy. They find that there is a large 
negative elasticity of hours worked in the shadow economy with respect to the net 
wage rate in the official sector, and that there is a high degree of labour rmbility 
between these two sectors. 
Total wage costs also offer an incentive for firms/ individuals to operate 
underground. This is especially the case in developed countries where unemployment 
is thought to be related to very high labour costs. 
The policy of reducing working hours to reduce unemployment ( for example 
by labour unions in France/ Canada) may provide an incentive for labour to increase 
in the shadow sector as people have more time on their hands to do "cash-in-hand" 
jobs. Early retirement/ part-time jobs also provide people with opportunities to 
undertake employment in the shadow economy where their wages are untaxed. 
(, kv) Public Sector Services and Social Transfers 
Poor provision of public sector goods and services (such as public 
infrastructure) and social transfers (such as pensions and unemployment benefit) 
create incentives for firms/ individuals to operate in the shadow economy. Often a 
vicious cycle occurs in which poor provision of public goods and services 
leads to an 
increase in shadow sector activity which leads to a decrease in taxation revenues (and 
a further decrease in public provision), an 
increase in tax rates and a further increase 
in the shadow economy. 
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Effect of Shadow Economy on the Official Economy 
A growing shadow economy reduces taxation revenues resulting in both a 
lower quality and lower quantity of public goods and services. Loayza (l')96) 
develops an endogenous growth model with congestable public services. The model 
finds that in economies where (i) the enforcement of compliance is weak and where 
(ii) the tax burden is larger than the optimal tax burden, increases in the relative size 
of the shadow economy results in a fall in economic growth. This model has been 
widely criticised for unrealistic assumptions. 
Schneider and Enste (2000) report that figures produced in Schneider (1998) 
show that 66% of income earned in the shadow economy is immediately spent in the 
official economy which positively stimulates the official economy. Bha ttacharyya 
(1990), estimating an econometric model for UK consumer expenditures from 1960- 
84, finds that the shadow economy has a significant positive effect on consumer 
expenditures (especially durable goods and services). 
Adam and Ginsburgh (1985) build a small macroeconomic model containing 
an irregular sector. They examine how policies intended to increase employment and 
output can conflict with policies designed to discourage irregular sector activity. 
They show that Keynesian multipliers may be lowered by as much as 40", (') in some 
cases even though the irregular sector only represents 10-15% of total economic 
activity. however they also find, under certain circumstances, a positive relationship 
between the growth of the shadow economy and the official sector. Expansionary 
fiscal policy positively stimulates both the official and irregular sectors. 
McGec and Feige (1989) incorporate the unrecorded sector into cXistifL 
macro-models to examine the consequences of policy reactions to misinformation. 
They show that distorted information can greatly affect the stability of the economic 
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system. When full employment is the target for monetary policy distorted 
information can cause accelerating stagflation. When price stability is the target for 
monetary policy, with fiscal policy relying on automatic stabilisers, distorted 
information may lead to higher interest rates and budget deficits. The authors suggest 
that "the predicted consequences of such distortions are broadly consistent with what 
we increasingly observe in our present-day economies" (p. 98). 
Empirical Analysis of the Shadow Economy 
There are three main types of information available to empirical researchers of 
the shadow economy. The first is anecdotal evidence which is useful as a qualitative 
guide to understanding the underground economy, but not useful as a quantitativc 
guide. The second is microdata collected from sources such as surveys, tax audits, 
and unemployment records. The third is macroeconomic data from published data 
sources. 
A variety of methods are employed by researchers to estimate various aspects 
of the underground economy. With various definitions and methods of quantifying 
the shadow economy, what is (and needs to be) measured is often a bone of 
contention. The June 1999 edition of the Economic Journal included a collection of 
papers by Tanzi, Bhattacharyya, Feinstein, Giles, and Thomas discussing the 
controversy surrounding the measurement of the hidden economy: Thomas criticises 
the various methods of estimating the hidden economy. fie says " measurement 
without theory is a fair description of the published empirical work aimed at 
guestimating the size of the 'hidden' or 'black' econom`...... a mere guestimate of the 
overall size of the black: economy is of limited Value for the policy maker; 
it is also 
important to know who is doing what, where, how and wt by " (p. F") 8 1). Ile goc' on to 
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suggest that with "the various attempts to measure the size of the black economy, one 
should be aware of a political dimension to some of this work...... If a large part of the 
black economy is social security fraud, then maybe unemployment is not really as bad 
as it looks? Clearly such political conclusions depended on having good theoretical as 
well as sound quantitative foundations and both of these components were generally 
missing" (p. F381). 
(i) Microeconomic Analysis 
Economists who undertake empirical microeconomic studies usually 
concentrate sample surveys which have been carried out to collect information 
relevant to the shadow economy. Three types of such sample surveys are tax audits, 
labour market surveys, and household surveys. 
Frey and Pommerehne (1982) discuss the use of tax auditing methods to 
estimate the size of the underground economy. They report that the extent to which 
tax auditing is used differs considerably among countries. In the United States the 
General Accounting Office (GAO 1979) attempted to estimate the number of 
nonfilers of Federal income tax using a representative sample of 50,000 households. 
It estimated that there were between 4.1 and 5.3 million nonfilers in 1972, compared 
with the Inland Revenue Service (IRS) estimate of 0.6 million nonfilers for that year. 
While tax auditing methods are useful for gaining detailed information about income 
groups, it tends to underestimate the exact size of the underground economy because 
respondents are usually unwilling to admit the true extent of their tax evasion. In 
addition the estimates are easily altered by changes 
in detection methods/ 
questionnaire design. 
The shadow economy may reveal itself through low 
labour force participation 
rates in formal labour markets. The difference 
between the official and "actual" 
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participation rates allows t he size of the shadow labour force to be estimated. Frey 
and Pommerehne (1982) suggest that according to OECD statistics reported in Fua 
(1976) the official participation rate in Italy in 1975 was only 35.5% compared to 
46.4% in the United Kingdom and 48% in Japan. The underground labour force can 
also be estimated by interviewing a sample of the population asking whether they are 
buyers or sellers of underground labour services. In a study undertaken by Isachsen, 
Klovland, and Strom (1981) people were more willing to admit that they had bought 
underground labour services (29%) than to admit they had sold such services (20%). 
Data on labour force participation rates are likely to underestimate the size of the 
underground labour force due to the narrow focus of such data. 
Household surveys can be used to derive information on discrepancies in 
income-expenditure of private households and extrapolated (if the sample is 
representative) to give an estimate of the whole shadow economy. Frey and 
Pommerehne report that O'Higgins (1980) calculates expenditure-income 
discrepancies for specific types of households, occupational groups and income 
classes and compares them to disaggregated unexplained residuals in the macro level. 
O'Higgins suggests that in 1978 in the United Kingdom private households headed by 
self-employed people failed to report about £2.10 billion. This compares favourably 
with the estimate by the Central Statistical Office of £2.15 bil lion. 
(ii) Macroeconomic Analysis 
Macroempirical estimation of the underground economy has the advantage of 
using published data sources that have been collected for reasons other than the study 
of the underground economy. however these methods require explicit assumptions to 
produce estimates of the underground economy and as such the cliability of any 
method rests on the reasonableness of the assumptions underlying the estimation 
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procedure. Many approaches have been adopted to estimate the size of the 
underground economy and in general these can be put into the following groups. 
Discrepancy Methods 
These involve estimating the size of the underground economy by examining 
the difference between estimates of national income and national expenditure. Frey 
and Pommerehne (1982) use this method to calculate estimates of the underground 
economy for a number of countries. Estimates vaned between 1 and 23.3% of GDP. 
For example the estimate for the UK in 1978 was between 2.5-3%, while the estimate 
for France in 1965 was 23%. There are a number of criticisms of this approach. 
Firstly, estimates of national expenditure are not always larger than estimates of 
national income. Thomas (1999) suggests that in Switzerland national income 
estimates tended to be larger than national expenditure estimates, implying a negatvc 
shadow economy! Secondly, estimates of rational income and expenditure are not 
always constructed in a statistically independent manner. Often the same components 
are included in both estimates. 
Cash-Deposit Methods 
These methods assume that cash is the main medium for transactions in the 
underground economy. If the velocity of circulation of money and the level of 
deposits remain constant, a rise in underground activity will be reflected in a rise in 
the cash-deposit ratio. Cagan (1958) and Gutmann (1977) are widely credited for 
pioneering this approach. This method has a number of restrictive and possibl`- 
questionable assumptions. Firstly, transactions in the shadow economy as assumed to 
be carried out only in cash. Secondly. the velocity of circulation of cash is assumed to 
he the same in both the shadow and non-shadow sectors. And thirdly, a specific year 
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or period has to be identified as the starting point at which the economy had no 
shadow sector. The third assumption is extremely questionable as shadow activity 
has been recorded for many centuries. As Thomas (1999) aptly puts it "Was there 
ever a year in any society when hidden economic activities were not being 
undertaken? Perhaps in the Garden of Eden, but even there we do not know what else 
the Serpent got up to! " (p. F383). 
Transactions Approach 
Feige (1979) proposed that cheques as well as cash are used in the 
underground economy in the United States. He proposed that the size of the 
underground economy could be estimated using the transactions method which is 
based on Fisher's (191 1) equation of exchange in which the total volume of payments 
(MV) is equal to the total volume of transactions (PT). 
The transactions approach is similar to the cash-deposit approach. and as such 
is open to all the criticisms of that approach. It does have the advantage of being less 
restrictive than the cash-deposit method by relaxing the cash only assumption. 2 The 
transactions approach makes the critical assumption of a stable and proportional 
relationship between total income and total transactions. This method requires a large 
amount of data for empirical estimation and this limits its widespread use. 
Rcii'. s'sion Alodet 
Multiple regression models have been developed to try to estimate the size of 
the shadow economy. Tanzi (1983) was one of the first pioneers of this method to 
estimate the size of the shadow economy. Regression analysis has the advantage over 
the first two approaches of allowing for effects other than changes in the shadow 
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sector on cash holdings. In addition it does not require the restrictive assumption of a 
specific year or period in which the shadow sector does not exist. However 
regression modelling is not based on sound economic theory, and may suffer from a 
missing variable problem. Other researchers who have used regression modelling for 
this purpose include Matthews (1983), Matthews and Rastogi (1985), and Schneider 
(1997). 
Bhattacharyya (1990) uses regression analysis to incorporate the shadow 
sector's financial requirements into a demand for money equation. He estimates the 
size of the shadow sector through a reinterpretation of the quadratic and higher power 
terms used in Ramsey's RESET test of functional form mis-specification. Although 
this method has the potential for properly testing theories of tax evasion he makes the 
assumption that there is no functional mis-specification of the demand for currency in 
the non-shadow economy and that any mis-specification in that equation is due to the 
exclusion of the shadow sector. In addition the shadow economy variable which the 
model is supposed to explain is exogenous, and as such the method cannot explain 
any links between the shadow economy and its economic causes. Thomas (1992 and 
1997) provides a comprehensive discussion and critique of this method. 
Schneider and Enste (2000) provide a comprehensive survey of the estimates 
of the size of the shadow economy in 76 different countries using different methods of 
estimation. They find that the growth of the shadow economy is increasing in all 76 
countries, and that this growth is strongly related to increasing burdens of taxation and 
social security contributions, as well as to the extent of state regulatory acti,. itics. In 
addition rising corruption also has a positive impact on the `growth of the shadow 
CCo110I11y. 
lowc\ er this leads to much higher est nmtc of the underground e<ononiý than an} other method 
because of the use of a 
broader definition of money. This produce., larger multiplier effects 
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3.2.2 Corruption 
The Definition of Corruption 
It is important to differentiate between politically motivated corruption and 
economically motivated corruption. The former is undertaken to obtain some degree 
of political power while the latter is undertaken to obtain financial wealth. Most of 
the time the motivations for corruption are a mixture of politics and economics but we 
will concentrate on the latter with respect to public officials. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1993) define corruption as "the sale by government 
officials of government property for personal gain" (p. 599). This definition however 
excludes the possibility of corrupt government officials obtaining money for their 
services as well as money from the sale of government property. Andvig and Moene 
(1990) present a more comprehensive definition by suggesting that "a member of a 
public organization acts in a corrupt way if he directly or indirectly deals with a non- 
member and uses the organization's resources including his decision making power 
special information to acquire payment that is against the rules of the organization or 
against the law" (p. 64). 
Similarities are often drawn between shadow sector activity and corrupt 
activity and there are often discussions as to whether these two types of activity are 
actually the same. Fiorentini and Zamagni (1999a) refute this and suggest that a 
"relevant difference between corruption in legal settings and trading in illegal markets 
is that the latter one often observes a relatively large number of suppliers, while the 
fonner is characterized by a monopolistic supply. This is because illegal markets 
display low barriers to entry and exit while corruption takes place when there is a 
public monopoly of supply with large rents which cannot he appropriated by the 
legitimate government due to informational asymmetries fivouring the bureaucrats. 
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For instance, licences, permits, tax benefits and services capable of spurring 
corruption are strictly rationed; therefore those who allocate them can extract most of 
the rents accruing to the purchasers. " (p. xvi). 
Fiorentini and Zamagni (1999a) however admit that their definition might not 
be completely accurate. They suggest that the "most recent literature on the 
economics of organized crime casts serious doubts over the fact that illegal markets 
are contestable. This is due to the fact that organized crime tries to impose its taxes 
through entry barriers, that is by requiring firms to pay a licence to operate through 
price regulation (imposing the purchase of over-priced inputs), and quotas which 
restrict output with the aim of increasing equilibrium profits . ...... such regulations are 
typically designed to take into account the interests of the firms active under the 
protection of the organized crime, providing them with effective barriers against new 
competitors and from police intervention. " (p. xvi). 
Theoretical Analysis of Corruption 
Corruption is a problem everywhere, not just in Russia. Corruption has many 
components including bribery, nepotism, fraud, the use of "speed money" to speed up 
bureaucratic processes, and embezzlement. 
(i) Corruption: Type, Causes, Consequences and Cures 
Corruption: tl'i)c and degree 
Corruption varies in degree and kind from place to place, and not all varieties 
of corruption are equally harmful. Klitgaard (1998) distinguishes between three types 
of corruption. The first is corruption that harms economic and political dc\ clopment 
by undercutting established rules (such as property rights, the justice systenm, and the 
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banking system). The second is corruption that is environmentally or socially 
destructive. This includes allowing widespread pollution of the environment or 
extorting high levels of payment from patients in hospitals. The third type of 
corruption involves paying money to get through bureaucratic regulations or queues 
more quickly, or irregularities in campaign financing. 
Mauro (1998) distinguishes between well-organised corruption and chaotic 
corruption. The former involves a system of corruption whereby private individuals 
know whom they need to bribe and how much they need to bribe to obtain particular 
goods or services. Chaotic corruption, on the other hand, involves a system of 
corruption in which private individuals need to pay several bribes to different 
bureaucrats at different stages to obtain a particular good or service, with no guarantee 
that they will actually get the good at the end of the bribing process. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1993) show that well-organised corruption is less 
harmful than chaotic corruption, especially where the government has a monopoly on 
the supply of the good (such as licences, permits and passports). They suggest that in 
situations in which a buyer requires several complementary goods to conduct 
business, well-organised corruption involves joint profit maximisation by the different 
government agencies, while chaotic corruption involves independent profit 
maximisation by the different government agencies. The joint monopolist agency sets 
the price p, (including bribe) at which 
11R, + Y11R, 
a x, = Mc, a xi 
ww'hcrc: 
j)1 is the cum bribe price of gov eminent good I 
P2 is the cum bribe price of government good 2 
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X, is the quantity sold of government good 1 
x2 is the quantity sold of government good 2 
MC, is the official price of good I and is the monopolist's marginal cost 
MC2 is the official price of good 2 and is the monopolist's marginal cost 
MR, denotes the marginal revenue from the sale of good I 
MR2 denotes the marginal revenue from the sale of good 2 
Thus 
a X' 
>0 when the two goods are complements (as is often the case with ax2 
different government permits for the same project). At the optimum, MR, < MC, . 
The joint monopolist keeps the bribe on good 1 down to expand the demand for good 
2. This raises its profits from good 2. For the same reason the monopolist agency 
keeps the price of good 2 down. 
Suppose instead that the two goods are allocated by independent monopolist 
agencies and each agency takes the output of the other agency as given. Thus, 
a _t, = 0. At the optimum, MR, = MC, . The level of bribes (per unit bribes) are aX2 
higher under independent monopolists than under joint monopolists. Output is lower 
in the former case. However total bribes collected are higher under joint monopolists 
since independent monopolists drive the quantity sold so far down that the total 
revenues from corruption fall. Shleifer and Vishny suggest that well-organised 
corruption existed in Communist Russia where bribes were channelled through local 
communist offices and any deviation from the agreed bribe was easily detected and 
heavily punished. 
Chaotic corruption now exists in post-Communist Russia where "the sellers of 
the complementary government goods, such as permits and licenses, act 
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independently. Different ministries, agencies, and levels of local government all set 
their own bribes independently in an attempt to maximise their own revenue, rather 
than the combined revenue of all the bribe collectors. In Russia in 1991. for example, 
getting a business started often required bribing the local legislature, the central 
ministry, the local executive branch, the fire authorities, the water authorities, 
etc..... The army and police also often demand a cut for protection - another needed 
government input. " (Shleifer and Vishny, p. 605). The authors go on to suggest that 
the central government is too weak to fire or penalise corrupt officials. 
The extent of corruption is also important. Most economic systems have some 
degree of corruption, and some authors suggest that corruption can be efficiency 
enhancing in a society with a high degree of regulatory burden. However where 
corruption is the norm rather than the exception, the effects are widespread and 
devastating and the control/ reduction of corruption becomes virtually impossible. 
Costs of corruption 
It has been argued that there are both positive and negative costs/ effects of 
corruption. The negative costs include the following. 
Bribery increases the costs of transactions and creates a climate of uncertainty 
in the economy. Bribery acts as a type of tax on enterprises -a regressive tax that 
falls more heavily on small-scale trade and service enterprises. This has distributional 
consequences for the economy. In particular it pushes firms underground (outside the 
formal sector), thereby undercutting the state's ability to raise revenues, and leading to 
ever-higher tax rates being levied on fewer and fewer taxpayers. This, in turn, 
reduces the state's ability to provide essential public goods, including the rule of law. 
A vicious cycle of increasing corruption and underground economic activity can 
result. 
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Bribery is economically inefficient as it has a negative impact on long-term 
foreign and domestic investment, and may stimulate capital flight and 'dollarisation' 
of the economy as it weakens the banking and credit system. Gustafson (1999) 
suggests that more capital has flown out of Russia since 1991 than has flown in, 
amounting to a massive disinvestment in the Russian economy. Mauro (1996) shows 
that corruption has a negative effect on economic growth. Corruption causes the 
misallocation of resources as talented agents pursue rent-seeking activities rather than 
productive economic activity. 
Corruption influences government spending priorities, usually favouring 
"white elephant" projects or large defence contracts, to spending on social schemes 
such as health, education and civil service pay. Corruption is more distortionary than 
taxation because of effort must be expended to avoid detection and punishment. 
Corruption undermines the legitimacy and power of the state. 
The positive effects of corruption centre on its role as an efficiency-enhancing 
system where an economy has a high degree of burdensome regulations. This 
positive effect is questioned by authors such as Gray and Kaufman (1998). 
Sources/ Causes of Corruption 
The sources/ causes of corruption are often complexly interwoven. There are 
both strong motivations for and opportunities to engage in corruption. One (strong) 
motivation for corruption is the desire to earn an income, particularly where poverty 
and low civil service salaries are rife. Another motivation for corruption is the lack of 
insurance, unemployment benefits, and other risk-reducing mechanisms usually 
available in developed countries. In the event of accidents, unemployment, and 
illness there is little help available. This creates a climate of uncertainty which 
tiostcrs/ breeds corruption. 
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There are a large number of opportunities to engage in corruption. especially 
in Russia: there are many opportunities for obtaining large economic rents with the 
privatisation of state-owned properties; officials often have wide-ranging discretion 
when dealing with private agents and have the power to deny them the provision of 
government goods and services; there are systematic weaknesses of the state, which 
are further weakened by unclear rules and regulations which are changed regularly' 
and not widely published or reported; there is excessive government intervention. 
regulation and discretion in the economy which provides a breeding ground for 
corruption; there is a lack of government transparency and accountability, and poor 
financial management serves to create opportunities for corruption, including the use 
of proceeds from humanitarian aid programs for corrupt purposes; and finally, there is 
a lack of an effective economic, legal, regulatory and competitive environment for 
efficient market-based activities which opens up opportunities for corruption. 
Tackling corruption 
Tackling corruption, especially when it is widespread and pervades all aspects 
of the economy is extremely difficult. Corruption is caused by political, institutional 
and economic factors and these underlying causes must be addressed if corruption is 
to be tackled effectively. A number of economic policy changes will result in a fall in 
corruption. Reducing taxes/ tariffs and other barriers to international trade, flexible 
exchange rates, minimising regulations, licensing requirements and other barriers to 
entry for new enterprises and private (domestic and foreign) investors, reducing 
subsidies to enterprises, privatisation, and increased transparency, accountability and 
good financial management. 
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Government institutions will also require reform. This includes civil service 
reform, better financial management, tax administration and auditing procedures, and 
strengthening the legal and judicial systems. 
(ii) Corruption: Concept of the State 
The literature on corruption can be differentiated according to the concept of 
the state held by the author(s). There are two main concepts: proprietary theories of 
the state and welfare maximising theories. 
(i) Proprietary theory of the state 
These theories assume that public intervention is not designed to solve market 
failures, but to distribute resources in favour of the ruling class. Fiorentini and 
Zarnagni (1999a) report that "in the presence of inefficient regulation and paternalistic 
bans on some activities, corruption and illegal trading can be efficiency-enhancing, as 
they may reduce waiting lists, allocate procurements to low-costs firms and allow for 
an increase in the total surplus in the case of illegal markets" (p. xxiii). 
Researchers suggest that only competition for governmental positions or 
among different governments can reduce the amount of corruption, forcing 
governments to introduce less discretionary forms of regulations. Becker (1983) for 
example, suggests that lobbying between different interest groups can bring about 
more efficient outcomes. 
Policy recommendations stemming from above theory are therefore twofold. 
Firstly, reduce the scope of direct public intervention and the barriers set up through 
other regulatory measures. Secondly. legalise illegal markets by deregulation and by 
reducing controls and constraints on the working of the legal markets. Chcung (1996) 
surveys different institutional settings in which it is more likely that price regulation 
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will lead to more bribing. Khan (1996) and Liew (1992) discuss how the social costs 
of corruption are linked with public intervention. 
(ii) Welfare maximising theory of the state 
Researchers belonging to this tradition of thought assume that public 
intervention is an attempt to solve various market failures. They deny that corruption 
or illegal trading can be efficiency enhancing in the short run, since corrupt 
bureaucrats tend to "increase waiting lists and manipulate public procurements in 
order to extract more rents thereby inducing a large dissipation of resources" 
(Fiorentini and Zamagni, 1999a, p. xxiii). Thus illegal markets can be viewed as a 
second best policy to improve the allocation of resources. The welfare approach 
suggests that in the long run both corruption and illegal trading have large negative 
implications for the economy as a consequence of the emergence of increasing returns 
in corrupt activities which increase the opportunity costs of investing in productive 
activities. 
Most models which start from the assumption of a welfare maximising theory 
of the state are characterised by multiple equilibria. Andvig (1991) and Bardhan 
(1997) provide complete surveys of multiple equilibria models of corruption. 
The focus of the research is on finding institutions which are better equipped 
for reducing corruption and illegal markets. Policy recommendations stemming from 
above theory depend on whether a static or dynamic framework is adopted. 
In static frameworks. normative models are built on the assumption that 
o\ crnnlcnts maximise some measure of social welfare. Thus the three main areas of 
focus are: the compensation for bureaucrats exposed to the risk of being bribed 
(Nlookhct jcc & Pilo, 1995), the vertical structure of bureaucratic offices agencies 
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(Bac (1996), and Cadot (1987)), and the degree of centralisation of public decision 
making. 
In dynamic frameworks, it is extremely difficult to ascertain the consequences 
of corruption on the investment prospects and long-run growth of a region or a 
country . Theoretically, there is a negative relationship between corruption and 
growth. For example see Beenstock (1979). 
Bardhan (1997) provides a survey on the literature on corruption. 
Empirical Analysis of Corruption 
There are few empirical studies based on sound economic theory which 
investigate the various aspects of corruption. 
(i) Microeconomic Analysis 
Oldenberg (1987) undertakes a case study of a non-corrupt (at least initially) 
land consolidation administration scheme in India, and shows how important 
perceptions about the incidence of corruption may be for the actual incidence of 
corruption. Wade (1982,1985, and 1989) studies a specific canal irrigation scheme in 
the South of India and shows how the efficiency of the administration institution 
depends on the type of corruption that pervades the institution. Klitgaard (1988) 
presents several case studies of how anti-corruption campaigns reduce the equilibrium 
level of corruption 
(ii) Macroeconomic Analysis 
There are very few macro-empirical studies on corruption. Using the indices 
of corruption and institutional efficiency provided by Business International, Mauro 
(1995) finds a significant negative association between the corruption index and the 
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investment and growth rates. A one-point improvement in the corruption index 
increases the rate of investment by 3%. 
Johnson et al (1998b) find a significant relationship between corruption and 
GDP growth (an improvement in the corruption index by one point decreases GDP 
growth by 0.84%), though this relationship becomes insignificant when the shadow 
economy is included as an independent variable. 
3.2.3 Corruption and the Shadow Economy 
There is some debate about the relationship between corruption and the 
shadow economy. One point of view, suggested by Rose-Ackermann (among others), 
is that shadow economy activities are a substitute for corrupt activities. However, this 
point of view is refuted by a number of authors who suggest that these activities 
complement each other. Johnson et al (1998a, 1998b) and Friedman, Johnson, 
Kaufmann and Zoido-Lobaton (1999) undertake empirical investigations of the 
relationship between corruption and the shadow economy. Friedman et al show that a 
one point increase in the corruption index (that is, corruption has worsened) for a 
group of countries in 1997 increased the share of the shadow economy by 7.6 %. 
They conclude that "... In summary, the relationship between the share of the 
unofficial economy and rule of law (including corruption) is strong and consistent 
across eight measures provided by six distinct organizations. All eight of the indices 
suggest that countries with more corruption have a higher share of the unofficial 
economy" (p. 27). 
Schneider and Enste (2000) provide a comprehensive survey of the estimates 
of the size of the shadow economy in 76 different countries using different methods of 
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estimation. They find that rising corruption has a positive impact on the growth of the 
shadow economy. 
3.3 Russia's Legitimate Private Sector, Shadow Economy 
and Corrupt Bureaucracy 
We examine how the three-sector structure of our model to be developed in 
section 3.4 is representative of actual observations in Russia in terms of its legitimate 
private sector, the shadow economy, and corrupt bureaucracy. 
The Legitimate Private Sector Labour Market in Russia 
Layard and Richter (1997) present an excellent discussion of the adjustment of 
Russia's labour market to the new capitalist economy. They suggest that Russia's 
successful labour market adjustment in the first few years of transition was 
predominantly the result of real wage flexibility. A Russian firm facing a fall in 
revenue is under far less pressure to maintain the real wage of its workforce than a 
firm in the United Kingdom. Not only can the firms pay workers less (even to the 
point of running up wage arrears), but the workers can also be put on short-time hours 
or involuntary leave. Thus few Russians are pushed out of their jobs. The 
unemployment rate in 1993 was only 5.3%. This compares favourably with 
unemployment rates in Poland (15%), in Hungary (12%), and in Slovakia (14"'0) 
(Financial Tipres, 29 July 1994, p. 1 1). 
Thus in the early stages of transition there appears to have been an implicit 
contract between firms and employees where employees accepted highly flexible 
wages and hours in return for job security. Employees were willing to accept these 
terms for three main reasons. 
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Firstly firms provide not only the wages of employees but also welfare, housing, 
and the use of the firm's tools which can be used for second jobs. Secondly, 
employment is a source of social identity and few people look forward to the prospect 
of unemployment. Thirdly, unemployment benefits are low. 
Firms were also willing to accept these terms for a number of reasons. The first 
reason is financial. Workers have to be paid high severance payments in the event of 
redundancy and it makes financial sense for the firms to keep employees on unpaid 
leave/ short-time hours instead of making them redundant. Secondly firms/ managers 
feel a strong obligation to workers either for paternalistic reasons or (increasingly) 
because workers tend to be the majority shareholders in the firms. Privatisation by 
the voucher system left a large number of former state-owned enterprises in the hands 
of the workers. Fear of unemployment and a lack of necessary incentives conspire to 
prevent workers from restructuring. Blanchard (1997) suggests that although 
restructuring leads to increases in productivity and output, the resulting initial increase 
in unemployment may increase opposition to restructuring and therefore slow down 
the economic recovery process. 
Unemployment rates remained below the Western European average of 10% 
until 1997. The table below shows unemployment rates in Russia from 1992. 
Table 3.2: Unemployment (annual average, in per cent of labour force) 
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Unemplovmrnt 0.0 4.8 5.3 7.1 8.5 9.6 10.8 11.8 12.7 10.6 9.0 
Source: EBRD Transition Report, 
Russia Economic Trends 
The August 1998 rouble crisis led to a small fall in employment: registered 
employment at large and medium-sized enterprises fell about 4",, from 43.7 million to 
ýJ 
42 million (Russian Economic Trends, 1999). Immediately after the August crisis, 
there was a surge in consumer prices that eroded real wages by 35% between August 
and October. Wage arrears owed by enterprises continued to rise and in 2001 totalled 
R29.8 billion, although in 2001 they rose more slowly than in previous years. In 
addition real wages increased by 22.1 % in 2001 compared to 19.6% in 2000. 
Thus, while unemployment increased in 1999, it declined again in 2000 and 2001 
in response to economic growth in Russia, as well as to continued real wage increases 
and a reduction in wage arrears. 
The decline in real wages and continuing growth of wage arrears in the mid 
1990s contributed to an increase in strike activity. Strike activity peaked in 1992, 
1997, and 1998-99. By the year 2000, the level of strike activity had fallen to near- 
zero levels. Below is a diagram showing strike activity in the 1990s. 
Figure 3.1: Level of strike activity from 1992-2000 
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The fall in real wages in 1998 was accompanied by a rise in wage differentiation. 
By December 1998, real wages in health care and education had fallen to 14-15°'0 of 
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wages in the finance and insurance industry (compared to 25% in Ucember 1997) 
(Russian Economic Trends 1999). By January 1999 real wages were down by 38° o 
from a year earlier (Russian Economic Trends, 1999). Wage differentiation across 
industries continued to grow: by 68% in 2000 and 65% in 2001. 
Despite unemployment reaching higher levels in the late 1990s, few bothered to 
register with the unemployment office. Graph 1 above shows the discrepancy 
between the number of unemployed workers and the number of registered 
unemployed. The data are from Russian Economic Trends. 
Figure 3.2: Discrepancy between actual unemployment and registered unemployment 
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There are a number of reasons for the low numbers of the registered unemployed 
Including low unemployment benefits, undeclared earnings, and distance from the 
Employment Office. 
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The Shadow Economy 
Russia is not a novice when it comes to a shadow economy. The USSR's 
"second" economy was well established and is well documented. 3 Treml and Alexeev- 
(1994) estimate that in the 1970s the second economy accounted for between 15-18% 
of total economic activity in the USSR. By the mid-1980s it had grown even larger, 
and by 1994 it was estimated to account for 40% of GDP (Schneider and Enste, 
2000). 
Kaufmann and Kaliberda (1996) suggest six main distinct characteristics of the 
shadow economy in the FSU (former Soviet Union) and CEE (Central and Eastern 
European Countries). These are: 
(i) The coexistence of state and shadow activities and enterprises 
Shadow sector activities are often carried out with the knowledge of state 
officials and are sometimes carried out with/in state assets such as buildings/ 
enterprises. 
(ii) Visibility and size 
Shadow activities are sometimes large and visible, although they are not 
always obvious as they take place within large state enterprises where part of 
the operation is official and part is unofficial 
activities employ the use of high technology. 
(iii) Extralegal in an economic sense 
In addition some shadow sector 
Shadow sector activities appear to be largely non-violent and non-criminal. 
and operate "unofficially" to escape regulatory burden and high taxation rates. 
There is also a criminal mafia, but this organisation appears to have a 
relatively small share of shadow sector activities. 
iti 
(iv) Continuum in the official-unofficial activity spectrum 
Shadow sector activities vary from operating fully in the official sector to 
being completely unofficial. In practice most operations take place in both 
economies. 
(v) Social services and state subsidies are accessible to unofficial activities 
The legacy of socialism, the existence of state and shadow activities, and the 
continuum in the official-unofficial spectrum means that almost every activity 
and individual is within the social security net 
expert at extracting resources from the State. 
(vi) The shadow economy is "shallow" 
Shadow sector activities are 
Decisions on operating in the official or unofficial economies depend largely 
on government-induced incentives rather than on well-entrenched operating 
procedures (such as the criminal Mafia). 
A presidential report contradicts Kaufmann and Kaliberda's assertion in (iii) 
above that the criminal Mafia appears to have a small share of shadow sector 
activities. The report suggests that 70-80% of all Russian private enterprises and 
commercial banks pay protection money to criminal gangs, amounting to between 10- 
20% of their turnover or to about half their profits. 4 Gustafson (1999) reports that 
almost all small consumer businesses, such as small shops, restaurants, cafes, kiosks, 
and even private farmers, pay extortion money (p. 137). In addition, of course, the 
income those criminal gangs obtain through extortion represents a loss of taxation 
revenue to the government on two counts. First, the businesses which pay extortion 
` tier for e\ample, Grossman (1977). Katsenelinhoigen (1977), O'Hea n (II) SO), Rumer (1981), I3auer (1 9S I ). Feldhn, L'te t NN'. 31, 
and Grossman and "l reml (198') and retcrrnces therein. 
(1 ustafson (1999) stales that the report %ýas \. ritten h\ Petr FiIippov in 1994 when 
he Has scr. ing as an ad%iser to the President 
and that the report is mpniaris d in The \cn+ )urk Times (Januar 30 1994). 
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money have less money left to pay taxes, and will probably under-report profits to 
take into account the loss of income. Second, criminal gangs obtain a large 
unreported income which is free of all government taxes. 
In addition, corrupt officials, who are seeking to obtain bribes, turn up (often 
unannounced) and threaten the companies with lengthy bureaucratic or legal 
procedures regarding the operation of their businesses/ the accuracy of the company 
(tax) accounts. In fact, the two are often in cahoots with each other. Gustafson 
suggests that "Organized gangs know whom to shake down and how much to 
demand, because an army of police officers, bank officials, and undercover agents 
serve as tipsters .... Extortion is hard to fight because nearly everyone has something 
to hide. Victims will not report crimes to the police, for fear of revealing their 
incomes to the tax inspectors or to corrupt officials who will tip off the gangsters. 
One Russian source estimates that 80% of all robberies and 90% of all frauds are 
never reported. "(p. 138). 
Schneider and Enste (2000) report a substantial increase in the size of Russia's 
shadow economy during the transition period: in 1994-95 it amounted to an average 
of 40% of GDP. The data are shown in the table below. 
Table 3.3: The size of Russia's shadow economy using the physical input (electricity) 
method of estimation (in percent of GDP) 
1990-93 (average) 1994-95 (average) 
Fstimates from Johnson et al 27 41 
Estimates from Lacko 36.9 39.2 
Sources: Calculations of Schneider and Enste (2000), using values of Johnson, Kaufmann, and Shleifcr 
(1 997, table 1, p .182-83); 
Johnson, Kaufmann and Zoida-Lobaton (1998a, p-151 ) and Lacko (1999. 
table 8) 
Kaufmann and Kaliberda (1996) also obtain an estimate for Russia's shadow 
economy of about 4O°, o using the macroelectric approach. 
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The Corrupt Bureaucracy 
Corruption of state officials is a big problem in Russia, infiltrating all aspects of 
the Russian economy. Transparency international's Corruption Perception Index 
(2000) estimated Russia's index of corruption as equal to 2.1 (out of a perfect score of 
10), ranking it 82nd worst out of 88 countries. 
Gustafson (1999) sites the following example to show the extent of corruption 
among local officials, police, soldiers, and border guards. "Russian soldiers and 
border guards play a key role. "If you have enough money, " says a Kyrgiz anti- 
narcotics official, "you can pay Russian border guards to deliver your opium in 
helicopters. ""(p. 141). 
Another example is one given to me personally by Mark Harrison who has 
visited Russia on many occasions. "The day after I had been shaken down by police 
for a couple of hundred rubles, a friend told me that a German journalist had been 
interviewed on the radio. I le had been stopped by the (notoriously corrupt) GAI, the 
traffic police. He said: "Why did you stop me? I've done nothing wrong. " The 
policeman said: "Why should my wife and children have to wait for you to do 
something wrong? " it .5 
Goldman (1998) compiled a list of the 12 wealthiest men in Russia who between 
them control most parts of the economy including oil, media, transport, heavy 
industry, finance and banking, and computers and electronics. Goldman assorts that 
in 1988 none of these men had a net worth of more than S 10,000. They have grown 
rich on the back of the transition process. The list includes Anatoly Chubais, the 
former deputy prime minister. who has also been the President of the electricity 
monopoly UES. His varied political career included being in charge of the State 
stark Harrison in personal correspondence, 12 June 2001. 
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Committee on Privatisation (where he designed and implemented the voucher 
privatisation of state-owned enterprises), and negotiating loans with the INIF (he 
convinced the IMF to provide Russia with $22 billion in loans, double the expected 
amount). In the summer of 1999 Anatoly Chubais was one of the first names on the 
prosecutor-general Yuri Skuratov's list of Russia's corrupt politicians involved in 
money laundering. Also on the prosecutor-general's list was Andrei Kozyrev, the 
former foreign minister. Boris Yeltsin, the ex-President of Russia, and his family, 
have also been linked to corruption. 
In the summer of 1999, the problem of corruption came to a head with the IMF 
halting loans to Russia until allegations of money laundering had been investigated. 
In fact, recent IMF policies stress "good governance" as a (pre-) condition of the 
lending process. Wolf and Gurgen (2000) examine the relationship between 
governance and corruption in transition economies. Governance is the "manner in 
which governments discharge their responsibilities" (p. 4). Governance covers a wider 
range of government activities than corruption, and is a broader concept than 
corruption. Poor governance, he suggests, creates opportunities and incentives for 
corruption and thus governance must be improved if corruption is to be reduced. 
Wolf and Gurgen focus on three main areas where governance needs to be improved. 
Firstly government intervention, regulation and discretion in the economy needs to be 
reduced. Secondly, government accountability, transparency and financial 
management need to be enhanced. Thirdly, an effective environment for efficient 
market-based activities needs to be created. The authors discuss the efforts the IMF is 
undertaking to improve governance in transition countries. 
`ý ý_ 
3.4 The Basic Model 
This model comprises three distinct sectors: a bureaucracy, a legitimate private 
sector, and a shadow economy. The first two are referred to collectively as the 
legitimate sector (L): the legitimate sector is that part of the private economy which is 
subject to direct and indirect official taxation. Income in the shadow economy is not 
liable to taxation. Total output Y of the economy is given by: 
Y=YL +YS 
where YL is output from the legitimate sector (registered output) and }s is output 
from the shadow economy. Registered output is given by the modified Cobb Douglas 
output function: 
ZBBZP K (I-Ya-Yr) (1 ) YL -06 L 
where: E (0,1) 
. 
for i=B, P; YP ý YB ; aZ 
> 0, ,<0 
P aZp 
where Z and K are the labour and capital inputs of production respectively, and labour 
is divided into the bureaucratic labour input, Z. , and the 
legitimate private sector 
labour input, Z,,. Let ZB and Zp denote the number of hours worked in the 
bureaucracy and private sector. 
We assume that while governments fix bureaucratic wages and the number of 
bureaucrats, the number of workers in the legitimate private sector and the shadow 
economy is determined by perfect mobility between the sectors. For the purposes of 
this model, the capital input is normalised to 1. 
8 1) 
The legitimate private sector 
The gross wage rate (wý) in the legitimate private sector is determined by the 
marginal productivity of labour. That is, 
Wp= 
laYL 
= aL YPZBB Z 
(yp-1) 
(2) 
VZ PP 
And the official net wage (it, ") is: 
ýtý =ý1-v)wP (3) 
where z is the official tax rate 
A worker's take-home-pay is reduced by the amount he has to pay in bribes to 
public officials for various public goods and services he requires on a day-to-day 
basis. Chugh and Uppal (1986) characterise bribes as 'private taxation collected by 
public officials, who wield the effective monopoly power invested in them to ssue 
permits, licences for scarce commodities or import/export licences, etc., for their 
private gain' (p. 71). We assume that corruption acts as a (unofficial) proportional tax 
(re. ) on workers. Thus their net unofficial wage is: 
IV =(1-T-Zc)A'P 
The shadow economy, 
(4) 
Workers can move in and out of the shadow economy with ease, and wages are 
not taxed, either officially or unofficially. Output of the shadow sector is given by: 
Y= as Zs Ys K ('-Ys) 
where: Ys E (0,1) ; YP+YB>YSI aýa2}a, >aL, >0, ;< 5 zs azs_ 
(5) 
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where ZS , and the number of hours worked 
in the shadow economy. The shadow 
economy is assumed to produce the same goods as the legitimate private sector but 
has a different production function. Frey and Weck suggest that the reason for this is 
that in the shadow economy property rights and contracts are not enforceable by 
public law. This may result in different information and transactions costs involved in 
production activities. The gross wage of the shadow sector worker is also given by 
his marginal productivity. That is: 
ws aZ 
s= 
as Ys Zs (6) 
Although the gross wage is not officially taxed, individuals face a risk SS of being 
detected and punished, and deduct this from their gross wage. Therefore the net wage 
is given by: 
11's =(1-os)ws 
The corrupt public bureaucracy 
(7) 
Market forces do not determine the bureaucrats' official wage rate. The 
government bases the official bureaucratic wage on the tax revenues it should receive 
rather than what it will receive given its weak tax base. Government spending G is 
only used to pay public employees. 
Public bureaucrats also pay income taxes and this is deducted at source. Public 
bureaucrats are paid a pre-determined after-tax official wage of 
G= (l - Z)WB Ze 
G=w"Ze (8) 
Each bureaucrat receives a net official «vage it' .I lowcver. we assume that all 
bureaucrats are (equally) corrupt and supplement their wages with the proceeds from 
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a corruption tax on legitimate private sector wages. The definition of corruption used 
in this paper is the (mis-) use of public office for personal gain. The bureaucrat faces, 
a risk SB of being caught for corruption and deducts this from the proceeds of corrupt 
activities. Thus, the after-tax unofficial wage for bureaucrats is given by: 
WB =WB +\1-SB)CWP 
ZP 
ZB 
(9) 
where (5B is the probability of being caught for corruption. We assume that workers 
in the other sectors are not penalised for bribing public officials and as such assign a 
figure of zero to the risk of being caught in the act, and that all bureaucrats earn the 
same amount from the corruption tax. The risk of detection varies between shadow 
and public sectors SB >_ SS . In an economy with a 
large shadow economy and a 
corrupt bureaucracy, the probability of being caught and punished is close to zero 
(SB---> O; öS - O) 
For the purpose of this paper it will be assumed that the proceeds of corruption, 
bribes, although unreported to the tax authority, are distinct from the tax evasive 
activities associated with the shadow economy. In the case of the former, government 
property (and office) is involved and in the case of the latter, it is private property. In 
addition the official wage of bureaucrats is taxed at source, and hence bureaucrats are 
unable to evade taxes on their official wage. 
Government revenue is derived from taxation. Taxes are levied on income 
(equals output) in the legitimate private sector. Thus, any policies that affect labour 
or productivity in the legitimate private sector will affect tax revenues received by the 
bureaucracy. There are, how ever, some policies that affect taxation revenues that do 
not affect productivity in the legitimate private sector In particular in an economy 
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with widespread tax arrears, tax exemptions, tax deferrals, inter-enterprise arrears. and 
barter are allowed, some taxes are levied but not paid and hence the government faces 
a weakening of its tax collection ability. Although income is declared and liable to 
taxation the government finds it difficult to collect the taxes. Thus tax revenues arc 
actually given by: 
T= pTYL 0: 5 p<1 (10) 
where p is the tax collection rate and is fixed for the purpose of the paper. 
The budget constraint of the government is given, rather restrictively by: 
G=T 
where G is government spending, and T is taxation revenue. In order to concentrate 
on the essential issues, we assume that there is no external debt and no seigniorage. 
The government spends G=T= rYL but only receives revenues of T=p TYL . 
Thus, (1- p)zYL = del', where def is the budget deficit. As there is no debt, the 
government finances the deficit by running up payment arrears. 
The government has three main options when it comes to reducing the size of the 
budget deficit. Reduce spending (G), increase taxation revenues by increasing the tax 
rate (r), and increase taxation revenues by increasing the tax collection rate (p ) 
Equilibrium employment and resource constraint 
Workers move easily between the legitimate private sector and the shadow 
economy. Workers will move into the legitimate private sector if "wS < ivp, and into 
the shadow sector if tits > VIwP . When ve =tip , an equilibrium 
distribution between 
the two sectors is reached. However, the high barriers to entry into the bureaucracy, 
and the fact that the market does not determine the official «vage of bureaucrats. 
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means that the market does not directly determine the movement of labour between 
the private sectors and the bureaucracy. The number of bureaucrats employed in the 
period under consideration is constant. 
The full employment condition is given by: 
Z+ zs =N- zB 
aZ 
p<0; 
IZs 
<o 
azs azp 
where N is the total workforce. An increase in legitimate sector employment results 
in a reduction in shadow sector work. This assumes that there is no unemployment, 
only shadow sector activity. This is not unrealistic in countries without well- 
functioning welfare systems - such as Russia - where people who lose their jobs in the 
legitimate private/ public sectors have little or no alternative source of support if they 
do not engage in some form of shadow sector work. 
There is a resource constraint between the legitimate private sector and the 
shadow economy which indicates the limitations of employment expansion, all things 
remaining equal. This ensures that legitimate sector employment is negatively related 
to shadow sector employment. 
If for any reason the size of the total workforce increases (for example if there is 
an increase in immigrants), then both P and S will increase as workers distribute 
themselves according to the relative effect on marginal productivities. Equilibrium 
employment is given when ii's = tii'p. That is, from equations (4) and (7), 
(1 
-T -Tc 
W= (1 - Ss wt's 
ý1 
-T- t( YPZeeZpr"-I 
)= ý1-fis 
sYsZsr' 
ýý 
Solving for Z., 
88 
[(i - 
Ss 
s Ys Zsrs -I 
) rP -i ZP = 
\l - 
Z-TC 
/"`'L! PZBB 
From (11) it follows that as employment in the legitimate private sector increases, 
there is an increase in the equilibrium number of shadow sector workers 
az1 
>0 azs 
because of diminishing returns to shadow sector work. 
Solving for ZS , 
\i -t- 
ZC 
! ""LYPZBeZPYP-ýý 
Ys 
ZS = 
(1-Ss)sYs (1? ) 
From (12) it follows that the equilibrium level of employment in the shadow 
economy also increases if and the equilibrium number of legitimate private sector 
workers rise 
az'5 
>0 As the risks of detection for shadow sector activity azp 
increases, the size of the shadow economy falls 
aZS 
<0. 
ass 
Our basic model shows that a corrupt bureaucracy does affect the distribution of 
labour between the shadow and legitimate private sectors, as participation in the legal 
economy becomes more expensive (through the proportional tax). This confirms the 
results of previous studies (such as Owoye and Bendardaf (1996)) which show that 
corruption adversely affects economic growth through its impact on the labour and 
production markets. 
3.5 Reduced Expenditure 
The bureaucracy attempts to reduce spending to reduce the budget deficit and 
lnlprove the balance of payments- IMF policies for most transition and developing 
countries encourage improved budget deficits. 
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The bureaucracy can do this by reducing the real wages of bureaucrats. In the 
worst case scenario where tax collection rates are very low (p --ý 0) the government 
may be unable to pay bureaucrats in a particular period. Instead the government 
informs bureaucrats that they will be paid sometime in the future, when revenues 
improve. Wage arrears to public bureaucrats in Russia have been a feature of post- 
communist transition. 
Officials therefore face real wage reductions, and even the possibility that their 
net official wage may equal zero in any period. Assuming corrupt bureaucrats wish to 
maintain a constant net wage, they supplement the fall in the official wage with 
increased proceeds of corruption. From equation (9), the corruption tax for a i,,, cn 
total wage of 1,, B is given 
by: 
[____-(1 - 
T) wI'H ZR 
\1 - 
öB )11'P Z, 
(13) 
From equation (13), it follows that the corruption tax increases when the real gross 
official bureaucratic wage decreases 
a -CC 
-- 
(1- T)z8 
<0 This result is 
aß'ä (1 - SB)ýt'g ZP 
supported by other studies which adopt different theoretical and empirical approaches. 
For example, Andvig and Moene (1990) find that the lower the salary of bureaucrats, 
the higher the incidence of corruption. They suggest that many developing countries 
are forced to cut public spending as a cure for the balance-of-payment problem: if this 
also implies that the real wages of civil servants are cut more than those in the private 
sector this will result in an increase in corruption. 
The rise in the corruption tax as a result of the fall in the bureaucratic official 
wage results in a fall in legitimate private sector employment ment <0 and an 
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increase in shadow sector activity 
aZs 
>0I. As legitimate private sector a Tý- 
employment falls, taxation revenues fall, both as a result of less employment 
1aT >0 and lower tax collection rates aP <0. Registered output falls azf a -rC 
aYL 
>0. Shown diagrammatically below, az,, 
Figure 3.4: The impact of a fall in real bureaucratic wages on emplol"ment 
tcl 1c2 
Zp 
Zs 
ws 
The economy is initially in equilibrium at E,. The fall in real official 
bureaucratic wages results in a rise in the corruption tax from T( , to T(, . 
The rise in 
the corruption tax lowers the (unofficial) legitimate private sector wage at each and 
every level of employment, from tit,,, to 'ti',,, . 
The corruption effect results in a rise 
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in shadow sector employment (from ZS, to ZS, ) at the expense of legitimate private 
sector employment (from ZPO to ZP2) . Real wages in the shadow sector fall in line 
with increased employment in that sector, from w sj to tits, . The final equilibrium 
position of the economy is E,. 
In the worst case scenario, bureaucrats may be unpaid in a particular period. 
That is, wB = 0. In which case the corruption tax will be at its maximum, 
[WB (1 
- T)wB 
ZB 
(1- Sa )wg ZP 
Interestingly, private sector wage arrears (ti' - 0) - also a feature of post- 
communist Russia - would imply there is no private sector wage on which bureaucrats 
can levy a corruption tax. The corrupt bureaucrats lose their corruption tax base. 
Thus, the net unofficial wage of bureaucrats would be approximately equal to their net 
official wage (from equation (12) itB = %i' ). That is, unless private sector workers 
run up corruption tax arrears! The running up of private sector wage arrears may 
have inadvertently provided an antidote to the corruption effect that is associated with 
public sector wage arrears. This result is indirectly supported by Andvig and Moene's 
findings (see explanation below equation 13) that if the real wages of civil servants 
are cut more than those in the private sector this will result in an increase in 
corruption. In our model, it is possible that those in the private sector had their wages 
cut by at least the same amount as bureaucrats, that is, to zero. 
3.6 Increased Taxation 
In an economy with a corrupt bureaucracy and a shadow economy. a rise in the 
official tax rate has a dual effect on employment: 
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(1) Disincentive effect on employment in the taxed sector 
aZP 
< 0; 
±Z-` 
>0I. This ýz ýr 
effect is well documented and researched. 
(2) Corruption effect 
T` 
>0O. As the net official bureaucratic wage falls from a 
rý T 
rise in official taxation, the corruption tax rises and there is a rise in shadow sector 
employment IaZ-s >0 at the expense of legitimate private sector employment a -CC 
K azi, 
<0. From equation (9), 
r`- X18 ZB 
>0. The dual effect on 
-CC (1-Z, 
employment is shown in the diagram below. 
Figure 3.5: Dual impact of an increase in official tax rates on c'niplminent 
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The economy is initially in equilibrium at E, E. A rise in the official tax rate t, to 
'r, results in a fall in legitimate sector employment (from Zr,, to Z,,, ) and a rise in 
shadow sector activity (from Zs., to Z2). However the rise in the official tax rate 
results in a fall in the net official bureaucratic wage. This leads to a rise in the 
corruption tax to 'r e, 5 and a corruption effect resulting in a further fall in employment 
in the legitimate private sector (from Z,,, to Zß, 3 
), and a further rise in shadow sector 
employment (from ZS 2 to Zs, 
). The final equilibrium position of the economy is 
E3. 
The impact of an increase in official tax rates on tax revenues is less clear. The 
optimal rate of tax is the tax rate at which tax revenues are maximised. Usually a rise 
in the official tax rate will result in a rise in taxation revenue if the official tax rate is 
less than the optimal rate of tax (r<_ r). The Laffer curve is shown below for the 
case where the optimal rate of tax occurs when the tax rate is 0.5 (50%): 
The Laffer curve: perfect tax collection 
30- 
25- 
20- 
15- 
10- 
5- 
0- 
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 
tax rate 
Figure 3.6: The Laffi'r Curie 
However in our model legitimate private sector employment decisions are also based 
on the unofficial corruption tax levied by corrupt bureaucrats. A rise in the official 
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tax rate causes a rise in the corruption tax rate which reduces output further and has a 
negative impact on taxation revenues. Indeed, taxation revenues in the presence of 
bureaucratic corruption are lower at every rate of tax than when corruption is absent. 
Taxation revenues are therefore maximised when the official rate of tax and the 
corruption tax are equal to the optimal rate of tax. That is, when z+ -rc = r' . Thus 
taxation revenues will rise as long as r <_ T' - -r,. 
In tables 3.4 and 3.5 below we use the equation for taxation revenues from 
equation 10, T=pz YL , to simulate taxation revenues with and without corruption. 
In table 3.4 we assume that output declines by units of 10 as the tax rate rises by ten 
percentage points and that there is no corruption. The optimal rate of official taxation 
occurs at 50%. The tax collection rate, p=0.9, is constant for the period in question. 
Table 3.4: Tax revenues in a non-corrupt economy where output falls by ten units 
for cvcri' ten percentage point increase in the official tax rate 
P yL T (no corruption) 
0.9 0 100 0 
0.9 0.1 90 8.1 
0.9 0.2 80 14.4 
0.9 0.3 70 18.9 
0.9 0.4 60 21.6 
0.9 0.5 50 22.5 
0.9 0.6 40 21.6 
0.9 0.7 30 18.9 
0.9 0.8 20 14.4 
0.9 0.9 101 8.1 
0.9 1 0 0 
I lowever, in the presence of corruption, a ten percentage point increase in the tax 
rate results in output falling by more than ten units. This is because the rise in the 
official tax rate leads to an associated rise in the corruption tax rate: we assume that 
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each ten percentage point increase in the official tax rate results in a 2.5 percentage 
point increase in the corruption tax rate. Table 3.5 shows that output now falls by 
12.5 points for each ten percentage point increase in the official tax rate. Taxation 
revenues are now lower at each and every level of the official tax rate. Indeed, the 
optimal rate of official taxation now occurs at 40% rather than 50%. 
Table 3.5. Tax revenues in a corrupt economy where output noºt' fills by 12.5 
units for every ten percentage point increase in the official tax rate 
P Z Tý T +TC 
(Effective rate 
of tax) 
y'L T (corruption) 
0.9 0 0 0 100 0 
0.9 0.1 0.025 0.125 87.5 7.875 
0.9 0.2 0.05 0.25 75 13.5 
0.9 0.3 0.075 0.375 62.5 16.875 
0.9 0.4 0.1 0.5 50 18 
0.9 0.5 0.125 0.625 37.5 16.875 
0.9 0.6 0.15 0.75 25 13.5 
0.9 0.7 0.175 0.875 12.5 7.875 
0.9 0.8 0.2 1 0 0 
0.9 0.9 0.225 1.125 0 0 
0.9 1 0.25 1.25 0 0 
Figure 3.7 shows the Laffer curves with and without corruption. 
Taxation revenues: optimal rate of official tax is lower with bureaucratic 
corruption 
25 
20 
Laffer curve 
O Corrupt Laffer curve 
15 
10 
5 
0 
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 
Tax rate 
Figure 3.7: Diagram showing simulated Laffer curves with and without 
corruption 
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This analysis raises questions about the optimal rate of tax in the presence of a 
corruption tax, and has important policy implications. 
Figure 3.8 shows, more generally, Laffer curves with and without corruption 
present. These more general curves will be used in the theoretical analysis to follow 
below. 
The impact of an increase in tax rates on the corruption tax, legitimate sector 
employment, and taxation revenues is shown in the diagram below. 
97 
Figure 3.8: Taxation Revenues are lower in the presence o/'bureaucratic corruption 
Figure 39: Impact of'an increase in tax rates on taxation revenues 
T 
,c 
ipt Laffer 
T( 
Lp 
A positive corruption tax reduces taxation revenues at each and every level of 
official tax rates. As official tax rates rise, the corruption tax also increases. Tax 
revenues continue to rise as long as 2 <_ T* - T(" Legitimate private sector 
employment falls as official tax rates rise, both through the disincentive effect and 
through the corruption effect. 
The government can help prevent an increase in corruption by increasing the 
gross official wage of bureaucrats in line with the tax increase to keep their net 
official wage constant. 
Alternatively the government could increase tax revenues and tax collection 
rates. An improvement in tax collection rates (p) does not directly affect the 
distribution of labour between the legitimate private sector and the shadow 
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economy 
LZL 
= 0; 
aZ 
=0I. There is however an improvement in taxation ap ap 
revenues ( 
aT 
> 0). The main reason for this is that employment decisions are based 
ap 
on the official rate of tax, while the weakness of the tax base depends on structural 
characteristics. 
Policies which advocate "good governance", for example, see recent IMF 
publications, involve removing the opportunities for corruption and increasing the 
detection rates of corruption 
IZC 
<0. 
a68 
3.7 Comparison 
Our analysis raises the following question: is the corruption effect generated by 
tax increases greater or less than the corruption effect generated by reduced 
bureaucratic wages. That is, is 
a r(. a r(. > az a, ýB 
The corruption effect generated by tax increases in greater than the corruption effect 
generated by reduced bureaucratic wages as long as: 
1BZe (1-z)Za >0 ý1-Se)w', ZP ýl-3B)"gZP 
which occurs if WB >I-T 
Thus, the corruption effect of increased official taxation outweighs that of 
decreased expenditure in all cases except where it 8 <1- T. This would occur 
if 
bureaucrats are unpaid in a particular period (titwB =0), as is the case when the 
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government chooses to run up wage arrears to public bureaucrats instead of paying 
them. In which case the corruption tax associated with public sector wage arrears will 
- be at its maximum z, = 
(WB (1 
-T)we ZB 
ý1 6B) 
P 
ZP 
This will exceed the corruption effect 
from increased taxation. 
3.8 Fiscal Policy in Russia and the Results of our Model 
We examine Russia's recent fiscal policy in terms of expenditure and taxation 
revenues and then examine whether the results predicted by the analysis of our model 
have been observed in post-communist Russia. As the data we have for corruption 
start from 1996, this is the period we will focus most of our efforts on. 
There is almost unanimous agreement that one of the most important causes of 
the 1998 Russian crisis was the persistent fiscal deficits that prevailed since 1992 
which were associated with high expenditure, an outmoded tax regime, the slow 
restructuring of enterprises, substantial shadow and barter economies, and corruption. 
This was neatly summarised by the World Economic Outlook (October 1998). 
"Although external developments, including the Asian crisis and associated weakness 
of energy prices, contributed to Russia's difficulties, domestic policy shortcomings 
were more important. In particular, the failure over many years to bring the fiscal 
situation under control led to levels of public debt and debt service payments that 
increasing appeared unsustainable. The fiscal problems, in turn, ori`, inated in failure 
to reform the tax system, inadequate tax collection that formed part of a culture of 
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nonpayment, lack of spending discipline in important areas, and slow progress in 
structural reform.... " (p. 7). 
After the 1998 economic crisis, the government decreased expenditures to more 
manageable levels. 
Table 3.6: Federal Budget Expenditures (% of GDP) 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Expenditures 19.4 19.0 15.2 15.2 13.5 14.7 
Source: Kussian Economic I rends 
More important, though, was the improvement in tax collection rates post-1998. 
In fact, there seem to have been two distinct periods of tax policy in Russia: 1992- 
1999, and 2000 to date. 
Tax policy from 1992-1999 
There was no comprehensive overhaul of Russia's tax regime during this period. 
Slow and inconsistent tax reforms were attempted, and deep political and economic 
tensions lay in tax reform. A larger part of the tax burden fell on enterprises than on 
individuals, and these enterprises faced taxes which were based on revenue not profit. 
In addition, the legislation governing the tax system was frequently changed and 
the tax regime lacked transparency. Widespread tax avoidance, tax deferrals and tax 
privileges caused the tax base to shrink. The deterioration in tax revenues were also 
be blamed on the decline in output and profits, reductions in certain rates (such as 
export tariffs), and the deterioration in tax discipline. The table below gives an 
indication of tax revenues which rose by only 1.5 percent of GDP over a four-year 
period. 
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Table 3.7: Federal Budget Taxation revenue (% of GDP) 
1996 1997 1998 1999 
Tax revenue 9.9 10.1 8.8 11.4 
Source: Russian Economic Trends 
Poor taxation revenues in Russia appear to be the result from two main factors: a 
weak tax base, and a rise in non-monetary means of payment. 
(I) Poor Tax Collection 
The 1997 EBRD Transition Report recognised that Russia's shrinking tax base 
was caused not only by the decline in output and profits but also by the impact of tax 
exemptions, tax deferrals and other tax concessions. The Report suggests that at the 
end of 1996 total tax concessions amounted to an estimated Rb 163 trillion (7.2% of 
GDP) and tax arrears amounted to Rb 128 trillion (5.7% of GDP). There has also 
been an increase in tax evasion: at the beginning of 1997 about one-third of 
enterprises did not pay any taxes, and only 16.6% of enterprises were regularly paying 
taxes. 
(Il) Non-Monetary Means of Transactions 
Gara (2001) suggests that in 1997 banks and non-financial enterprises issued 
about 27.5 trillion promissory notes, equal to 1.1% of GDP, and barter accounted for 
approximately half of inter-enterprise transactions in 1998. As such, only a third of 
the overall amount of all transactions are monetised. 
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Causes 
Inter-enterprise arrears 
The growth in inter-enterprise arrears and barter in Russia has given rise to 
debate about the causes of these phenomena. Treisman (2000) suggests that ove rdue 
payables to suppliers in industry, agriculture, transport and construction increased 
from 6.6% of GDP in 1993 to 17.7% in 1998. The percentage of total pavables that 
were overdue increased from 39% in 1993 to 56% in 1998. Treisman suggests that 
the main reason for this trend is political. In particular, "politically inspired cross- 
subsidization of certain less profitable sectors (agriculture, ferrous metallurgy) by 
more profitable ones (electricity, gas, and pipeline transport)" (p. 234). He quotes 
Sergey Dubinin, the deputy chairman of the board of Gazprom, saying "all kinds of 
political pressures are exerted to keep the company from cutting off delinquent clients 
- from government resolutions prohibiting cutoffs to specific organizations to more 
subtle pressures" (p. 234). 
Barter 
Barter is undertaken by both profitable and loss-making enterprises, although 
utilities appear to play a disproportionately bigger role in the barter economy. Barter 
is attractive to many firms and enterprises as it helps to avoid government restrictions 
on price cuts and taxation. In addition, barter is accepted as a means of transaction in 
an economy with huge political pressures to continue dealing with unprofitable 
business partners. Other reasons for the spread of barter include the role of rnonetar' 
policy in scN-ci-cly demonitising the economy 
Implications 
A large number of non-monetary transactions result in various implications for 
the eCOnOmV. 
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(i) Transactions costs 
Non-monetary means of transacting, especially barter, results in a higher level of 
transaction costs. 
(ii) Incentives to reduce costs 
There is less incentive to reduce costs, as a higher price for a company's products 
transferred to suppliers under barter enable a company to offset a larger proportion of 
its liabilities to its suppliers. 
(iii) Confusion 
There is confusion about the multiple prices generated by cash and non-cash rubles. 
A ruble in cash is worth more than a ruble's worth of bartered goods. 
(iv) Distorted information 
The widespread use of non-monetary means of payments leads to a distortion of 
company accounts/ company information. This proves particularly difficult for 
investors and creditors. 
(v) Tax avoidance/ tax evasion 
The growing use of non-monetary means of payment in the economy leads to a 
growing problem of tax non-payment, tax evasion, and tax avoidance. 
Tax policy from 2000-2002 
The Russian government has focused on improving tax collection rates and 
reducing tax arrears since the year 2000. The new Tax Code which was introduced in 
2000 changed the structure of tax revenues and improved taxation revenues. The 
government adjusted import and export tariffs, pegging crude oil export tariffs to 
world prices: the tariff is zero when oil prices are below S 12.50 per barrel. and then 
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there are a series of tariffs up to a maximum of S45 per tonne when the oil price is 
$32.50 per barrel or higher. 
For the first time since 1992, the federal budget run a surplus in the year 2000 
mainly because of high revenues from increased exports and rapid economic growth. 
Oil export duties alone contributed R171 billion, about 15% of total federal budget 
revenue (compared to only 7% in 1999). The budget revenue exceeded target 
revenues by almost 40% (Russian Economic Trends, 2001). 
During 2000, non-monetary means of payment begun to give way to monetary 
forms of payment: the share of barter and promissory notes declined significantly. 
The federal budget law for 2001 (which was passed by the Duma in December 
2000) aimed to achieve a balanced budget for the first time in post-Soviet history and 
without drastic expenditure cuts. 
Total tax arrears to the budget from the beginning of the 1990s to the end of 2001 
amounted to R475 billion, although in 2001 tax arrears increased by only RII billion 
compared with R86 billion growth in 2000 (RET, 2001). 
The table below shows Russia's federal taxation revenue which grew by about 
2.3% between 1999 and 2000 (higher than the 1.5% tax revenue growth over the four- 
year period from 1996-1999) and by 2.5% between 2000 and 2001. 
Table 3.8: Federal Budget Taxation revenue (% of GDP) 
1999 2000 2001 
Tax revenue 11.4 13.7 16.2 
The Results of Our Model and the Outcomes in Russia 
Our results show that there are consequences for employment, output, and 
taxation revenues of fiscal policy-induced changes in bureaucratic corruption \il 
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obvious restriction is the short time series data available for Russia, which makes a 
more in depth and concrete empirical analysis impossible. Anal-vsis of the data in this 
section is therefore intended to be indicative, rather than an attempt to produce 
concrete empirical results. 
Result 1: 
Corruption does affect the distribution of labour between the shadow and 
legitimate private sectors as participation in the legal economy become., more 
expensive (through the proportional tax). A rise in corruption results in a Jill in 
legitimate private sector employment and output. 
The date we use for corruption is from the Corruption Perceptions Index 
(henceforth CORPI). Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index 
(2000) discusses the methodology, limitations, and problems with the data. The data 
for Russia are only available annually, from 1996-2001. Perfect scores (no 
corruption) equal 10 points, while totally corrupt economies gain a score of 0 points. 
Thus the higher the score the less corrupt the economy. 
We use employment data given by the Russian authorities. The data are the 
employed population as a percentage of the 15 to 72 year age group. The data are 
only available until the year 2000. From the first result of our model, wc expect a 
positive empirical relationship between employment and the CORPI: as the CORPI 
improves, employment should rise. 
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Table 3.9: CORPI and employment rates in Russia 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
CORPI 2.58 2.27 2.4 2.4 2.1 
Employment 57.6 54.9 53.0 57.2 58.4 
Sources: Corruption Perceptions Index; Goskomstat Rossii (2002), Rossilskil Statisticheskii 
Ezhcgodnkik 200 1. Statisticheskii Sbornik, Moscow: Ofitsial'noe izdanie, p. 134. 
Figure 3.10: Graph showing CORPI and employment rates in Russia (with trend line) 
CORPI and employment rates in Russia, 
1996-2000 
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The trend line in the diagram above, which is not statistically significant, indicates a 
negative relationship between CORPI and employment rates, contrary to the 
prediction of our theoretical results. Looking at the data more closely, between 1996 
and 1997 there was a deterioration in the CORTI and, as our model predicts, a fall in 
employment. However, the expected relationship appears to break down at this point. 
Between 1997 and 1998 there is an improvement in the CORPI but a fiall in 
employment. Then in 1999 there is an improvement in employment with the CORPI 
remaining at its new improved level. The CORPI deteriorates again in 2000, 
accompanied by a rise in employment. 
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There could be any number of reasons for the break down of the relationship 
between the CORPI and employment rate, aside from the data issues connected with 
the measurement of the CORPI and the employment rates. For instance, thcre could 
be a lag between changes in corruption and changes in employment becausc of 
impediments to labour mobility between the legitimate private sector and the shadoýý,, 
economy (such as employment contracts). Alternatively, Russia's unique labour 
market characteristics which involve implicit contracts between firm and workers 
about hours of work and pay could distort the relationship between corruption and 
employment data. 
In order to establish an indicative relationship betwcen the CORPI and 
employment rates with a larger data set the CORPI and unemployment rates in a 
cross-section of countries will be examined. Data on employment rates as 
percentages rather than amounts are not readily available in all cases. As such xe use 
unemployment data. From result I we expect a negative association between 
unemployment and the CORPI: as the CORPI improves, unemployment falls. 
Below is a graph of the countries featured in the Corruption Perceptions Index 
(2000) and their unemployment rates. 
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Figure 3.1 ]. - CORPIfor the year (2000) for all the countries in the CORN surve. 1, and 
the unemployment rates in the countries 
Corruption Perceptions Index (CORPI) for the year 2000 for all the countries in 
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This graph indicates a negative relationship between the -ý,, ariables: as corruption 
improves, unemployment falls.. However, the result cannot be verified for Russia 
alone because of lack of data. 
Our theoretical model also predicts a positive relationship between corruption 
and output: as corruption improves, output improves. 
Table 3.10: CORPI and real output in Russia 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
CURPI 2.58 2 . 
27 2.4 2.4 2.1 2.3 
GDP (R bn 2000) 6677 6734 6445 6749 7335 7696 
Sources: Corruption Perceptions Index 
Russian Economic Trends 
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Figure 3.12. - Diagram showing CORN and real output in Russia 
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Output rises steadily from 1996 until 2001, with the exception of a fall in 1998. 
Corruption, on the other hand, fluctuates over the six-year period. There is no 
indication of a positive correlation between CORPI and output for this data set. 
Result 2: 
A fidl in bureaucratic wages results in a rise in corruption. The rise in 
corruption has a ncgat ýf , 
fect of emploYnient. 
We have suggested that the data appear to indicate a negative correlation between 
corruption and unemployment in result I above for a cross-section of countries. We 
now move on to examine whether there are any indications that a fall in bureaucratic 
wages might suggest an associated rise in corruption. tý 
There is no useful data on public sector wages for 1996-2001 but there is data on 
government expenditure. We expect, from our theoretical results, that a reduction in 
(loverrinicrit expendItUre may be associated with an increase in comiption or vice 
versa. 
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Table 3.11. - CORN and Federal Budget Expenditures (/o of GDP) 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
CORPI 2.58 2.27 2.4 2.4 2.1 -) 'I -. -1 
Expenditures 19.4 19.0 15.2 15.2 13.5 14.7 
Source: Kussian Economic I rends 
The expected relationship holds for the years, 1996-97, for 1998-99, and for 2000- 
2001, but not consecutively for 1996-2001. 
Figure 3.13. - CORPI und Federul Budget Expenditurcs (% ol'GDP) 
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When the data set is plotted in a diagram (above) the indicative trend line suggests a 
positive correlation between an increase in expenditure and an improvement in the 
CORPI, as Suggested by our theoretical result. Z-- 
Result 3: 
An increase in tax rates results in an Inci-case 'I, c, oj, j, jjptj, oj, jj(ýg(jtjj, eýj, 
at/ý'c"ts c'nIJ)lc» mi»ent. 
This is a difficult relationship to test empirically at the best of times, especially as 
tax rates do not change annually whereas our corruption data does. We expect some 
indication of a positive relationship between tax rates and corruption: as tax rates rise, 
corruption nses. 
Income tax rates in Russia changed in 2001 compared to 2000: personal income 
tax was reduced to a flat rate of 13% compared with three income tax bands in the 
year 2000 (12%, 16% and 25%). Our model predicts that corrupt, on should improve 
over this period. In fact, it did. The CORPI improved from 2.1 in the year 2000 to 
2.3 in 2001. 
Result 4: 
An improvement in tax collection rates (p) does not directli, af Tect the 
distribution of labour between the legitimate private sector and the shadow economy. 
There is however an improvement in taxation revenues. The main reason for this is 
that employment decisions are based on the official rate of tax, while the weakness of 
the tax base depends on structural characteristics such as a corrupt bureaucracy. 
As discussed earlier, Russia has worked on improving tax collection in recent 
years and has experienced an associated rise in tax revenues. 
3.9 Conclusion 
We develop a three-sector model with a corrupt bureaucracy to analyse the 
consequences for employment, output, and taxation revenues of budgetary policy- 
induced changes in corruption. We model corruption as a proportional tax on labour 
income, and define the corruption effect as the negative impact of an increase in 
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corruption on legitimate private sector employment and output. An important 
assumption is that bureaucrats aim to maintain a constant predetermined real wage. L- 
We suggest that some of the budgetary policies pursued by the Russian 
government, namely reduced spending and increased taxation resulted in an increase 
in the corruption tax and an associated decrease in employment, output, and taxation 
revenues. 
We also suggest that while in general the corruption effect of increased taxation 
and inflationary finance exceeds that of reduced spending, if reduced spendim, results 
in wage arrears to public bureaucrats then the corruption effect of reduced spending 
will exceed that of either increased taxation or inflationary finance. 
Our theoretical results suggest a negative association between legitimate private 
sector employment and corruption. Further research to test the empirical basis of 
these associations could be undertaken. 
This paper discusses the results of the chapter in light of Russia's experience. We 
find that despite the lack of empirical evidence to provide concrete correlations 
between the variables, the results pass an initial test of consistency with the data, but 
the data are extremely sparse at present and do not permit a strong test. 
This paper also raises questions about the optimal official rate of tax in the 
pi-cscncc of an unofficial tax on wages: the optimal rate of tax will depend on 
corruption and on the risk of detection for shadow sector activities. A reduction in the 
"crowding out" of private inx, cstment through reduced govcrnment cxpenditure may 
be offset by an inci-case in corruption. 
This paper reconimends widening the tax base as the Icast distortionar,,, - method 
of improving the budget deficit. A number of policy recommendations are made, 
1I 
including wage indexation for bureaucrats and ensuring that the real net wage of 
bureaucrats is increased before structural adjustment programmes are implemented. 
While our results lend credence to the IMF's recent policies of "good 
governance" they suggest that corruption should be rooted out before structural 
adjustment programs are implemented minimise the corruption effect on employment, 
output and inflation. 
Following on from the policies adopted in Russia, it would appear that an 
interesting antidote to the corruption problems associated with public sector wage 
arrears was the policy of private sector wage arrears by fin-ns and enterprises. 
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Chapter 4 
Optimal Monetary Policy with a Weak Tax 
Base: The Case of Russia 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines the optimality of Russia's monetary policy in the 1990s 
and raises questions about the optimality of its current monetary policies. Specifically 
we focus on the consequences for inflation, output, and taxation of non-coordinated 
monetary and fiscal policies in an economy with an independent central bank and a 
wcak tax base. 
Kydland and Prescott (1977), Calvo (1978) and Barro and Gordon (1983) are the 
notable early works on which much of the modem literature of the time inconsisteiicy 
of monetary policy is based. The studies showed that inflation, -ývhile costly, is 
usually positivc in most countries. This inflation bias stems from the incentives of the 
monetary authorities to generate unexpected inflation to expand the economy %% hen 
policy making is discretionary. 
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Cukierman (1990) examines various motives for policyrnakers for monetary 
expansion. T ese motives include employment, revenue and financial stability. One 
of the fundamental assumptions of the literature on time inconsistency is that the 
market-determined level of employment is too low, either because of hbour market 
imperfections (such as a monopolistic trade union) which force real wages above the 
market-clearing level, or because of tax distortions which reduce labour supply below 
its market-clearing level. Alesina and Tabellini (1987), among others, concentrate on 
the employment motive. Barro and Gordon suggest that a higher level of employment 
is preferred because the objective ftinction of the monetary authority represents the 
preferences of the representative private agent, while Woolley (1984) suggests that 
policyrnakers are subject to political pressures which deten-nine their preference for a 
higher level of employment. 
Various researchers have explored ways to reduce or eliminate the inflation bias. 
Rogoff (1985), Waller (1992) and Lohmann (1992) suggests that society should 
appoint a conservative central banker who acts in a discretionary way but is more 
concerned about reducing inflation than society is. Walsh (1995) uses the principal- 
agent approach to show that designing a contract that imposes costs on the central 
banker when inflation deviates from the optimal level can eliminate the inflation bias. 
Aicsina and Tabellini (1987) suggest that where the monetary and fiscal authorities 
have the same objective function, binding commitments to policies can be welfare- 
improving, but where the authorities have different preferences then a discretionary 
reoinie may be better. This argument differs from the standard time inconsistency 
analysis prior to 1987 where binding commitments made by the ccntral bank were 
seen as necessarily preferable to a discretionary regime. 
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In this paper we contribute to the debate about Russia's poor economIc 
perfon-nance by focusing on the time inconsistency of its monetary policy. In 
particular we examine two distinct non-consecutive penods in the 1990s - 1992-1994, 
and post 17 August 1998 - when the government did not or could not use public debt 
for financing the budget deficit. In the first period of Russia's post-communist era, 
1992-1994, it did not borrow from the public to finance its deficit (it begun borrowing 
in 1995 when the first GKO's were issued). In the second period (post 17th August 
1998), the government could not borrow from the public because it had announced a 
defacto default on its debts (although by the year 2000, Russia was once again being 
given loans). In both periods in question, monetary and fiscal policies were not 
coordinated, the central bank was effectively independent of the fiscal authonty and 
the tax base was weak. 
Our model is a modified version of the model by Alesina and Tabellini (1987) 
which suggests that when policies are non-coordinated and the central bank is 
independent, then policyrnakers may be better off in a regime with discretion rather 
than commitments. However, we suggest that in the first period in Russia (1992-94), 
an underlying assumption of the model, that the central bank attaches niore weight to 
inflation reduction, was violated. In fact policy was discretionary with fairly 
disastrous results. End-year inflation in 1992 was 2500 per cent and the economy ývas 
on the brink of hyperinflation. Repeated attempts were made to resolve the inflation 
problem in 1992-1994 but these attempts were undennined by the Ceritral Bank of 
Russia (CBR) financing the deficit through monetary expansion and making off- 
budget payments and credits to commercial banks and enterprises. Skidelsky ind 
I lalligan ( 1996) analysc 3 failed attempts to stabilise inflation during this period. Wc 
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suggest that commitment would have been preferable to discretion under these 
circumstances. 
In the second period in question, post-August 17 1998, after years of successfully 
reducing inflation, the preferences of the central bank had now altered. It had a lower 
preference for inflation than the fiscal authority. However, it continued to follow a 
committed policy of low inflation. According to the Alesina and Tabellini model 
policy should have been discretionary. In particular, "In a regime with commitments 
the FA is forced to choose in a worse trade-off between public spending and tax 
distortions, since money seigniorage is smaller than in the discretionary equilibrium. 
Hence, the FA reacts to the change in monetary regime by raising taxes, thereby 
reducing output, to compensate for part of the public loss of public spenditio, L- 
determined by the decrease in money creation" (Alesina and Tabellini, p. 626). 
Indeed, while the Central Bank of Russia continued to keep a tight rein on monetary 
policy and did not resort to widespread printing of money, real GDP slowed in the 
fourth quarter of 1998. According to the model output under these circumstances is 
lower than optimal. 
We suggest that improving tax collcction rates increases taxation revenues 
without the distorting influence on the labour market and output (see previous chapter 
of this thesis). Indeed, post August 1998, the FA In Russia has temporarily averted 
the raising of tax rates by raising tax collection rates instead. Our model predicts, 
liowever, that once tax collection rates are perfect, output under commitment wdl be 
lower than optimal. 
This paper is adapted from my NISc dissertation (En(-,, iiiann, 1998). Howcýer we 
compare different periods in Russia's transition. Engmann ( 199S) compares two 
consecutive periods - 1992-1994, and 199-5-ALWILISt 1998 - and 
does not consider the 
110 
impact of the independent central bank attaching a lower weight to inflation 
reduction. We follow Engmann (1998) by modifying Alesina and Tabellin's model to 
allow for a weak tax base. This captures the poor tax collection abilities of the 
Russian authorities because of widespread tax avoidance, tax eý*asion. tax deferrals 
and tax exemptions. The weak tax base contributes to a higher level of inflation in 
under both commitment and discretion. This modification helps in part to explain 
why, contrary to Alesina and Tabellini's prediction, taxes were not raised in the 
second period (post-August 17 1998) when policy was discretionary. Instead, it was 
tax collection which was improved. Another modification wc adopt is to analyse our 
results in a graphical framework of output, inflation and taxation. 
This model has a number of interesting implications. Based on our model we 
suggest that Russia's poor economic performance in terms of output and taxation 
revenues stems in part from pursuing sub-optimal monetary and fiscal policies. While 
its current policy of improving tax collection rates rather than increasing tax rates in a 
commitment to a low inflation policy is effective, our model suggests that once the 
tax base has been strengthened, output will be lower and taxes will be higher than 
optimal. 
The model also has significance for a large number of governments of 
developing and post-communist transition economies who are facing the choice 
between rules and discretion xvhen the central bank and fiscal authoritv have different 
preferences. Our results, while lending support to the INIF policy of independent 
protessional central banks committed to a low inflation polic-v, suggest that this may 
not be optimal if the ccntral bank and the fiscal authonty do not have co-ordinated 
monctary and fiscal policies. In which case, onk, if the central bank 
has a lo%\er 
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preference for inflation than the fiscal authonty, may it optimal to have discretionary 
policies. We suggest that improving tax collection may be the least distortionary 
method of financing the budget deficit. 
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. We analyse the definition, causes 
and consequences of a weak tax base in section 4.2. The basic model is developed in 
section 4.3. Sections 4.4 and 4.5 discuss discretion and commitments respectivcly. 
Section 4.6 compares discretion with commitments. In section 4.7 we apply the 
model to the Russian economy for the period 1992-1994 and in section 4.8 wc apply 
the model to the Russian economy post August 17 1998. Section 4.9 considers the 
limitations of our model. Section 4.10 concludes. 
4.2 A Weak Tax Base 
A tax base is a stock or flow of income or capital that is liable to taxation. In 
general, people pay taxes up to the point where the marginal cost of paying tax equals 
the marginal benefit of not paying tax. Individuals will choose not to pay taxes if the 
marginal benefits of non-payment exceed the marginal cost of payment. There are a 
number of ways to reduce the amount of tax an indi-vidual pays. This can be done 
through tax evasion, tax avoidance and tax planning. James and Nobes (1998) 
provide a definition of these terms. Tax evasion is the "illegal manipulation of one's 
affairs so as to reduce tax". Tax avoidance is the "manipulation of one's affairs 
within the law so as to reduce tax". Tax plannino is "arranoing one affairs to take t7 
advant., w, c of the obvious and often intended efficcts of tax rules in order to maximise 
onc's after-tax retums". 
1-10 
Taxation gives rise to income and substitution effects. Income effects tgenerally 
do not result in economic inefficiency as they merely represent a transfer of iesources 
from the taxpayer to the government. Substitution effects affect relative prices and so 
distort consumers' choices between goods, or producers' choices between factors of 
production. This cost to the taxpayer which does not benefit the government is the 
excess burden of the tax. On the whole, the burden of the tax will be less in an 
economy with a broad tax base than in one with a narrow tax base because the 
collection of the tax will be spread over a larger number of goods and activities. As 
such there will be less distortion than if taxes were concentrated on a smaller area of 
the economy. 
Taxation also distorts the economy by imposing costs of administering the tax 
system and costs of complying with the tax system. 
The payment of taxes is distortionary as there are costs imposed on the private 
sector in complying with the requirements of the taxes. However, the activities 
involved in the non-payment of taxes are also distortionary: bribery, corruption, 
shadow economy activities, barter, political pressure and lobbying. These activities 
may be a source of output reduction because resources are invested in creating a gap 
between the nominal tax rate and the effective tax rate. Resources are invested in 
non-cornpliance up to the point where the marginal cost of non-compliance equals the 
mai-ginal benefit of compliance. Hence it can be assumed that the distortion effect of 
unpaid taxes equals that of paid taxes. 
In this thesis the main focus is on the avera, -,, c rate of tax. This is justified 
because Alesma and Tabcllini, in their artic1c, define T as the tax rate on the total 
rc,, viltic of firms. Hence T is a proportional tax- the same proportion of tax is taken 
fi-oni all income, however large or small. For a proporilonal tax, the marginal ratc of 
l-1l 
tax equals the average rate of tax. And hence in this case it can be therefore be 
assumed that people pay taxes up to the point where the average cost of paying tax 
equals the average benefit of not paying tax. 
With a weak tax base the government cannot raise in tax revenue what it loses in 
seigniorage through reduced money supply. However, the incentive for both the 
fiscal authonty and monetary authority to spend still remains (for political and 
economic reasons). As a consequence, the central bank has a preference for higher 
inflation at each tax rate compared to the case when the tax base is strong. Hence the 
economy experiences a higher rate of inflation for a given level of tax distortions and 
output. 
The 1997 EBRD Transition Report recognised that Russia's shrinking tax base 
was caused not only by the decline in output and profits but also by the impact of tax 
exemptions, tax deferrals and other tax concessions. In chapter 3 of this thesis we 
discuss how the EBRD Transition Report suggests that at the end of 1996 total tax 
concessions amounted to an estimated Rb 163 trillion (7.2% of GDP), and tax arrears 
amounted to Rb 128 trillion (5.7% of GDP). There had also been an increase in tax 
evasion: at the beginning of 1997 about one-third of enterprises did not pay any taxes, 
and only 16.6% of enterprises were regularly paying taxes. If in 1996 no tax 
concessions were granted and there were no tax arrears, then taxation revenue could 
have reached 45.6% of GDP (32.7% revenue collected, 7.2% tax concessions, and 
5.7% tax arrears) and would have improved the government's balances (which were 
minus 8.3% of GDP). 1 
From 1992-99 the Russian government deliberately based its budget on what it 
should receive rather than what it did receive. In this way it was able to keep 
' This method of estimating possible taxation revenue is ob% iously only an approximation and should be treated %% A suitable 
caution. 
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spending more than the IMF would allow. The IMF insists on a balanced budget law 
- the government must only spend what it can receive in taxes (Camdessus, 1998). 
By basing the budget on what the government could receive were its tax base 
broader/stronger, it consistently spent more than it received in tax revenues (to soften 
the transition process, to influence economic performance, to aid favourable election 
results) and the economy experienced persistent fiscal deficits. This poor fiscal 
situation contributed to the August 1998 rouble crisis. 
In addition to controlling government expenditure, the IMF insists that the 
authorities reduce money supply, make the central bank independent and make 
binding commitments to policy. 
In 1999 the IMF said (of Russia) that, "Fundamental problems still exist, such a 
complicated and non-transparent tax system. The 1999 budget does not offer a 
solution. Based on unrealistic assumptions about inflation, exchange rate, and 
external finance, it serves only to highlight the goven-iment's lack of touch with 
reality. The only possible conclusion is that political and economic interest groups 
are blocking real reforms" (Russian Econonfic Trends, 1999,1, p. 2). 
Our model in chapter 3 of this thesis and the model to be developed in this 
chapter show that improving tax collection rates may be the least distortionary method 
of improving the budget deficit. Indeed, since the August 1998 cnsis, the Russiai-i 
goverriment has focused on improving tax collection rates and reducing tax arrears. 
ilcxv Tax Code was introduced in 2000 which changed the structure of tax re% enues. 
However, most of the benefit of the new Tax Code has been felt since 2001. 
In addition, there has been a change in political pressures to incur deficits. The 
federal budget law for 2001, passed by the Duma on 14 December 2000, aimed to 
achieve a balanced bLidgct for the first time in post-Soviet history without any drastic 
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expenditure cuts. Total tax arrears to the budget from the beginning of the 1990s to 
the end of 2001 amounted to R475 billion, although in 2001 tax arrears increased by 
only RI I billion compared with R86 billion growth in 2000 (RET, 2001). 
Some of the improvement in the fiscal situation can be attributed to the 
restructuring of debt indebtedness. There has been a growth of advance VAT 
payments, both for technical accounting reasons and because exporters are required 
by make advance VAT payments to the government, which will be reimbursed in the 
future. This has caused controversy because although advance tax payments help 
reduce net tax arrears and improve the current budget situation, it means that some 
time in the future the budget will either not receive this money or have to pay some of 
it back. This could cause budget instability in the future. 
4.3 The Basic Model 
In the model there are three players: the central bank (CB), fiscal authority (FA) 
and the wage setters. Wage setters move first, setting wages one period in advance 
based on expectations of the price level. In the next period, the CB and FA 
simultaneously set money growth and taxes: price levels in excess of the previous 
period's expectations can result in real output movements. 
One of the basic assumptions of the literature on time inconsistency is that the 
market-deten-nined le,,,, el of employment is too low, either because of labour market 
imperfections or because of tax distortions. The authorities would like to increase 
employment by increasing output but because of the standard specification of 
amm-coate supply it can only do so by generating surprises. 
The centralised trade union (TU) wishes to minimise the deviations of the real 
Nvagic from a target v- Its loss function is'. 
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T 
TU IIp 
., P, 
(w, - P, - VY 2 1=0 
where p= log of price level; w= log of nominal wage; 
The first order condition is given by: 
w =P e+v 
tt 
At their desired wage, union members are willing to supply any amount of labour. 
The supply function is given by: 
e a(7Z7t - 7Z7t - Tt - V) a>0 
where x= log of real output; 'r = tax rate on the total revenue of firrns; Ti = actual 
inflation rate; n' = expected inflation rate . The supply curve shows that output 
depends positively on inflation surprises 
(7r, 
-; r, ' 
) 
and depends negatively on 
distortionary taxes ( r, ) and the target wage (v). 
There is no public debt, and government spending is financed either by 
distortionary taxes (fiscal authority) or by money creation (central bank). The 
government budget constraint is given by: 
(m t- MI-I 
TIT, + 
P, X 
17'rt + 7r, 77 <ý I 
where r7 is the tax collection rate 
(3) 
Alesina and Tabellini (1987) and Beetsma 
and Bovenberg (1997) set r7=1 whereas we allow a non-unitary ., -alue for 
Allowing q to differ from unity xvill play an important part in the forthcoming 
analysis- r7 approximates the strength of the tax base idually after is set res 
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inflation and taxation are set. While the budget constraint is affected by the weak tax 
2 base, the supply ftinction. is not affected directly . 
The two authorities may or may not have the same preferences and may or may 
not act in a co-ordinated way. Policyrnakers wish to minimise the deviations of 
inflation and output from targets normalised on zero, and to minimise the deviations 
of public spending (g) from some positive amount, g. The loss function of the CB is 
given by: 
VCB 
T., 
Pt 7r 2+x2t_ 
-)2 
Itt 
+JU2(9 9 
2 t=o 
g pl > M2 01 
ß< l1 
The loss function of the FA is given by: 
v FA 
T, 
ot 2x2 
kI 
2 t=o 
61 0<0<1, 
If g is positive, policymakers wish, in every period, to raise an amount g of 
revenues in the forrn of either taxes or seigniorage. If v is positive, trade unions forcc 
output to be lower than the level desired by policymakers. Thus, if either g or v is 
positive then the FA and CB have incentives to create unexpected inflation in order to 
increase the level of output towards their desired level and to partially finance public 
cxpenditure. 
Assume that 
6, ý! P, for i=1,2 
In the next chapter we will consider the case %\ here the supply function is affected by one of the cau';, cs 
Ma %%cak 
tax basci corruption 
1 
-1 () 
Thus the central bank will attach a greater weight to inflation relative to output and 
public spending. Although the CB and FA are assumed to have the same ultimate 
goals, they disagree on the optimal mix of financing. 
4.4 Discretion 
In the discretionary regime no commitments are made to policies. The 
authorities are free to set or to change policies if and when they want. The game 
between the authorities is static and finite, hence the subgame perfect Nash 
equilibrium is the unique Nash equilibrium of the one-shot game. The unique Nash 
equilibrium of the one-shot game can be derived from the first order conditions of the 
FA and CB. This Nash equilibrium is time consistent because none of the players 
have the incentive to deviate from the equilibrium: the central bank has no incentive 
to generate policy surprises because the fiscal authonty's choice of taxes and the tradc 
union's choice of wages are in line with the central bank's preferences. 
First we will denve the equilibrium levels of output, inflation and public 
spending ftorn target levels. The Nash equilibrium is time consistent for a given tax 
collection rate. The authorities are assumed to have different objective functions and 
policies are non-coordinated. We will then extend the results by deriving a long run 
supply curve and the reaction ftinctions of the fiscal authority and central bank to 
generate a graphical framework. We will compare the results with those with perfect 
tax collection. 
FISCAL AUTHORITY 
\rFA 2+ 61 X12 + in one period: (6) 
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Minimising Vv' subject to the supply curve and the government's budget constraint, 
i. e. 
av FA 
subject to x, a(7; - r, ' - -r, - v) (7) a, r 
and g 77'rr + 7r, (8) 
Therefore, VFA in one period: 
1[2 
+öd( _e_ _VY + 
(77, +_ -), 
] 
z 7r T (5 r 7r ttt2t1 
av FA /_ 
=1 
[- 
26, a , 
(7r, 
- 7r' - r, -+2 116, (r7 -r, + 7r, - 
j) 
a, r / 7c, 121 
91 
=-6101xt +7761(g-g)=o 
d 
1162 
div 
abi 
From (9), x"" <0. The equilibrium level of output is below its target, zero. The 
higher is g, the greater the need for T (given 7r, v) and the lower is x. g and x are 
directly associated because both rely on seigniorage. 
Companng with the case where rl =I, that is, tax collection is perfect, ', Vdiv : ý. Xd , 
the equilibrium level of output is higher under a weak tax base. 
CENTRAL BANK 
V("' in one period: 
12+ ýjj X2+ý,., ((, II 
') 
17ri 
I-ý, f - g) 
at - CR 
subject to x, = a(7r, - 7r, " - r, - and g, :: -- il T-.. + 7r, a7r 
1-18 
Therefore, NýC B in one period: 
12( 
7r 
te . 7r( +Pia -7rt - Ir -v +M2 (Trt + 7rt -) 
av CB [2irt 
+2M, a2 
(7C 
t- 
7rt e v)+ 2P2 (T7'rt + 7r, v2 
= 7r, + plooct + /"ý 
(9 
- 9) = 
Using (9), 7r 
dw 
=P 177452 
+P2 81 ý-g dw 
61 (10) 
From (10), 7rd", > 0. The equilibrium rate of inflation is positive (above its zero target 
level) and positively related to g The higher is g the higher is inflation 
(seigniorage) to finance public spending. 
Comparing with the case where q=1, that is, tax collection is perfect, 7r,,,, > 7r, , 
the equilibrium rate of inflation is higher under a weak tax base. 
GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE 
From (9), - 61 Mt + 6,77ý 9) 
Hence rg - g) 
016, 
x 
An expression for x, xvill be generated in terms of 7r, g, and v and then substituted 
back into the expression for 
(g- 
- g). 
From (7) 7v = Ir L 1 (_ ) ý7 
7r 
Using (8), 
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61 coct - However, from (9), 9t - 
'52 TI 
+g 
7rt (51 00cr 9 therefore xt ------v 'n 45 217 
2 77 
8217 2 +ö 
1a2 rg 
+ 77d 
oý32 77 2 77 
or62 77 (), 
C, -+ qv)) 6211 2+6, a2 
Substituting x, calculated above into the expression for g-g, 
Oý6 
-, 
77 rg 
-g)= 22k- 
rg 
+ rtv))] 
45271 '52 
Using the equilibrium rate of inflation calculated in equation (10): 
dvt, 
=_ 
a(5, [ 0ý6,17 PI 62 17 + 112 451 d)_ ý+ 17V) 
r9-9 ) 
-2 2 
rg 
-9 
(5,77 (5,77 a (51 
div 
+a cc 451 
rg 
-2"2 
(PI6217 + Al' 
2" t7v) g 
(5, q+6, a 6,17 + 6, a2 
61[l 2 +6 OC + a2ý11 6 -61 
+ r7V 
rg 
-9 
, 17+6062 
2 
+ 6, a-' 452 1 
dw a 
26 
1+ 77") r9-9 
26 1- 
, 
(I + P2 )+ a- A 
The larger are g and v, the further away is g from its target. From (9) and (10), 
the hig-Yher is g, the greater is output and the higher is inflation (respectively). 
By simulation it can be deduced that government expenditure is less when tax 
collection is weak dw gd). This intuitivelv makes sensc. With less tax re-venue 
coming in, the government has less to spend (for a oiven rate of inflation) and ZI z: l 
1 ý0 
government expenditure is further away from its target level, making it ýý-orse off it 
aims to minimise deviations of output of g from g) compared to the perfect tax 
collection case. 
Extending our results to allow graphical analysis involves &-riving the long run 
supply curve and the reaction functions of the authorities in the inflation-output space 
and the inflation-tax space. 
INFLATION-OUTPUT SPACE 
Firstly the long run supply curve will be derived with output as a ftinction of 
inflation. To generate the "no fooling" long run supply curve, assume ir = ir" 
From (7) xf Cý- -r, - ") 
Using (8), x 
K, g, 
V) 
77 77 
451 coc f From (9), 91 - +g 
7r, 45, M, 9 
26 
2 
T7 
, 5, r72 +6, a 
21 (Ir - 
2 
Oýý-, 17 
"No fooling" Supply Curve: 
(7r, 
-g- 77V) 
T7 + 8, a2 
(12 
The slope of the "no fooling" supply curve is positively related to inflation and is 
IIbII ion non-wrtical: the more g is financed by seigniorage, the less distortionary is taxat 
and the higher is output. The position of the no fooling supply curve depends on the 
value of q: the smaller is il the further away the curve from the perfect tax colicction 
CýIsc. 
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The short run central bank's reaction function will now be derived with i nflation 
as a ftinction of output. To generate the central bank's reaction ftinction, (10) is used: 
7r, OXI - P2 
(g 
t 
7, r, OoCt - JU2 
( 
6217 +9 -9 
CB's reaction function: Irt --,: -4 11, + 
15217 1 
(13) 
The reaction function is negatively sloping. The lower is output, the higher the 
incentive to generate surprise inflation. 
INFLATION-TAX SPACE 
The fiscal authority's reaction function and the central bank's reaction ftinction 
are derived below. In both cases inflation is a function of taxation. To generate the 
FA's reaction function, (9) is used: 
'Al rg -9 a45, 
45, m, = 1145, 
ý- 
- 
(17T + Ir - 61 a2 (- 'r 176, -9) 
)Tt - 
FA's reaction function: 
T7-c+ 9 
61 or 
+17 + "1 6,77 
13 
given 7r = 7r" 
(14) 
Inflation is negatively related to taxation. The lower the central bank sets 
inflation, the higher the FA sets distortionary taxes to finance public spending and the 
lower is output. The weak tax base affects both the slope and the intercepts of the FA 
reaction function. 
To generate the central bank's reaction function, (10) is used: 
7Z7t = -P I 
Mt - P2 
(JrlT 
+ 7r 
t 
7rl + P2 V)- P2 
ýjj a2+ pl a2+ M2 
-g 
7ri (1 + /12 Y -T(17/12 
CB's reaction function: )Tt = 1+ 
1 
/12 
1( 
pp 2- P2 + p, a2+ ýj -91 
Inflation is positively related to taxation. The higher are the distortionary taxes 
set by the FA, the lower is output, and the higher the CB's incentive to generate 
unexpected inflation to raise output (from (7), output is negatively related to taxes). 
The weak tax base affects the slope of the CB reaction function: it is steeper. That is, 
inflation is higher at each level of the nominal tax rate as the effcctivc rate of tax is 
lower. 
Using the ctir,, -cs we havc denved for the long run supply function and the reaction 
functions of the authorities in the inflation-output space and the inflation-tax space we 
no\\- analyse, graphically, the equilibrium under discretion (with and wIthOLIt perfect 
tax collcctloll). 
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Figure 4.1. - Equilibrium under discretion - comparing weak andpeifect tax collection 
T 
k 
FA,, 
In summary, in comparison to the perfect tax collection case, 
Xdw : ý, Xd ; lr(hi > j7d; gdiv < gd; rchs < Tl 
The loss of government expenditure from lower tax rates is partly compensated by 
higher inflation rates. However, the lower tax rates and the higher inflation rates 
have a positive effect on output. 
4.5 Commitment 
The central bank enters into a binding commitment about its policy before the 
trade union sets wages. The central bank sets a rate of inflation and then the trade 
L1111011 sets wages in line with the inflation rate set by the bank. In this way there are 
110 illflatIOll Surprises, and because the central bank does not rene(2c oil its promiscs, a 
time inconsistent policy of low inflation may be sustained. In other ývords, the central 
bank and the trade Linion cooperate to achie,,,, e a low inflation and time inconsistent 
cquilibrium. 
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Binding commitments are modelled by imposing the condition that ir = j7 
before taking the first order condition of the objective function of the central bank. 
Under discretion this condition was imposed after the first order conditions had been 
taken. 
FISCAL AUTHORITY 
Equations (16) and (17) are derived in a similar way to equations (9) and (10). 
x 
,,, 2 rg 
- g-" (16) 
a6i 
From (16), x" < 0. That is, the optimal level of output is less than zero. 
Compared to the perfect tax collection situation, x"' > x', the equilibnum level of 
output is greater under a weak tax base. 
CENTRAL BANK 
Vc'3 in one period: 
[ 
7r12 + ýi 
,a22 
(17'rt 
2 
Imposing ir = ir" before taking the first order conditions rather than after, implies 
minimising: 
at, CB 
subject to x, cý- -r, -v) and g, = qrt + 7r, 
7r 
VB + ý11 a2 rt Therefore, in one period: 
[7CI 
- +'U, (17r, + 7r, 
ol, C8 
V=1 
[21r, 
+2p, (r7 rt + 7r, - gj)] a Ir 
IT-, 
2 
7r, 
W= 
ýJ, (7 
( it 
- rg -11, ) 
(17) 
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From (17), 7r" >0. Compared to the perfect tax collection situation, 7r"' > 7, c 
The equilibrium level of inflation is greater under a weak tax base. 
GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE 
a 
26 
, 
cg + qv) 
g ga 261(1+, 12 )+62 772 (18) 
By simulation it can be deduced that government expenditure is lower under a weak 
tax base, g"< g' . 
The long run supply curve and the reaction functions of the central bank and 
fiscal authorities are now derived in the inflation-output and the inflation-tax space. 
INFLATION-OUTPUT SPACE 
The long run supply curve is identical to that under discretion and generated by an 
identical method. 
CB's reaction function: Irl = -P- 
"' )Yt 
., 1761 
(19) 
The central bank is committed to lower inflation. The slope of the curve is steeper for 
the weak tax base than for a perfect tax base 
more inflation is required. 
INFLATION-TAX SPACE 
That is, for a given level of output 
This is derived using, a similar method to that for discretion 
az 
+ or FA's reaction function: Irl Tj 
+17 11ý 
(TO) 
I 
_3 6 
The FA's reaction function is the same under commitment and discretion. 
although compared to the perfect tax collection case, the FA's reaction function LMdcr 
a weak tax base is steeper and shifted inwards. 
CB's reaction function: 7r, 
P2 rg 
- 
+ P., 
(21) 
The rate of inflation is negatively related to the rate of distortionary taxation. 
The slope of the curve is less steep when the tax base is weak. That is, for a given 
level of distortionary taxation a higher level of inflation is required as the effective 
rate of tax is lower. 
Figure 4.2. - Equilibrium under commitment - comparing weak alldpelftct tax 
collection 
supply curýe 
I 
FA,, 
In summary, in comparison to the perfect tax collection case, 
XCU, > xt'; Z (ýt > 7r C; <gt. ; fýU 
T 
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The loss of government expenditure from lower tax rates is pank compensated b\ 
higher inflation rates. However, the lower tax rates and the higher inflation rates 
have a positive effect on output. 
4.6 Comparison 
The results of our model are as follows. Output, inflation and governi-nent 
expenditure are higher under discretion than commitment 
Algebraically, 
dw, 
> 
(141 
/T 
d14' 
> /T C14, 
dw cw dw 
We show the results graphically in the diagram below. 
Taxes are lower. 
Figure 4.3. - Comparing discrclion vviih commillnew undcr a weak lav buse 
suppIN curve 
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From their obýjectjve functions, both players care about inflation, output, and the 
deviations of government expenditure from its target g. According to Alesina and I 
Tabellim, as pretcrcnces are different and actions are non-coordinated, discretion may 
CBdN% 
13 8 
be preferable to commitment. This is because in a regime with commitments the FA 
is faced with a decrease in money seigniorage, and consequently a worse trade-off 
between public spending and tax distortions. The FA is forced to raise taxes (NOich 
reduces output) to compensate for part of the loss of public spending. In the diagram 
above, the discretionary equilibrium may be pareto dominant when at least one plaNer, 
the FA, is better off when compared to commitment because the gains frorn increased 
output, lower distortionary taxation and higher government expenditure outx\eigh the 
costs of extra inflation, and the CB is no worse off, as it may xNell attach a sufficient 
weight to output (p, ). The trade union is indifferent between the two regimes even 
though it may be worse off under commitment if it cares about employment. 
The introduction of a weak tax base does not significantly change their conclusion, 
although the optimal level of inflation is higher. 
4.7 1992-1994 
A crucial assumption of the model in the previous section is that the central bank 
attaches a preater weight to inflation reduction than the fiscal authority ( (ýj ý! pj 
I is llo\\, c\cr, the outcome in Russia in the early 1990s cleark contradicts thi 
assumption: the central bank attached less \\cl(-, ht to Inflation reduction than the fiscal 
authority ((ý, < 11, ), Skidelsky and Halligan (1996) anal N'se 3 attempts by the Russian II- -I - 
authoritics during 199-2-1994 to bring intlation under control- 
1-19 
-1 
0 In 1992, Gaidar tried to reduced inflation by cutting the budget deficit through tax 
increases and spending cuts 
01n 1993, Fedorov embarked on a programme of cutting off-budget CBR credits to 
public and private enterprises and to former Soviet republics. Howe\-er high L- 
inflationary expectations and continued credits to the agricultural sector 
undennined his policies 
01n 1994, Chernomyrdin introduced a new interest rate policy to stem the flow of 
credit to commercial banks. Monetary financing of the budget deficit continued, 
and the ruble crash in October 1994 marked an end to this inflation reduction 
period. 
In our model, an increase in p, and/ or p. for a given (ý such that 6, !ýp, for 
i=1,2, can be interpreted as the appointment of an independent central bank that has a 
particular liking for inflation. For instance, this may occur, as is the case of Russia, 
where the CB rather than the FA incorporates the true social preferences. Taking the 
partial derivatives of equations (9), (10), and (11) with respect to p, and 
unnecessary to show here - shows that an increase in p, and p, results in higher 
ii1flation, higher output, higher government expenditure and lower taxes. 
Intuitively, if the CB attaches a greater weight to output (p, ) this increases the 
time consistent rate of inflation since it increases the CB's incentive to generate 
surprise inflation. However, this induces the FA to lower tax revenue (in Russia's 
ca-se through widespread tax exemptions and deferrals) Nvith a positive impact on Z7 
output. If the CB attaches a greater Nvelght to public expcnditures ( p2 ) then it is more 
willing to finance public spending by means of money ci-cation (which the CBR did in 
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1992-1994). Thus the authorities are collecting too much revenue in the form of 
inflation and too little in the forrn of taxation. This is shown diagrammatically below. 
Figure 4.4. - Equilibrium in 1992-1994 (D') tinder discretion 
Ir supply curýe 
I 
I%% 
T 
FA,, 
This analysis sheds light on the large output fall experienced by Russia during 
this period. It suggests that in the period 1992-94 in Russia when real GDP growth 
averaged about minus 12 per cent, the fall in output would have been even greater if 
the central bank had been averse to inflation. That is, things were not as bad as they 
could have been. However the smaller drop in output was far outweighed by the loss 
in terms of three-digit inflation and reduced taxation revenues. 
In the period 1995-August 1998, with the political support of the Durna and 
tinancial support from the IMF, the CBR successfully committed to a low inflation 
policy and the preferences of the CB and FA were broadly identical. By 1998 the 
CB's preferences had been altered and it had effectively become inflation-averse. 
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Next, we argue that in the aftermath of August 17 1998 when Russia basically 
defaulted on its public and intemational debt, the CBR's continued commitment to a 
low inflation policy was perhaps too harsh in terrns of the cost to output and its 
preferences once again diverged from those of the FA. 
4.8 August 17 1998-1999 
In the aften-nath of August 1998, the Russian authorities found it nearly 
impossible to borrow money and the CBR, now under more responsible and inflation- 
averse management, resisted attempts for monetary expansion. Russian Econoniic 
Trends neatly summanses the problem: "The Russian government is effectively cut 
off from sources of non-inflationary financing for its programs. It has virtually no 
access to either foreign or domestic capital markets after the default on the roublc debt 
and devaluation, and they are likely to remain closed until a credible program of 
revitalising the economy is adopted. It is not obvious whether the IMF will provide 
loans to Russia next year. Nevertheless, the state needs funds to finance its budget 
deficit, its arrears and its banking sector restructuring ..... The stock of arrears owed 
by 
the goveniment has continued to increase. Running up arrears has been one measure 
used by the govt to finance de-facto budgetary gaps. For want of more realistic 
estimates of tax collection and/ or more realistic spending promises, the pressure on 
the govt to continue using arrears for its budgetary needs wIII remain, and Inflation 
will make it even more attractivc to delay payments. State sector waue arrears 
amounted to R22 billion by the end of October (excluding arrears to the military), and 
other ovcrdue obligations of the federal budget alonc amount to sevcral times this 
figure. Eventually these debts will have to be paid off. " (Russi(m Economic Trouls. 
1998,4, p. 20). 
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Alesina and Tabellini suggest that when the CB and FA have different 
preferences, for 6, ý! p,, then both policyrnakers could be worse off in a regime xith 
commitments than in a discretionary regime. Their reasoning is as follows. If 
policyrnakers assign different weights to their objectives, then in a regime with 
commitments the FA is forced to choose a worse trade-off bem'cen public spending 
and distortionary taxes, since money seigniorage is smaller than in a discretionary 
regime. The FA is forced to raise taxes to compensate for the loss in public spending 
from reduced seigniorage, and this negatively affects output. If the gain from reduced 
inflation far outweighs the loss in output and public spending then the FA is made 
worse off under a regime with commitments. This is particularly the case when there 
is large difference between the weights attaches to public expenditures. That is, 
6, -pi is large. The CB may even be worse off Itself under a discretionary regime if 
it attaches a large weight to output (p, ). The trade union (TU) is indifferent between 
the two regimes even though it may be worse off under commitment if it cares about 
employment. Thus a committed central bank may bring about a Pareto deterioration 
if none of the players are better off and at least one player is worse off. 
Indeed in the aften-nath of August 17 1998, the CBR is maintained a fairly tight C- 
rein on inflation. However, like the Alesina and Tabellini model, our model suggests 
that even with a weak tax base it may perhaps be preferable for policy to be 
discretionary if at least one of the players are better off and neither is worse off. It 
appears that Russia has moved from one sub-optimal position in 1992-94 to another 
post August 17 1998. In diagram 5.3 the economy is at C* instead of D*. Output 1. 
would be higher under a discretionary regime. 
The FA in Russia has, as the model sugocsts, taxation rcveiiues. but not 
by increasing the tax rate. Instead the FA has incrcascd the tax collection rate. This L, 
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may well have averted a large fall in output. This model suggests howe%-er. that once 
tax collection is as perfect as it could be, tax rates will be increased if the central bank- 
remains committed to a low inflation policy. 
In addition, the Russian FA managed to maintain high public expenditures by 
running up wage and payment arrears but this policy is gradually being reversed and 
eventually the FA will have to reduce public spending if the low rate of inflation 
continues. Thus government expenditure may be brought in line vvith taxation 
revenues. In which case it may be in everyone's interest if the CBR sets policy in a 
discretionary manner, especially now that the lessons from Russia's failed attempts at 
inflation reduction in 1992-94, as analysed by Skidelsky and Halligan (1996), have 
been learned. 
4.9 Limitations of the Model 
The criticisms levied at Alesina and Tabellini's original model also hold here. 
Most notably our model is seriously restrictive because we do not considcr debt which 
has played a key role in Russia's economic crises. 
We have assumed that the weak tax collection ability of the authorities has a 
positive impact on output, if any. However this impact very much depends on the 
reasons whi, tax collection is Nveak. If it is Nveak purely because the government 
allows widespread tax exemptions and tax deferrals or there is a large barter economy. 
then it is likely that output will be unaffected (or even positivcl-v affected). I lowcvcr 
if tax collection is wcak because the bureaucrats are corrupt. as in Chapter 4 ot this 
thesis, then output may be ne, (,,, wivc1Y affected by a fall in the tax collection rate. In 
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the next chapter of this thesis we will develop a model in which one of the causes of a 
weak tax base, corruption, is explicitly incorporated in the aggregate supply function. 
We have also assumed that the tax collection rate is constant and does not vary 
with any macroeconomic variables. The impact on tax revenues of a constant tax 
collection rate is shown in the diagram below. 
Figure 4.5. - Taxation revenues where tax collection is inipeýfect but constant 
Taxation revenues: tax collection rate is imperfect but constant 
0 Revenues: perfect tax collection CD Revenues: imperfect tax collection 
30 
Q) 25 
Z3 z 20 Q) 
15 
IK 10 
ý2 
5 
0 
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 
tax rate 
However, according to the model developed in Chapter 3 of this thesis, the tax 
collection rate nia_v vary with the rate of taxation in an economy with a corrupt 
bureaucracy as corrupt bureaucrats alter their bribe-taking activities in response to 
lower net wages. 
Tax basc varies with the rate qf taxation 
Suppose that il, = g(r, ), g< 0, g"< 0. There is a large theoretical and empirical 
literature that shows that an increase in taxation results in an increase in shadow 
sector activities -for example Waud (1986) and Feige (1989). The impact on taxation L_ 
revenues depends on whether the tax rate is greater or less than the optimal rate of tax. 
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In Chapter 4 we make an additional point about taxation in an economy with a corrupt 
bureaucracy. An increase in taxation will result in an increase in corruption whIch 
further reduces legitimate pnvate sector activity and results in a decrease in taxation 
revenues at each rate of tax. Taxation revenues are maximised when 'r + -rBR = r* , 
where T* is the optimal rate of tax and -r,, is the corruption tax. Thus taxation 
revenues will nse as long as -c < -r * --c,, . Diagram 5.7 shows the case where the 
inflation rate is constant, but the tax collection rate falls as the tax rate increases. 
Figure 4.6. - Taxation revenues with tax collection rate that varies with the tax rate 
Optimal taxation revenues occur at a lower rate of tax 
in the presence of bureacuratic corruption 
0 Revenues: perfect tax collection 0 Revenues: imperfect tax collection 
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In which case it is commitment to low inflation which is Pareto infenor as it 
involves an even greater fall in output when the FA is forced to raise taxes to finance 
tile budget deficit. If the CB cares about output then both players are made worse off 
Tax base varies with the rate of inflation 
Suppose 11, =. f (7r, ); f< 0, f "< 0. An increase in inflation in an inadequately 
indexed economy, as is the case with Russia, results in an increase in corruption and 
shadow economy activities which negatively affects taxation revenues. Diagram 5.6 
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shows the case where the tax rate is constant, but increasing inflation results in falling Z7 
tax collection. 
Figure 4.7. - Taxation revenues with a constant tax rate and decreasing tax collection rate 
Tax revenues: tax rate constant (0.25) but decreasing tax collection rate 
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In the literature on time inconsistency positive inflation is associated with nsing 
output. However, in an inadequately indexed economy, nsing inflation may result in 
rising shadow sector activities and/ or corruption. This will result in a jall in 
registered output. That is, inflation is negatively related to output (Phillips curve is 
upward sloping). In which case, commitment to low inflation may be Pareto superior 
fferent preferences, because higher inflation will result III even if authorities have di ,I I-- 
lower output. 
In this section we have suggested that the tax collection rate may vary and that 
the reasons why it varies affects the time consistency of monetary policN,. 
In an economy with a corrupt bureaucracy, an increase in the rate of tax may 
result in a fall in output because of an associated increase in corruption as bureaucrats 
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seek to supplement the fall in their real official net wages. In which case, discretion is 
even more preferable to commitment when the FA and CB have different preferences 
as it involves a lower rate of tax and consequently a lower corruption effect on output 
(we elaborate further on this in the next chapter of this thesis). 
In an inadequately indexed economy, an increase in inflation results in a fall in 
the tax collection rate as there is more shadow sector work and/ or corruption. This 
negatively affects registered output. Thus if the tax collection rate is negatively 
related to the rate of inflation, commitment to low inflation may be superior to 
discretion even if the CB and FA have different preferences. 
4.10 Conclusion 
We modify the time inconsistency model by Alesina and Tabellini and apply it to 
post-communist Russia. The modifications involve allowing for weak tax collection 
abilities of the authorities. The results are analysed both algebraically and graphically. 
The results show that in the presence of a weak tax base the time consistent rate of 
inflation under both discretion and commitment is higher, output is higher and 
taxation revenues are lower. 
We apply the model to Russia's experiences since the fall of communism and 
mioocst that for the two non-consecutive periods under consideration when the t, __ 
authorities could not or did not borrow from the public, Russia moved from one sub- 
optimal position to another. 
For the first period under consideration, 199-1-94. Russia had an independent 
central bank which had different preferences to the fiscal authonty and polic% was 
non-coordinatcd. According to the model, policy should have been discretionary. In 
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fact, policy was discretionary with fairly disastrous consequences for inflation. We 
suggest that the reason for this was that the central bank attached a lower ývewdit to 
inflation reduction than the fiscal authority, and this violated one of the underlying 
assumptions of the model. The authorities were collecting too much revenue in the 
foun of inflation and too little in the fonn of taxation. This analysis sheds new light L- 
on the large output fall experienced by Russia during this period. It suggests that in 
the period 1992-94 in Russia when GDP growth fell by about minus 12 per cent, the 
fall in output would have been even greater if the central bank had been averse to 
inflation. That is, things were not as bad as they could have been. 
For the second period under consideration, post August 17 1998, the central bank 
remained committed to a low inflation policy, the CB had different (more inflation- 
averse) preferences to the FA, and policy was uncoordinated. The model suggests 
that policy should in fact have been discretionary as authorities are collecting too little 
in the form of seigniorage and too much in the fon-n of distortionary taxation. The 
analysis suggests that Russia's current policy of a committed central bank may mean 
that output is too low. It appears that the efforts of the Russian authorities to improve 
taxation revenues by increasing tax collection rates rather than tax rates may havc 
delayed the impact of a committed central bank on output. This model suggests 
however, that once tax collection is as perfect as it could be, tax rates will have to be 
increased if the central bank remains committed to a low inflation policy and this will 
have a negative effect on output. The model suggests that the optimal policy Nvotild 
now in fact be discretionary policy. 
We also briefly analyse the causes and consequences of a vwýving tax collection 
rate. We consider two main causes of a varying tax collection rate: taxation and 
inflation. In an economy xvhere the tax base varies %vIth the rate of taxation, 
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discretion may be even more preferable to commitment ýý,, hen the FA and CB have 
different preferences as it involves a lower rate of distortionary taxation than 
commitment. output. In an inadequately indexed economy, an increase in inflation 
results in a fall in the tax collection rate as there is more shadow sector work and/ or 
corruption. This negatively affects registered output. Thus if the tax collection rate is 
negatively related to the rate of inflation, commitment to low inflation may be 
superior to discretion even if the CB and FA have different preferences. 
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Chapter 5 
Optimal Monetary Policy with Bureaucratic 
Corruption 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter builds on the results of the previous chapters by focusing on the 
optimality of monetary policy in the presence of bureaucratic corruption. We focus 
on the consequences of corruption for inflation, output, and taxation in an economy 
with non-coordinated and coordinated monetary and fiscal policies and an 
independent central bank. 
Our model is based the one by Alesina and Tabellini (1987) which sLiggests that 
where the monetary and fiscal authorities have the same objective function. binding 
commitments to policies can be welfare-improving, but where the authorities ha,,, c 
different preferences then a discretionary regime ina. v be better. 
In this paper we show that in the presence of corruption the output loss associated 
with commitment will outweigh the benefits of lowcr inflation when tllc preference, ý 
of the central bank and fiscal authority are not coordinated. B cn ý, vhen preferences 
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are coordinated, it may be the case that the output loss associated with commitment 
may be too great when compared with the benefits of lower inflation. These results 
are contrary to those of existing models of time inconsistency which suggest that 
binding commitments are necessarily preferable to di ion, especially when scret 
preferences are coordinated (for example, Beetsma and Bovenberg, 1997). 
This chapter builds on the results of two previous chapters of this thesis. In 
Chapter 3 in of this thesis, an increase in the tax rate results in a rise in the corruption 
tax as corrupt bureaucrats seek to supplement their decreasing official net 
bureaucratic wages. This results in a fall in legitimate private sector supply. In 
Chapter 4, we suggest that the time consistent level of inflation may be too low in a 
regime of commitments with non- coordinated preferences if the tax base is weak. In 
this chapter, one of the causes of a weak tax base, corruption, and its negative impact 
on aggregate supply, are taken into account whilst analysing the optimality of 
monetary policy. 
We model corruption as a proportional tax on the total revenues of firms. The 
proceeds of the corruption tax, unlike those of the official tax, do not go into 
government coffers. We model the corruption tax as a positive function of the official 
tax rate. The higher the official tax, the higher the corruption tax levied by public 
bureaucrats in order to supplement their decreasing official net wage, and the lower is 
output. 
We show three main results. Firstly, as the corruption tax has a ticgative impact 
on output and rises as the official tax rate rises, the output loss under commitment 
exceeds that under discretion because official tax rates are higher. Sccondly, for both 
discretion and commitment, optimal output. taxation and government expenditure are 
lower, and inflation is higher. Thirdly. for both discretion and commitment the loss ot 
I -ý-) 
output and the rise in inflation is less when preferences are coordinated than Nvhen 
they are not coordinated. 
We show that when preferences are not coordinated, discretion \vill be preferable 
to commitment as the gains from reduced inflation are far outweighed by the loss in 
output and government expenditure, and higher taxes. Both players, the fiscal 
authority and the central bank, are worse off under commitment. Thus the movement 
from discretion to commitment is not a pareto improvement as at least one player is 
worse off. 
We go further and suggest that even when preferences are coordinated, discretion 
may be preferable to commitment as the gains from reduced inflation may be 
outweighed by the loss of output and government expenditure and higher taxes. At 
least one of the players, particularly the fiscal authority, may be worse off under 
commitment. 
A possible solution to this problem involves allowing policy to remain 
discretionary, unless corruption is minimised through increasing bureaucratic wages 
in line with tax increases. 
Our model is particularly applicable to the immediate aftermath of the August 17, 
1998 situation in Russia when corruption was rife, the preferences of the fiscal 
authority and central bank were non- coordinated, monetary policy was committed, 
and public debt was unavailable. In the post August 17 1998 period. the govcmment 
could not borrow from the public because it had announced a (Ic jacto default on its 
debts. Indeed, post-August 17 1998, while the Central Bank of Russia continued to 
keep a tight rcin on monetary policy and did not resort to xvidespi-cad printing of 
money, flicre Nvas sonic risc in inflation, a fall in output (rcal GDP slovVcd In the 
1ý- 
fourth quarter of 1998), and a fall in actual public spending. A rise in tax rates was 
averted by simply raising the tax collection rate as Russia's tax base is unusualk, 
weak. 
Our model has a number of interesting implications. One of the implications is 
that inflation-reduction in a corrupt economy has more severe consequences for 
output, inflation and government expenditure than in a non-corrupt economy. This 
model may help explain why tighter monetary policies in many transition and 
developing countries, particularly Russia, result in large r-than-expected output losses, 
higher-than-anticipated inflation, larger government budget deficits as planned 
expenditures exceed actual revenues, and lower tax rates. This has implications for a 
large number of governments of developing and post-communist transition economies 
who are facing the choice between rules and commitment in the presence of 
corruption. 
Resolving the problem of corruption in Russia is imperative, and in the absence 
of complete eradication, higher bureaucratic net wages which rise in line with tax 
increases. While lending support to the IMF policy of independent professional 
central banks committed to a low inflation policy, the model suggests that this may 
not be optimal if corruption is rife and especially if the central bank and the fiscal 
autlionty do not have co-ordinated monetary and fiscal policies. 
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. The basic model is devc1oped in 
section 5.2. Sections 5.3 and 5.4 dISCLIss discretion and itments comm' respectively. 
with and without coordinated preferences . 
In section s. s wc make comparisons 
bem-ecii discretion and commitment and discuss the results In relation to Rus". 
SI ection 5.6 concludes. 
1 
-5- 
5.2 The Model 
In the model there are three players: the central bank (CB), fiscal authority (FA) 
and the wage setters. Wage setters move first, setting wages one period in advance 
based on expectations of the price level. In the next period, the CB and FA 
simultaneously set money growth and taxes: price levels in excess of the preNious 
period's expectations can result in real output movements. 
One of the basic assumptions of the literature on time inconsistencN, is that the 
market-deten-nined level of employment is too low, either because of labour market 
imperfections or because of tax distortions. The authorities WOUld like to increase 
employment by increasing output but because of the standard specification of 
aggregate supply it can only do so by generating surprises. 
The centralised trade union (TU) wishes to minimise the deviations of the real 
wage from a target v. Its loss function is: 
T 
1 P, >>0 
2 1=0 
where: p= log of price level 
ii, =: log of nominal wage 
The first order condition is given by: 
it' = +v 
At their dcsired wage, union mcmbers are willing to supply any amount of labour. 
The supply function is givcn by: 
x=- 7r 
c- 71 - l' - r8R1) 
a>0 
1 a(7ri 1 
where: x= log, of real output 
Tc = actual inflation ratc 
(I) 
1 ý, ý 
e TE = expected inflation rate 
-r, = tax rate on the total revenue of finns, 0< -c, <I 
'r,,, = unofficial corruption tax on the total revenue of firms, 0< _CBRr !ý1 
The supply curve shows that output depends positively on inflation surprises 
(7r, 
- 7r, 
) and depends negatively on distortionary taxes ( -r, ). corruption taxes 
( TBRt ), and the target wage (v). Previous studies of time inconsistency have set 
T -':: 0; that is that there is no corruption in the economy. The corruption tax, which BRt 
is always positive, is levied unofficially on the legitimate pnvate sector by corrupt 
bureaucrats seeking to supplement their real net bureaucratic wages. For simplicity 
real net bureaucratic wages fall only as the tax rate rises, and not as the rate of 
inflation rises (earnings are adequately indexed) or government expenditure falls (as 
in chapter 3). We assume therefore that the corruption tax is a linear function of the 
tax rate: 
f (-r, ); 
a -rRR 
> 0, 
a 'rRR 
= 
There is no public debt, and government spending is financed either by 
distortionary taxes (fiscal authority) or by money creation (central bank). The 
absence of debt in our model, whilst restrictive, enables us to concentrate on the 
essential issues. We believe the fundamental results of this paper will not be affectcd 
by the introduction of a debt vanable, The go vernment budget constraint is given by: 
Px 
t 
+ 
o denotes the ratio of public cxpenditures over output and is set residually after 
inflation and taxation are sct. 
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The two authorities may or may not have the same preferences and may or maý, 
not act in a co-ordinated way. Policymakers wish to minimise the deviations of 
inflation and output from targets normalised on zero, and to minimise the de% iations 
of public spending (g) from some positive amount, g-. The loss function of the 
central bank is given by: 
CB 
Tý 
8f2 +MIX2 _-)2 7r 
11tt+ 112 
(9 
9 
2 t=o 
pl M2 ýý ()5 O< ß< 15 
The loss function of the fiscal authority is given by: 
T 
FA ot 2+ (5 JX2 + (5 t 
kI 
2 t=o 
(51 > 
0,62 ý! ol 0< o< 1, 
If g is positive, policymakers wish, in every period, to raise an amount g of 
revenues in the forin of either taxes or seigniorage. If v is positive, trade unions force 
output to be lower than the level desired by policymakers. Thus, if either g or ý' is 
positive then the FA and CB have incentives to create unexpected inflation in order to 
increase the level of output towards their desired level and to partially finance public 
cxpenditure. 
Assume that 
6i ý! pi for i=1,2 
Thus the central bank will attach a greater ývclght to inflation relative to output and 
public spending. Although the CB and FA are assumed to have the same Lihimatc 
goals, they disagree on the optimal mix of financin(-,,, 
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5.3 Discretion 
In the discretionary regime no commitments are made to policies. The 
authorities are free to set or to change policies if and when they want. The game 
between the authorities is static and finite, hence the subgame perfect Nash 
equilibrium is the unique Nash equilibrium of the one-shot game. The unique Nash 
equilibrium of the one-shot game can be derived from the first order conditions of the 
FA and CB. This Nash equilibrium is time consistent because none of the players 
have the incentive to deviate from the equilibrium: the central bank has no incentivc 
to generate policy surprises because the fiscal authority's choice of taxes and the trade 
union's choice of wages are in line with the central bank's preferences. 
First we will derive the equilibrium levels of output, inflation and public 
spending from target levels. The Nash equilibrium is time consistent for a given tax 
collection rate. The authorities are assumed to have different objective functions and 
policies are non- coordinated. We will then extend the results by deriving a long run 
supply curve and the reaction functions of the fiscal authority and central bank to 
generate my graphical framework. We will compare the results with those with no 
bribery and corruption. 
5.3.1 Non-Coordinated Preferences 
FISCAL AUTHORITY 
VFA 2+61X2+6., 
I_g)2] 
(6) in one period: 2 
7r, 
I- (g 
Minimising VF`ý subject to the supply curve and the government's budget constraint, 
I. e. 
ar FA 
subject to 
ar 
BRI) 
1-58 
and 9t = Tt + Irt 
Therefore, VFA in one period: 
' [7r, 
' + 6, a' 
(Ar-, 
- -r, -V- -CIR, 
Y+ 61 (TI + 7rt - 
J) 2 7rte 
av FA 
a2 e 26, 
(7rt 
- 7rt - TI V- TBRt )+ 26, (-C, +)T, - 91 a -C 
17r, 
v2 
t +6, (9-9) 
dBR 7762 rg 
_ gdBR 
ab, 
From (9), x dRR < 0. The equilibrium level of output is below its target, zero. The 
higher is g, the greater the need for r (given 7r, v) and the lower is x. g and x are 
directly associated because both rely on seigniorage. 
Comparing with the case where there is no corruption, x dBR < x" . The 
(8) 
(9) 
equilibfium level of output is lower when bribery and corruption is present. This is 
because government expenditure is further away from its target, g _gdBR > 9-9 
d 
(see below). 
CENTRAL BANK 
V" in one period: 
I [)Tt 2+ PIXI - +P2(91 -g 
2 
av C8 
subject to -v, = oýir, - 7r, 
' - -r, - and g, =T, + 7rt a 7r 
Therefore, ýCB in one period: 
[7rf' 
+ ý11 a2 
(7Z7, 
-V8R+P2 
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av C', I [27c 
+2A a2 
(7rt 
- 7r 
e_TT (T-, + 7r, - 
-)] 
a 7r 2tIt 
BRr 
)+ 2ý4 9 
7r = t+ 
PIOL'ýt + P2 
(9 
Using (9), 7r dRR -A 
152 + 112451 rg 
-9 
BRdK-) 
61 (10) 
From (10), ,r dBR > 0. The equilibrium rate of inflation is positive (above its zero 
target level) and positively related to g. The higher is g the higher is inflation 
(seigniorage) to finance public spending. 
Comparing with the case with no corruption 7r"' > 7r' . The equilibrium rate of 
inflation is higher in the presence of bribery and corruption. 
GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE 
From (9), - 61MI + 6., 
(g 
- 9) 
Hence rg - 9)= - xt 
An expression for x, will be generated in tenns of 7r, g, and v and then substituted 
(7 back into the expression for 
(, -, 
- g). 
From (7) xt= a(- -r -v) 
Using (8), -Vt = a(lr -9-" -'CBR 
) 
I lowcvcr, from (9). +9 
7r, - 
given Ir = 7r 
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61 
-= 7r + TBR "62 
ab-I 7r g -2 t+V 
+rBR 
452 +61a 
Substituting x, calculated above into the expression for g-g 
rg 
- 9) 
al5l 
[ 
a32 
2t+v+ 
TB 
R 
(52 452 + 45, a 
Using the equilibrium rate of inflation calculated in equation (10): 
rg 
_ 
dBR) ab ab, P, 6, + P, 6, 92 
rg 
-9 
d)_ + , 
)+ 
TYR 62 
(5, +6, a 61 
rg 
-9 
dBR 
+ 
a2 
2 
(P 
1451 
+P2 (51 
)] 
- 
a261 
-, 
rg 
++ 'r BR (52 + 61 (X 6, +61a 
rg 
-9 
dBR 
62 
+ 6, a 
2+a2p, 6, +a 
2 P2 61 
6, +6, a" 
9 
dBR )= " 
245 
1ý+ 11 
+ T81? 
) 
45 +, 5" 
(1 + a2, U 10 
+k'2 )- 
+ TBR 
+ 
The larger are g and v, the further away is from its target. From (9) and (10), 
the higher is g, the greater is output and the higher is inflation. 
Government expenditure is less when bribery and corruption are present 
dBR d ): the corruption tax variable in the numerator of equation (I I) is positive 
wlicii there is corruption and zero xvhen there is not. This intuitivcly makes sense. 
Corruption negativcly affects output which reduces taxation revenues, and hence the 
government has less to spend (for a given rate of inflation). Thus govcrnment 
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expenditure is further away from its target level, making it worse off (it aims to 
minimise deviations of output of g from g 
Extending our results to allow graphical analysis involves deriving the long run 
supply curve and the reaction functions of the authorities in the inflation-output space 
and the inflation-tax space. 
INFLATION-OUTPUT SPACE 
Firstly the long run supply curve will be derived with output as a function of 
inflation. To generate the "no fooling" long run supply curve, assume ir = ir' 
From (7) xt = 0ý- T-V -'ry)? ) 
Using (8), Xt --": 00 -9-V- TBR 
) 
However, from (9), g, = 
(52 
+9 
47r, 
- 62 
9 -V -'r BI? 
t((52 
+ 45, a2_)= 
,t- 
rg 
+V+ TBR 
a62 
Long Run "No fooling" Supply Curve: X=- 
0ý61 
BR 
)) 
(12) 
r-r +V+T 452 +45 a2 
OTI 
9 
The "no fooling" supply curve is positively related to inflation and is non- 
vertical: the more g is financed by seigniorage, the less distortionary is taxation and 
the higher is output. The intercepts of the supply curve with the inflation and output 
axes depend directly on the corruption tax, and consequently depend Indirectly on the 
rate of tax set by the fiscal authority. Thus, contrary to previous results 
in which the 
long run supply curve does not shift as the tax rate varies, the supply curve in this 
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analysis will shift outwards as the tax rate increases. The intercept of the no foolim-, 
supply curve with the inflation axis is above that when there is no corruption and 
bribery, although the slopes are the same. Thus, a higher rate of inflation is needed to 
generate a given level of output. This is shown in the diagram below: 
Figure 5.1. - Nofooling supply curve - comparing corruption and with no corruption 
I 
x 
The shoi-t i-im central bank's reaction function will now be derived with inflation 
as a function of output. To generate the central bank's reaction function, ( 10) is used-. 
=t-p: 
(g 
- g) 
jr, = -pl M, 
CB's reaction function: 
+ or - or 
ir 
1= 111 + 6, -1 (13) 
The reaction function is negatively sloping. The lower is output, the higher the 
incentive to generate surprise inflation. The slope of the central bank's reaction 
tunction in the inflation-output space is not affected by the presence of bribcry 
comiptioll. 
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INFLATION-TAX SPACE 
The fiscal authority's reaction function and the central bank's reaction function are 
derived below. In both cases inflation is a function of taxation. To generate the FA'.,, Z7 
reaction function, (9) is used: 
x=-_- g-g 
a51 
6100CI 
= 
62 
(T+7r-g 
iven 7r = 7r' 9' 
7r, =1 
(-Ir 
-v - rBR 
)-7 
+g 
ö-) 
FA's reaction function: 7rt +1 +9- + TBR (14) 
Inflation is negatively related to taxation. The lower the central bank sets 
inflation, the higher the FA sets distortionary taxes to finance public spending and the 
loxvcr is output. While the slope of the reaction function is not affected by bribery 
and corruption, the intercept of the curve with the inflation and taxation axes 1, 
affected. To generate the central bank's reaction function, (10) is used: 
Irt ---,: _P, M, - P-2 (7 JT ,-9) 
= -pla IM 
)- 
M' 
(-r 
- Z, 
(1 +P2) 
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_ Ml a2 + MI 
" 7Z7t +P2): aV+a Ts, 
ý 
+ P-2 9 
CB's reaction function: 
)Tt 
+1 112 
2_ /12 + MI Cý V+ 111"2 C 13 R+ 
tý 91 (15) 
Inflation is positively related to taxation. The higher are the distortionary taxes 
set by the FA, the lower is output, and the higher the CB's incentive to generate 
unexpected inflation to raise output (from (7), output Is negatively related to taxes). 
The intercepts of the reaction function with the inflation and output axes are affected 
by the corruption tax, although the slope is not. 
Figure 5.2. - Equilibrium under discreti . on with notic-oot-ditiatedpi-cýki-enc-es - 
comparing corruption with no COrrilpti . on 
supply curýe 
(corruption) 
t 
FA13R 
Compared to the situation when there is no corruption, equilibrium output and 
taxation are lower and equilibrium inflation is higher. 
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5.3.2 Coordinated Preferences 
Three of the equations calculated above are altered when pi = (5,. These are 
the equilibrium level of inflation, 7r 
dBR 
, the deviation of public spending from its 
target, g-g dBR , the central bank's reaction function in the inflation-output space. 
7r 
dBR 
= 2(5 2 
rg 
-9 
dBR (10*) 
9-9 
dBR a 
26 
1 
rg 
+v+T 
BR 
a 
26 
1(1+26 2)+82 
7r, = -2ab, x, (12*) 
5.3.3 Comparison 
Given the condition that 6, ý! p, , equilibrium 
inflation in equation (10*) is 
higher than equilibrium inflation in equation (10). That is, the equilibrium level of 
inflation 7r"" is higher when the authonties have the same objective function. ). In 
addition public expenditure is higher. Alesina and Tabellini suggest that in 
comparison with the situation in which the authorities have different objectivc 
ftinctions "in a discretionary equilibrium with p, = 6, the authorities are collecting 
too much revenue in the forn-i of inflation and too little rcvcnue in the forni of taxcs" 
(p-6225). There is an increased incentive to inflate which is represented by a steepci- 
mitral bank reaction function in the inflation-output space. This is one of the reasons 
\\ hy tlic IMF prefers an indelwmictit central bank: the incentivc to inflatc is lowcr- 
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The higher rate of tax under noncoordinated preferences means that the 
corruption tax is also higher. This affects the positions of the aggregate supply 
curves, the central bank reaction functions and the fiscal authority reaction functions 
whose intercepts depend on the rate of corruption tax. This is shown 
diagrammatically below. 
Figure 5.3. - Equilibrium under discretion - compari . ng coordinated with 
noncoordinated preferences 
supply curve 
IBR 
CB(I 
There is a greater reduction in output and taxation in the presence of 
corruption when preferences are not coordinated compared to when preferences arc 
coordinated. There is a greater nse in inflation when preferences are not coordinated 
compared to when they are coordinated. Thus in the presence of corruption, both 
players are worse off if they have noncoordinated preferences. 
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5.4 Commitment 
The central bank enters into a binding commitment about its policy before the 
trade union sets wages. The central bank sets a rate of inflation and then the trade 
union sets wages in line with the inflation rate set by the bank. In this waY there are 
no inflation surprises, and because the central bank does not renege on its promises, a 
time inconsistent policy of low inflation may be sustained. In other words, the central 
bank and the trade union cooperate to achieve a low inflation and time inconsistent 
equilibrium. 
Binding commitments are modelled by imposing the condition that 7r = 7r" 
before taking the first order condition of the objective function of the central bank. 
Under discretion this condition was imposed after the first order conditions had been 
taken. 
5.4.1 Non-Coordinated Preferences 
FISCAL AUTHORITY 
Equations (16) and (17) are derived in a similar way to equations (9) and (10). 
cBR 45L- rg 
-g 
cBR 
ab, 
(16) 
From (16), X, BR < 0. The equilibrium level of output is lower when bribery and 
, BR 
corruption are present. That is, X<x 
CENTRAL BANK 
I[ 
-1 + ýjj a2+ - )T in one period: II 
"BR 
)2 
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Imposing ;r= 7r' before taking the first order conditions rather than after. implies 
minimising: 
av CB 
subject to Xt =: Cý- Tt -V -'rBR) and gt = 'rt + 7rt 
7r 
TVC B+ 1ý a2 (_ rt )2 Therefore, in one period: 'rBR + P2 ( rt + )Tt - Or )2 
2t 
av CB / 
-1 
[27r 
+ 2p, (r, + 7r, - 
-g) 0 
a., Av 2 
7r cBR = P2 
(9 
-9 
cBR (17) 
From (17), , cBR > 0. The equilibnum level of inflation is higher in the presence 
of corruption, 7r"" > 7r' . 
GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE 
The derivation is identical to that for discretion (equation (I I )). 
BR a 2,5 1 
C9 
+" +rBR) 
g-g, 
a 
26 
, 
(I + P, 
)+ 
05, 
(18) 
Government expenditure is further away from its target when there is corruption. 
That is, g, 
BR >g-g, 
The long run supply curvc and the reaction functions of the central bank and 
fiscal authorities xvill now be denx-cd in the inflation-output and the inflation-tax 
space. 
169 
INFLATION-OUTPUT SPACE 
The fonnula for the long run supply curve is identical to that under discretion 
and generated by an identical method. That is, 
"No fooling" Supply Curve: x, - 
a62 
2 
(7rt 
9V BR 62 +61a 
Although the fon-nula for the long run supply curve is identical to that under 
discretion, the actual position of the curve is not, as the position depends on the rate of 
corruption tax (and henceforth the rate of tax). Under commitment to low Inflation, 
the rate of tax is higher than under discretion and therefore the supply curve will be 
further to the left of the supply curve under discretion. 
The central banks reaction function is given by: 
CB's reaction function: 7r t= -P2 (19) 
The central bank is committed to lower inflation. This means that for a given 
amount of government spending, taxation is more distortionary and output is lower 
than in the discretionary case. The slope and position of the curve is unchanged in the 
presence of a corruption tax. 
INFLATION-TAX SPACE 
This is derived using a similar method to that for discretion 
26 
+I-V- TBR +g (20) FA's reaction function: 7r, =, 
(5, (5, (5, 
The forniula for the FA's reaction ftinction is the sarne under commitment and 
discretion, although the position differs depending on the corruption tax rate. 
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CB's reaction function: 7r, 
P2 rg 
- -0 I+P2 (21) 
The rate of inflation is negatively related to the rate of distortionary taxation. 
Unlike the central bank reaction function in the inflation-tax space for discretion 
(equation (15)), the position of this curve is unchanged in the presence of corruption. 
Figure 5.4. - Equilibrium under commitment and noncoordinatedprqfereficcs 
comparing corruption and no corruption 
supply curve 
(corruption) 
T 
FABRýk 
Compared to the case when there is no corruption, equilibrium output and tax rates 
are lower and equilibrium inflation is higher. 
5.4.2 Coordinated Preferences 
Two of the equations calculated above are altered when p, = (5,. Tlicsc arc the 
deviation of public spending from its target, BR and the central bank's waction 9- Or "j, 
functiOli in the inflation-output space. 
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BR a 
26 
1 
rg 
+v 
) 
g g, 26 (1+ 6") + 6, 
) 
Ir 
t= -a8lx 
5.4.3 Comparison 
(18*) 
(19*) 
The incentive to inflate is higher when the two authorities attach the same 
weights to their objectives (equation (18*) is steeper than equation ( 18)). 
Government expenditure is closer to its target level. 
Figure 5.5. - Equilibrium under commitment- comparing corruption and no Corrilpti . on 
with coordinated and noncoordinated preferences 
-'B, (ý) 
I 
The loss of output and taxation is higher under corruption when preferences are not 
coordinated than when they are. The increase in inflation is higher when preferences 
are not coordinated. 
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supply curve (noncoord i nation) 
5.5 Comparison and Discussion 
Below is a summary of the results that have been derived. 
(1) When policy is discretionary, in companson to the case where there is no 
corruption, corruption results in higher inflation and lower output, loýver taxation and 
lower goven-iment spending. 
7r dBR > 7r d; x 
dBR <xd; rdBR < ,. dc ;g 
dBR <9d 
(2) When policy is committed, in comparison to the case where there is no corruption, 
corruption results in higher inflation and lower output, lower taxation aiid lo\vcr 
government spending. 
7r cBR > 7r c; X cBR <xc; rcBR < . rc ;9 cBR <9c 
(3) As the corruption tax has a negative impact on output and rises as the official tax 
rate rises, the output loss under commitment exceeds that under discretion because 
official tax rates are higher. In general, discretion results in highcr inflation, output, 
and public expenditures, and lower taxation than in a regime with commitments. The 
results are summansed below. 
7r (IRR > Ir cBR; XdBR > XcBR, rdBR < , cBR; gdBR < gcBR 
(4) In both discretion and commitment, inflation is higher and taxation is lower than 
in the case of no corruption. If there were no corruption, the higher inflation and 
lower tax rate would have resulted in higher output. Howevcr in this case the CB and 
FA attcmpt to mininuse the tax rate in returri for higher inflation in order to mInImlc 
17 31 
the corruption tax. The higher rate of inflation and lower tax rate only manage to 
mitigate part of the loss in output associated with corruption. 
(5) In both discretion and commitment the loss in output and the rise in inflation is 
less when preferences are coordinated than when they are not coordinated. 
if p, # 6,, both the FA and CB will be worse off under commitment than 
under discretion In moving from discretion to commitment we find that the loss in 
output and government expenditure is much higher in the presence of corruption, and 
the benefits from reduced inflation are lower. Overall, the gains from reduced 
inflation are more than outweighed by the losses in output and government 
expenditure and higher taxes. Thus the FA is made worse off, and the CB is also be 
worse as the output loss associated with higher taxes outweighs the gains from lo, ývcr 
inflation. 
if p, = 6,, both the FA and CB may be worse off under commitment than 
under discretion. In the original (no corruption) paper by Alesina and Tabellini they 
suggest that when preferences are the same, binding commitments to monetary policy 
are necessarily we I fare- improving, as the gains from reduced Inflation more than 
outweigh the losses in output and government expenditure and higher taxes. This is 
despite the fact that the FA raises taxation in an attempt to compensate for part of the 
loss of public expenditure. In our paper, there is less reduction in inflation and a 
oreater reduction in output and government expenditure. This is not compciisýitcd 
bv ýi 
smaller increase in taxation, as there is an associated increase in the corruption tax. 
Thus the C'B may bc worse off if the gains from reduced inflation are outwcwhed 
hý- 
output reductions and (government expenditure losses and higher taxes. 
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The diagram below shows the inflation-output combinations with and without 
corruption and with and without coordinated preferences. In all cases, there is a 
greater output loss in the presence of corruption than in the absence of corruption. 
Figure 5.6. - Equilibrium under discretion: comparing identical and non-identical 
preferences with and without corruption 
supply curves (with 
corrulnion): 
x 
(= implies coordlnatedprýfcrences), - arrows indicate distance between no corruption 
equilibria and corruption equilibria. 
The supply curves for commitment are further out than those for discretion 
(with unchanged central bank reaction functions) as the corruption tax rate is higher. L- 
A commitments regime yields less of a reduction in Inflation when cormption is 
present than when it is not, and more of an output reduction. Thus not only is the 
output loss greater under commitment, but there are reduced gains from inflation 
reduction. We suggest therefore that not only is discretion preferred when 
. VlJ)I)I 
T 
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CB(ým COMMItmont 
preferences are noncoordinated, but discretion may also be preferred when 
preferences are coordinated depending on the rate of corruption in the economy. 
The combined picture for discretion and commitments in the inflation-output and the 
inflation-tax space is shown in diagrams 6.7 and 6.8 below. For simplicity, wc have 
not combined the non- coordination and coordination diagrams in one diagram as the 
joint diagram gets too cluttered if all four situations are shown. 
Figures 5.7 and 5.8 show our three main results. Firstly, compared to the no 
corruption case, the loss in output under discretion is less than that under 
commitment. In both commitment and discretion the equilibrium rate of inflation is 
higher, and the official rate of tax is lower. 
Secondly, under the no corruption case, discretion may be preferable to 
commitment when preferences are not coordinated because the gains from reduced 
inflation outweigh the losses in output and public spending (Alesina and Tabellini). 
However, in the presence of corruption, the losses in output and public spending 
under commitment are even greater compared to discretion and hence discretion is 
actually preferred to commitment. 
Thirdly, even when preferences are coordinated, there is still a lar, -, cr loss of 
output under commitment than discretion when corruption is present, and inflation is 
higher. We conclude that it may well be the case that discretion inay also be 
preferable to commitment under these circumstances. 
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5.6 Monetary Policy in Russia: 1992-2002 
Russia has been plagued by time inconsistencies in its monetary policy. 
Below is a summary the Russia's main monetary policy attempts since 1992. To 
concentrate on the issues at hand, we omit discussion of Russia's exchange rate policy 
which has recently been used with some success to control inflation. 
1992-June 1995: 
Inflation was very high and the authorities pursued ýery lax monetary and 
fiscal policies. 
June 1995- August 1998: 
Monetary policy was tightened but fiscal policy remained lax 
stance is widely blamed for the August 1998 crisis. 
August 1998-February 1999: 
Monetary expansion increased to improve the fiscal situation. 
March 1999-Sept 2000: 
This fiscal 
Fiscal policy was tightened but monetary aggregates expanded at a higher rate 
than target levels. 
Sept 2000-2002: 
Continued improvement in the fiscal situation, with budget surpluses recorded 
for the first time in post-Soviet history. Inflation continued to grow in two- L_ 
digit levels, exceeding target levels. In 200 1, tax rates were reduced to a flat 
rate of 13%. 
Thus, despite years of trying to bring inflation down to one-digit levc1s. Russia I 
has failed. In addition, to stimulate income declarations and incrcasc revenues. the 
official rate of tax was reduced to a flat rate of 13% in 200 1- ThcL! outcomes 
correspond to one of less non-native results of our model. That is, under botli 
commitment and discretion the equilibrium rate of inflation II is higher, and the official 
rate of tax is lower. 
The rest of our theoretical results are non-native and impossible to test 
empirically with respect to Russia. However further study can be undertaken to test 
the results in a wider cross-sectional time series setting than is pen-nitted in this 
current work. 
5.7 Conclusion 
We introduce an unofficial corruption tax into a time inconsistency model of 
monetary policy. The corruption tax is positively related to the official rate of tax and 
has a negative impact on output. We show that the negative impact on output is 
greater under commitment than discretion because of a higher official tax rate. The 
equilibrium level of inflation is higher under both discretion and commitment. 
In addition we show that when preferences are not coordinated, discretion will 
be preferable to commitment as the gains from reduced inflation are far outwcIghed 
by the loss in output and government expenditure, and higher taxes. Both players, the 
fiscal authority and the central bank, are worse off under commitment. Thus. the 
movement from discretion to commitment is not a pareto improvement as at least one 
player is worse off 
We go ftirther and suggest that even when preferences are coordinated, L- 
discretion inay still be preferable to commitment as the gains from rcduced inflation 
may be out", cighed by the loss of output and government expenditure and higher 
taxes. At least one of the players, particularly the fiscal authontý', may be wor,, c off 
under commitnicnt. 
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The implications are that inflation-reduction in a corrupt economy has more 
severe consequences for output, inflation ýnd government expenditure than in a non- 
corrupt economy. This model may help explain why tighter monetary policies in 
many transition and developing countries, particularly Russi i lar, -, cr-than- 
ia, result in - 
expected output losses, higher-than-anticipated inflation, larger government budact 
deficits as planned expenditures exceed actual revenues, and lower tax rates. 
We summarise Russia's monetary policies from 1992-2002 which seem 
plagued by inconsistencies. We suggest that one of the less non-native results of our 
model, that corruption causes higher inflation and lower official taxation, appears to 
hold in the Russian context. 
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Chapter 6 
Conclusion 
6.1 Conclusions and Prospective Future Research 
The primary objective of this thesis has been to contribute to the debate of the 
reasons behind Russia's poor economic perfon-nance in its first decade after the fall of 
communism by examining the role of IMF economic programs in the reforrn process. 
In particular, we are interested in the failure of neo-classical models of the market 
economy, upon which economic refon-n programs were based, to predict the outcomes 
in Russia. 
We have offered a number of theoretical models which incorporate specific 
characteristics of the Russian economy, such as the political conflict within both tile 
IMF and the Russian government regarding the reform programme, large-scale publlc 
sector corruption, a substantial underground economy, and a weak tax ba, ýc. c 
analysc thesc models in relation to outcomes in Russia and fiiid that the theoretical 
models are capable predictim, the failings in the I%IF-Rus,, ia cconornic reform tN -- 
proo, mm. 1ý 
Is') 
In chapter 2, we analyse the role of multilateral lending in Russia's ret'orm. 
We suggest that during conditional development lending, especially In the case Of 
Russia, the IMF has released further tranches of loans without the full implementation 
of the conditions attached to the loan. We suggest that this is the result of a feature ot 
conditional development lending that may tempt the recipient to rene(-, e on its 
promises to comply with conditions, and which cannot be resolved by releaslii-g the 
loans in tranches. 
We suggest that the recipient is, in fact, aware that the donor is rnotlvýitcd not 
just by economic considerations but by its own political interests in the conditional 
development lending process, and that these political incentivcs are a factor in 
deten-nining the donor's degree of tolerance of non- compliance with economic 
reforrn programmes. Thus there ensues a game in which the recipient, awýire that tile 
donor has political motivations, attempts to undertake the least le\-cl of coniphance 
that guarantees it future loans, and the donor adopts a punishment strategy consisteilt 
with its political and economic motivations. 
We model the static two-period game between the recipient and donor, in 
which the recipient chooses its level of compliance with policy conditions and the 
donor decides whether or not to extend further financing. We solve for the suboanic Lý 
perfect Nash equilibrium by backwards induction. This yields many lcndiiw, - 
compliance equilibria depending on the values of the parameters in the payotT 
functions. 
With so many lending-compliance options, and because it faces intemal 
conflict in detcri-nining its lending options, xve propose that a lender may attempt to 
create ruleS Undcr which lending decisimis are made to regulate the internal conflict. 
These niles are decided in an exo(-, -cnous conflict bctween politics and ccotiomics thlit 
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takes place within the donor agency as to the circumstances under %\-hich punishment 
levied. This conflict, in effect, detennines the donor's degree of tolerance for policy 
slippages. The rules which arise from the intra-donor conflict, while permitting sonic 
discretion over which transgressions to punish, help to regulate the internal conflict b%- 
providing a framework of action within which to work. The rules of thumb help fix 
the value of 7r in relation to 6. 
We suggest three main types of rules that arise from the politics-economics 
split within the donor agency. The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for each tý'pe of 
rule is solved by backward mduction. 
With Rule 1, No re-lending, no level of compliance is sufficient to ensure 
further financing. The equilibrium for this rule is dqfi7idt, withhold. That is, the 
lender will always choose to withhold further finance and the recipient will always 
choose to default. 
With Rule 2, Reward on1j, fidl compliance, the lender has no tolerance for 
policy slippages, and will punish any deviation from a full compliance strategy on the 
part of the recipient. A donor that acts like this may be adopting a partludarly strict 
political stance with respect to this country, perhaps because it is not co-operating on 
key international political/ human rights agreements. If the donor has a "reward oiflý- 
full compliance" rule, then the recipient will choose to be fully compliam if the value 
of discounted future loans are of greater benefit to it than the immediate political 
benefits of non-compliancc, and will choose to be non--comphant if not. 
I t, tile 
i-ccipicrit is fully compliant, the donor will offer further finance. 
It' the recipient is 
non--compliant, the donor will withhold further financc. 
With Rule . 3), 
Leniency, the donor has tolerance for policy slippagcs dependim-, 
on the circurnstanccs of the recipient country Unlike vvith 
Rules (I) and (2), flicre is 
I 
1ý 
the possibility (y) of receiving further finance for non- compliance. We find that if 
the donor punishes recipients who implement less than 100"o of the conditions 
attached to the loan with a probability of y, then the recipient xvill choose to fully 
comply with conditions as long as value of discounted future loans exceeds the 
immediate political gain from policy slippage. If the gain from policy slippa, -, e 
exceeds the cost associated with the loss of further finance, the recipient ývill be nm- 
compliant. The recipient's choice of compliance level depends on the discount rate 
attached to the future loan, the political costs of compliance, and on the probability of 
punishment. 
Our model differs from existing theories in explicitly allowing the lender and 
recipient to face a trade-off between political and economic interests within its 
organisation which affect the degree of slippage or the tolerance of policy slippages. 
Furthen-nore, the adoption of "rules of thumb" allow the donor to behavc differently to 
two countnes that implement the same proportion of required conditions, or to one 
country which implements the same proportion of required conditions over two 
different time periods. 
We go further and discuss how the game between Russia and the INIF has 
elements of the game modelled in Section 2.3. In particular, we propose that froin 
1992-1998 the game between the two players had elements of Rule 3 (Lenienc-0 
where the probability of punishment was very low. From Januarý, 1999 - September 
1999, the rules of the game seemed to change with the IMF adopting a hard line 
stance xvith regards to the last tranche of a loan. ThIs "game" corrc,, ponded to 
clernents of Rule 2 (rcivarel onli, jull compliance). Then ti'orn the end of Scpternber 
1999 till December 31" 1999 (NN, hcii President Yeltsin re,,,, -, ned), the game 
bet%%-ecn 
tile two plavers corresponded to Rule I (No Re-Icndin, -, ). 
Since the year 2000. we 
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propose that the game has once again reverted to the one that takes place under Rule 
3, but with a higher probability of punishment. 
In chapter 3, we analyse the contribution of fiscal policN to Russia's relatively 
poor economic performance since it began market reforms in 1992. We concentrate 
on the consequences for employment, output and taxation revenues of fiscal pohcý- 
induced changes in bureaucratic corruption in an economy with a larilc shadm% 
economy. This allows us to discuss the consequences of some of the fiscal policies 
adopted by the Russian authorities during its transition to a market economy 
The first policy we consider is reduced public sector spendin(.,, in partICUlar the 
running up of public sector wage arrears, because the spending tar, -, cts of the Rus, ýian 
authorities often exceeded its revenue-raising abilities in 1992-1999. Since the \car 
2000, the Russian authorities have concentrated on paying back arrears and c\cn 
increasing public sector wages which had been eroded by years ot'high inflation. 
The second policy we consider is the policy of high taxes on \ýagcs. Ru,, sian 
authorities have recently imposed a ]-')'O, o flat rate of income tax in an attempt to 
encourage people to disclose hidden earnings. 
We build a three-sector model compnsing a corrupt bureaucrac\, shado\\ scctor 
and legitimate private sector. We use a modified Cobb Douglas model in \ýhich there 
are two labour inputs- bureaucratic input and legitimate priNate ýcctor inpUt tO 
separate out not only their respectiNe contributions to output in the cconomý'. but ako 
ýcparately from to anak'se \ariations in legitimate pn\ate sector emploNment s -1 
bureaucratic employment \\hich is constant in the period in question In the model. 
We model corruption as a proportional tax on the income of leuitimate pmate 
sector workers. Wc define the cw-i-upf, on e//cci as the nept I i\C I nipact ofan incrca,, c 
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in corruption on legitimate private sector employment and output. A crucial 
assumption is that bureaucrats are seeking to maintain a constant predeten-nined wage 
which is composed of their official and unofficial (corrupt) wage. This differs from 
the standard literature in which the rent-seeking behaviour of bureaucrats stcrns from 
their desire for a higher wage. 
We suggest that some of the budgetary policies pursued by the Russian 
government, namely reduced spending and increased taxation resulted in an iiicFcase 
in the corruption tax and an associated decrease in employment, output and taxation 
revenues. 
We also suggest that while in general the corruption effect of increased taxation 
and inflationary finance exceeds that of reduced spending, if reduced speiiding results L- 
in wage arrears to public bureaucrats then the corruption effect of reduced spcilding 
will exceed that of either increased taxation or inflationary finance. 
We suggest a negative association between legitimate private sector employment 
and corruption. Further research to test the empirical basis of these associations could 
be undertaken. 
This paper discusses the results of the chapter in light of Russia's experience. We 
find that despite the lack of enough empirical evidence to provide concrete 
correlations between the variables, some of the results appear to hold. 
This paper also raises questions about the optimal official rate of tax in the 
presence of an unofficial tax on wages. The optimal rate of tax will depend on 
corruption and on the risk of detection for shadow sector activities. A rcductlon in the 
it crowding out" of private investment through reduced go%-ernmeiit cxpenditure may 
be offset by an nici-casc in corruption. 
Iss 
This paper recommends widening the tax base as the least distortiomiry method 
of improving the budget deficit. Other policy recommendations are made, including 
wage indexation for bureaucrats and ensuring that the real net wage of bureaucrats is 
increased before structural adjustment programmes are implemented. 
In chapter 4, we examine the optimality of Russia's monetary policy in the 1990s. 
Specifically we focus on the consequences for inflation, output, and taxation of non- 
coordinated monetary and fiscal policies in an economy with an independent central 
bank and a weak tax base. The model is applied specially to the Russian context. 
Our model is a modified version of the model by Alesina and Tabellini (1987) 
which suggests that when policies are non-coordinated and the central bank is 
independent, then policymakers are better off in regime with discretion rather than 
commitments. When policies are coordinated, policyrnakers are better off under 
commitments. 
We consider two non- consecutive periods in Russia when the central bank could 
not, or did not raise public debt to finance the budget deficit. For the first period 
under consideration, 1992-94, Russia had an independent central bank which had 
different preferences to the fiscal authority and policy was noncoordinated. 
According to the model, policy shc)uld have been discretionary. In fact, policy was 
discretionary with fairly disastrous consequences for inflation. We suggest that the 
reason for this was that the central bank attached a lower weight to inflation reduction 
than the fiscal authofity, and this violated one of the underlying assumptions of the 
modcl. The authorities were collecting too much revenue In the forni of Inflation and 
too little in the fon-n of taxation. This analysis sheds new light on the lar, 2c output t'311 
experienced by Russia during this period. It suggests that in the period 1992-94 in 
in OUtPLIt would Russia when GDP growth fell by about minus 12 per cent, the fall i 
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have been even greater if the central bank had been averse to inflation. That is, things 
were not as bad as they could have been. 
For the second period under consideration, post August 17 1998, the central bank 
remained committed to a low inflation policy, the CB had different (more inflation- 
averse) preferences to the FA, and policy was uncoordinated. The model sua(yests 
that policy should in fact have been discretionary as authorities are collecting too littic 
in the fon-n of seigniorage and too much in the fon-n of distortionary taxation. The 
analysis suggests that Russia's current policy of a committed central bank may mean 
that output is too low. It appears that the efforts of the Russian authorities to improve 
taxation revenues by increasing tax collection rates rather than tax rates may have 
delayed the impact of a committed central bank on output. This model suggests 
however, that once tax collection is as perfect as it can be, tax rates will have to be 
increased if the central bank remains committed to a low inflation policy and this ý%, Ill 
have a negative effect on output. The model suggests that the optimal policy would 
now in fact be discretionary policy. 
We suggest that improving tax collection rates increases taxation re% enues 
without the distorting influence on the labour market and output. This is the strategy 
that has been adopted by the Russian authorities in recent years. 
We also briefly analyse the causes and consequences of a vao, ing tax collection 
rate. In an economy where the tax base vanes with the rate of taxation, discretion 
may be even more preferable to commitment when the FA and CB havc dfferent 
prefercrices as it involves a lower rate of distortionary taxation than commitment. 
In an inadequately indexed cconomy, an increase in inflation results in a fall in 
the tax collection rate as there is more shadow sector work and/ or corruption. This 
negatively affects registered output. ThLIS if the tax collection ratc is riegatively 
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related to the rate of inflation, commitment to low inflation ma-v be superior to 
discretion even if the CB and FA have different preferences. 
In chapter 5, we focus on the consequences of corruption for inflation, output, 
and taxation in an economy with non- coordinated and coordinated monetar---v and 
fiscal policies and an independent central bank. 
Our model is based the one by Alesina and Tabellini (1987) which sLiggcsts that 
where the monetary and fiscal authorities have the same objectiN, e function, binding 
commitments to policies can be welfare- improving, but where the authorities liýiý'c 
different preferences then a discretionary regime mav be better. Their argument 
differs from the standard time inconsistency analysis prior to 1987 where binding 
commitments made by the central bank were seen as necessarily preferable to a 
discretionary regime. 
In this paper we show that in the presence of corruption the output loss associated 
with commitment ivill outweigh the benefits of lower inflation when the preferences 
of the central bank and fiscal authority are not coordinated. Even when prcferenccs 
are coordinated, it mcýv be the case that the output loss associated with commitment 
may be too great when compared with the benefits of lower inflation. These results 
are contrary to those of existing models of time inconsistency which suggest that 
binding commitments are necessanly preferable to discretion, especially %ýhen 
preferences are coordinated (for example, Beetsma and Bovenberg, 1997). 
We model corruption as a proportional tax on the total revcnucs of finns. The 
proceeds of the corruption tax, unlike those of the official tax, do not go into 
govcmment coffers. We model the corruption tax as a positive function of the official 
tax rate. The higher the official tax, the highcr the comption tax levied bV PLIblIC 
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bureaucrats in order to supplement their decreasing official net wage, and the lower is 
output. 
We show three main results. Firstly, as the corruption tax has a negative impact 
on output and rises as the official tax rate rises, the output loss under COMMItTlIent 
exceeds that under discretion because official tax rates are higher. Secondly, for both 
discretion and commitment, optimal output, taxation and government expenditure are 
lower, and inflation is higher. Thirdly, for both discretion and commitment the loss of 
output and the nse in inflation is less when preferences are coordinated than \\-Iicn 
they are not coordinated. 
We show that when preferences are not coordinated, discretion %vill be pi-cferable 
to commitment as the gains ftom reduced inflation are far outwcighed by the loss in 
output and government expenditure, and higher taxes. Both players, the fiscal 
authority and the central bank, are worse off under commitment. Thus the movement 
t- rom discretion to commitment is not a pareto improvement as at least one player is 
worse off. 
We go ftirther and suggest that even when preferences are coordinated, discretion 
may be preferable to commitment as the gains from reduced inflation may be 
outweighed by the loss of output and govemment expenditure and higher taxes. At 
least one of the players, particularly the fiscal authority, may be worse off under 
commitment. 
A possible solution to this problem Involves allowing pollc\, to remain 
discretionary, unless corruption is minimised through increasing bureaucratic wa, -, cs 
in line with tax increases. 
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One of the implications of our model is that inf! at ion-- reduction in a corrupt 
economy has more severe consequences for output, inflation and goN-ernment 
expenditure than in a non-corrupt economy. This model may help explain whv t4:; htcr 
monetary policies in many transition and developing countries, particularly Russia, 
result in hrger-than- expected output losses, higher-than-- anticipated inflation, larl-'C F 
government budget deficits as planned expenditures exceed actual FCN-enues, and 
lower tax rates. Indeed when we briefly examine Russia's attempts at lo\venng 
inflation over the first decade of transition, we note that inflation is still above one- 
digit targets and the official tax rate has had to be lowered to improve tax revenues. 
Resolving the problem of corruption in Russia is imperative, and in the abseTice 
of complete eradication, higher bureaucratic net wages which rise in line with tax 
increases. 
The models in this thesis have been built on the assumption that mistakes where 
make in the design and implementation of the reform programme. and that both 
Russia and the IMF had political motivations which sometimes conflicted with 
economic logic. One aspect of IMF reforms in Russia that we have not discussed in 
this paper is the consensus that neither Russia nor the IMF is to blame for the failure 
of reforms. After seventy years of central planning and huge market distortions it ýý as 
not possible to reform the economy in the short- or medium-term. 
Indeed, Russia has often been accused of not being "reformable" because of the 
legacy of central planning (for example, The 
E('0170MISt, 15 August 1992). Indeed, 
"Was the inheritance too crushing? Evei-i by post-communist standards Russia came 
with an unusually difficult economic legacy. The reformers inherited a budt-,, et deficit 
running at 3 I'/, o of GDP, foreign-exchange iesen-es doxn to three hours-wori io 
193 
import cover, and a collapse of trade with Soviet republics. The industrial base was 
huge and loss-making. Monopolies choked the economy. Nothing had been done to 
refon-n agriculture, a central failing of Mikhail Gorbachev's" (The Economist, '9 
January 1994). 
Additionally, Russia had little experience of private ownership and little exposure 
to the free market system. The IMF has admitted that the legacy of central planning 
has contributed to the failure of refon-ns in Russia. A Camdessus, the fornier 
Managing Director of the IMF, suggests that the failure results from "70 ycars of 
central planning and the incomplete implementation of reforrn policies- itself a ivsult 
of a lack of domestic political consensus on reform" (Camdessus, September 13, 
1999). 
Furthen-nore Russia had to build a democracy from scratch which is a major 
undertaking at any time. Schleifer and Treisman (1998) suggest that Russia's 
experience of reforrn results from it "undergoing democratic and economic reform 
simultaneously" (p. 8). They suggest that an qppropriate design of reform policies 
which takes institutions, interest groups, and the characteristics of the leader into 
account could have overcome the political opposition and institutional blockages that 
Russia experienced. 
Prospective future theoretical and empirical work has been detailed where 
possible in each chapter. For instance, in chapter 2, we suggest that the tlieoretical 
model of conclitionality would be richer if either repeated games or games with 
incomplete infon-nation were considered. Morc representative utility functions, such 
as nonlinear utility functions, would also improve the analýýsis. In chapter '). future 
work would mainiv be empirical as sufficient data for Russia beconics availabIc to 
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test some of the interesting results and propositions of this chapter. In particular, 
establishing the empirical relationship between unemployment and corruption would 
be of some importance, especially for developing and transition economies. Chapters 
4 and 5 do not lend themselves easily to empirical investigation. Howcver, future 
work would try to establish whether higher inflation rates are in fact related to higher 
corruption levels. 
I 
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